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The Soundness of Financial Intermediaries 
Like all corporations, financial intermediaries' are subject to a com- 
plex system of legal regulation. Much of the regulation of ordinary 
industrial corporations is directed at ensuring full disclosure of 
relevant information to investors. Stockholders and other investors 
may then choose whether to take certain risks. By contrast, the regula- 
tion of financial intermediaries also limits the risks associated with 
the investment itself. Some regulation is aimed at ensuring that the 
intermediaries are "sound," i.e., not in danger of failure because of 
illiquidity or insolvency. Other legal techniques are designed to cope 
with failure and other unsound conditions when they do occur. The 
purpose of this article is to examine the major legal strategies for 
regulating the riskiness of financial intermediaries. Part I introduces 
the agencies involved in the regulation of financial intermediaries. 
Part II discusses the reasons for having any governmental regulation 
of the risk levels at which financial intermediaries operate. Part III 
classifies the four principal strategies employed by the law to deal with 
the liquidity and solvency of financial intermediaries, and attempts to 
determine the general virtues and drawbacks that inhere in each of 
these strategies. No effort is made to assess all the particular rules and 
alternatives that are possible within a single strategy. This article 
1. For an introductory discussion of the causes of financial intermediation and basic 
descriptions of the various types of intermediaries, see Clark, The Federal Income Taxa- 
tion of Financial Intermediaries, 84 YALE L.J. 1603, 1605-08 & nn.l-21 (1975). 
Because differences among the three major genera of financial intermediaries become 
important at various points in this article, the following outline may be helpful: 
I. Depository-Type Financial Intermediaries 
A. Commercial Banks 
1. National Banks 
2. State Member Banks 
3. Insured Nonmember Banks 
B. Thrift Institutions 
1. Mutual Savings Banks 
2. Savings and Loan Associations (S&Ls) 
a. Federal S&Ls 
b. State S&Ls 
II. Insurance-Type Financial Intermediaries 
A. Life, Annuity, Health, and Accident Insurance Companies 
B. Pension Plans 
C. Property and Liability Insurance Companies 
III. Investment-Type Financial Intermediaries 
A. Investment Companies 
1. Closed-End Funds 
2. Open-End Funds 
B. Real Estate Investment Trusts 
Like all financial intermediaries, investment-type intermediaries rely on pooling tech- 
niques. See Clark, sup-a at 1607-08 (discussion of pooling). This characteristic relates 
them to depository and insurance institutions and sets them apart from broker-dealer 
firms. The latter offer their customers accounts to which units of specified financial 
assets are identified. These firms are financial intermediaries in a broad sense, but are 
not considered in this article. 
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deliberately takes a highly general approach in the belief that useful 
insights can be facilitated by a comprehensive vantage point. 
I. Prologue: Regulatory Agencies and Their Activities 
Before proceeding to the proposed analysis, it may be helpful to 
identify the principal agencies that regulate financial intermediaries 
and to describe, in general terms, their regulatory activities. Although 
the focus of this discussion will be on how these activities ensure 
soundness, some mention will be made of their role in achieving other 
legislative goals. 
The first group of financial intermediaries is made up of depository 
institutions-commercial banks and thrift institutions. Commercial 
banks, which comprise the largest class of financial intermediaries,2 are 
subject to multiple regulation; all but a few are affected by at least 
two agencies. Nationally chartered banks are under the primary super- 
vision of the Comptroller of the Currency, whose office is within the 
Treasury Department.3 The Comptroller receives periodic financial 
reports from national banks; he passes upon applications for charters, 
branches, and, if the product of a business combination is a national 
bank, mergers. The greatest number of employees under his direction 
are bank examiners, who periodically visit the premises of national 
banks. Examiners seek to evaluate the quality of a bank's assets and 
management, assess its overall financial condition, and test for com- 
pliance with particular rules and guidelines directed toward ensuring 
financial and managerial integrity. In addition, they check for com- 
pliance with equal employment opportunity legislation and with 
various laws and regulations aimed at consumer protection (e.g., truth- 
in-lending, equal credit opportunity, and fair credit reporting rules). 
Other employees of the Comptroller's office are responsible for formal 
enforcement proceedings against wayward banks. The Comptroller also 
performs, as to national banks, many functions similar to those of the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), though the SEC does 
have jurisdiction over bank affiliates and bank holding companies.4 
2. See J. WHITE, BANKING LAW 34-37 (1976) (structure of commercial banking). 
3. The work of the Comptroller of the Currency is fully and readably described in 
Responses by the Comptroller of the Currency to the FINE Study Questionnaire, in I 
STAFF OF HousE COMM. ON BANKING, CURRENCY AND HOUSING, 94th Cong., 2D SESS., 
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND THE NATION'S ECONOMY 301-461 (Comm. Print 1976) [com- 
mittee print hereinafter cited as FINE STUDY PAPERS]. 
4. 15 U.S.C. ?? 781(i), 78p, 78w (1970 & Supp. IV 1974); 15 U.S.C.A. ? 78m (West 1971, 
Supp. 1976 & June 1976 Pamphlet); 12 C.F.R. pts. 11, 16 (1976). 
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All national banks are members of the Federal Reserve System5 and 
are subject, inter alia, to its reserve requirements. 
Similar supervision, examination, and enforcement functions are 
performed by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 
(Board) with respect to state-chartered banks that are members of the 
System;6 by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) with 
respect to insured nonmember banks;7 and by the banking commis- 
sioners of the 50 states with respect to all state-chartered banks, 
whether or not they are members of the System or are FDIC-insured.8 
Various arrangements among the agencies reduce some of the wasted 
effort caused by dual (state and federal) regulation.9 
The Board must approve bank mergers when the resulting entity 
is a state member bank. It plays, as to those banks, a role under the 
federal securities laws similar to that of the SEC. The Board also makes 
all rules and dispenses regulatory approvals under the Bank Holding 
Company Act of 1956,10 regardless of the types of banks owned by 
holding companies. Of course, the Board and the 12 individual Federal 
Reserve Banks perform many functions other than those directed 
toward ensuring the soundness of depository institutions." 
Much of the regulatory effort adumbrated above has or appears to 
have the effect of protecting depositors against bank failures and 
comes within the main focus of this article. These bank depositors may 
be termed "public suppliers of capital" because they comprise a class 
whose members are extremely numerous, have similar legal rights, 
and are, on the average, of relatively modest means.'2 The word 
"capital" is used despite the fact that some would reserve it for funds 
formally committed to the long-term use of an enterprise, because the 
5. 12 U.S.C. ? 222 (1970). This article ignores national banks located in U.S. territories. 
6. For a full discussion of the Board's regulatory activities, see Board of Governors of 
the Federal Reserve System, Responses to the FINE Study Questionnaire, in I FINE 
STUDY PAPERS, supra note 3, at 463-666. 
7. The FDIC collects and dispenses deposit insurance funds and plays a crucial role 
in liquidating failed banks. On the activities of the FDIC, see J. WHITE, supra note 2, 
at 80-82, 715-21, 726-31, 755-74 (1976). 
8. See generally W. BROWN, THE DUAL BANKING SYSTEM IN THE UNITED STATES (1968); 
Wille, State Banking: A Study in Dual Regulation, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 733 (1966). 
9. See, e.g., J. WHITE, supra note 2, at 731 (discussing trial program in which FDIC 
has tried to decentralize bank examination procedure by relying on state examination 
reports of bank financial conditions). 
10. 12 U.S.C. ?? 1841-1850, 1971-1978 (1970 & Supp. IV 1974). 
11. Substantial portions of their resources are devoted to check clearing operations, 
creation and maintenance of the money supply, promulgation and enforcement of margin 
rules, and acting as the fiscal agent of the Treasury Department. 
12. See Clark, supra note 1, at 1616-18. 
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aggregate deposit funds of a particular bank are often reasonably 
stable and thus function as a de facto part of its capital structure. 
By contrast, a bank's stockholders are here denominated "elite sup- 
pliers of capital" because they are less numerous, typically wealthier, 
and supply a smaller portion of the funds used by banks. Bank stock- 
holders are the intended beneficiaries of the securities regulation ap- 
plicable to banks. Even though stockholders are not covered by deposit 
insurance, whatever reduction in the risk of bank failure is achieved 
by supervision and examination affects them. 
The thrift institutions-mutual savings banks, savings and loan as- 
sociations, and credit unions-are subject to regulatory rules and pro- 
cesses that are similar to those affecting commercial banks.13 There 
are even parallels in the organizational structure of the agencies. 
Savings and loan associations, for example, may be federally chartered 
or state-chartered; the latter are usually subject to dual regulation. 
There are three principal federal statutes that deal with savings and 
loan associations. One establishes a system of Federal Home Loan 
Banks14 that is analogous to the Federal Reserve System, though much 
more limited in the extent and scope of its operations. A second, the 
Home Owner's Loan Act of 1933,15 provides for the chartering of 
federal associations, thus creating a parallel to the much earlier Na- 
tional Bank Act.16 The third act, the National Housing Act,17 estab- 
lishes the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC), 
which closely mimics the FDIC. There are, however, differences be- 
tween the federal regulation of depository institutions and that of thrift 
institutions. Commercial banks are regulated by three distinct federal 
agencies, which sometimes interpret the same laws differently.18 The 
laws affecting thrift institutions are, by contrast, basically administered 
by one supreme organ, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB).19 
Another critical difference is that the laws affecting savings and loan 
associations have as an additional goal the promotion of mortgage loans 
for the purchase of residences. This difference is reflected in dissimilar 
asset restraints, and in the differences between the Federal Home Loan 
13. See ABA HANDBOOK OF SAVINGS AND LOAN LAW (1973); T. MARVELL, THE FEDERAL 
HOME LOAN BANK BOARD (1969). Both of these sources are out of date with respect to 
various technical matters, but they give a good overview. 
14. Federal Home Loan Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. ?? 1421-1449 (1970 & Supp. IV 1974). 
15. 12 U.S.C.A. ?? 1461-1470 (West 1969 & Supp. 1976). 
16. Act of June 3, 1864, ch. 106, 13 Stat. 99 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). 
17. National Housing Act, tit. IV, 12 U.S.C. ?? 1724-1730f (1970 & Supp. IV 1974). 
18. See Hackley, Our Baffling Banking System, 52 VA. L. REV. (pts. 1-2), 565, 771 
(1966); Robertson, Federal Regulation of Banking: A Plea for Unification, 31 LAW & CON- 
TEMP. PROB. 673 (1966). 
19. 12 U.S.C. ?? 1437, 1464(a), 1,725(a) (1970). 
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Banks and the Federal Reserve Banks in patterns of advances to mem- 
ber institutions.20 
The second group of financial intermediaries consists of life insur- 
ance companies, property and liability insurance companies, and pen- 
sion plans. The former two are regulated almost exclusively by state 
law.21 In this way they are unlike depository institutions. Even so, 
the functions of the insurance commissioners of the various states 
bear striking resemblances to those of banking regulators.22 Most 
importantly, insurance regulators periodically conduct on-site, inten- 
sive examinations of the financial condition of insurance companies. 
They also receive financial reports from these companies and pass 
upon applications for charters, mergers, and holding company ac- 
quisitions. One significant disparity between insurance companies 
and banking institutions is that insurance companies are allowed by 
law to operate in more than one state, while banks usually are not. 
An insurance company wishing to do business in another state must 
meet the entry conditions imposed by the state's insurance commis- 
sioner. When those conditions take the form of statutory restraints 
on the investments of insurance companies, as in New York, they may 
have a far-reaching impact on the use of insurance company funds.23 
The public suppliers of capital to insurance companies are policy- 
holders. Since the policyholders are also the companies' customers, 
regulation promoting soundness and regulation protecting consumers 
generally protect the same persons, though in different ways. More- 
20. See pp. 37-38, 99-100 & note 125 infra. 
21. See H. DENENBERG et al., RISK AND INSURANCE 461-501 (1964); S. HUEBNER, K. 
BLACK & R. CLINE, PROPERTY AND LIABILITY INSURANCE 558-81 (1968); C. KULP & J. HALL, 
CASUALTY INSURANCE 958-1033 (1968); Kimball, The Purpose of Insurance Regulation: A 
Preliminary Inquiry in the Theory of Insurance Law, 45 MINN. L. REv. 471 (1961). Al- 
though state regulation controls the relationship between insurer and insured, the federal 
securities laws apply to the relationship between the insurer and the holder of its se- 
curities. SEC v. National Securities, Inc., 393 U.S. 453 (1969). 
22. Insurance commissioners concern themselves, as do bank regulators, with goals 
other than the soundness of the regulated companies. They enforce compliance with 
rules prohibiting certain kinds of policy provisions and requiring others. Many engage in 
ratemaking partially to protect policyholders against excessive premiums. Insurance 
commissioners may license and police the activities of insurance brokers and agents, and 
they may administer schemes-such as assigned risk pools-calculated to make insurance 
available to certain classes of people. A significant amount of uniformity in law and 
regulatory practice has resulted from the efforts of the National Association of Insurance 
Commissioners (NAIC), but important variations persist. For general descriptions of 
commissioners' activities directed toward goals other than soundness, and of the role of 
the NAIC, see H. DENENBERG et al., supra note 21, at 479-81, 487-91, 496-98; S. HUEBNER, K. 
BLACK & R. CLINE, supra note 21, at 564-65, 568-69; C. KULP & J. HALL, supra note 21, at 
970-76, 986-99, 1023-26. 
23. See, e.g., Note, The Effect of New York Statutory Restrictions Upon Life Insurance 
Investments in Common Stock, 27 ALB. L. REV. 97, 98 (1963). 
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over, many insurance companies are mutual in form, and thus lack 
elite suppliers of capital. 
Private pension plans are similar to life insurance companies in im- 
portant respects. From the consumer's viewpoint, a pension fund's 
provision for retirement is analogous to life insurance's provision for 
death. Liabilities are long-term and susceptible to fairly accurate 
actuarial estimation. But pension plans do differ in the way they are 
created, funded, administered, and "marketed" to public suppliers of 
capital.24 
Pension plans are classifiable as insurance-type intermediaries, yet 
they are basically subject to federal regulation rather than state or 
dual regulation. The dominant statute, the Employee Retirement In- 
come Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), assigns regulatory authority to 
both the Department of Labor and the Internal Revenue Service.25 
The statute does not provide for a massive examination effort similar 
to that traditionally applied to depository-type and insurance-type 
intermediaries. Rather it stresses full reports and public disclosure,26 
a graduated assortment of remedies (including civil fines),27 and ready 
access to the courts for plan participants (the public suppliers of 
capital) and beneficiaries.28 Nevertheless, ERISA contains substantive 
rules aimed at plan soundness which parallel those applied to the 
institutions previously discussed-strenuous funding rules and fiduciary 
standards,29 aimed at financial and managerial integrity respectively, 
24. In its most common form, a pension plan is created by an employer company, by 
a union, or by a company and the union that represents the employees. The employer 
then makes contributions to the plan on behalf of the participating employees. Fund 
assets are usually managed by a bank trust department, though they may also be 
managed by an insurance company or an investment advisory firm. When a fund is 
managed by a bank or an insurance company, it may benefit indirectly from regulatory 
examinations of those institutions. In a sense, then, trusteed plans and insured plans are 
regulated by banking and insurance commissioners. Employees do not shop around for 
pension plans, as they often do for banks; particular plans are attached to particular 
jobs or to membership in a particular union. See generally D. MCGILL, FUNDAMENTALS OF 
PRIVATE PENSIONS (3d ed. 1975). 
On the federal regulation of pension plans, see H.R. Rep. No. 93-533, 93d Cong., 1st 
Sess., reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4639; H.R. CONF. REP. No. 93-1280, 
93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5038; Comment, 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974: Policies and Problems, 26 SYRACUSE 
L. REV. 539 (1975). 
25. Pub. L. No. 93-406, [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 935 (codified principally 
at 29 U.S.C. ?? 1001-1381 (Supp. IV 1974) (Department of Labor) and in scattered sections 
of 26 U.S.C. (Internal Revenue Service)). 
26. See ERISA ?? 210-211, 29 U.S.C. ?? 1021-1031 (Supp. IV 1974). 
27. See id. ?? 501, 502, 29 U.S.C. ?? 1131, 1132 (Supp. IV 1974) (remedies). 
28. See id. ? 502(a), 29 U.S.C. ? 1132(a) (Supp. IV 1974) (persons empowered to bring 
civil suit). 
29. See id. ?? 301-306, 29 U.S.C. ?? 1081-1086 (Supp. IV 1974) (funding rules); id. 
?? 401-414, 29 U.S.C. ?? 1011-1114 (Supp. IV 1974) (fiduciary standards). 
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and a guaranty fund for dealing with plan terminations.30 
The third group of financial intermediaries includes both invest- 
ment companies and real estate investment trusts (REITs). Invest- 
ment companies, though chartered under state law, are usually reg- 
ulated by the SEC under the Investment Company Act of 1940.31 That 
Act emphasizes reporting and disclosure, stringent conflict of interest 
rules, regulation of advisory fees and sales loads, prevention of fraud- 
ulent or unfair sales practices, adherence to announced investment 
policies, and simple and sound capital structures.32 (Capital structure 
regulation is so severe that it virtually eliminates worries about invest- 
ment company soundness in the formal sense of freedom from danger 
of insolvency: because of the limitations on debt an open-end invest- 
ment company33 could hardly ever "fail" in a discrete sense. It could, 
however, shrink catastrophically in value, causing great loss to its 
public shareholders.) There is no regular examination effort or 
guaranty fund, and asset restraints are minimal. As in the case of 
REITs,34 regulatory protection against the consequences of unsound- 
ness is far from complete. Yet at least the investment companies are 
intruded upon more than ordinary public corporations.35 
In summary, financial intermediaries are subject to disparate pat- 
30. See id. ?? 4001-4004, 4021-4023, 29 U.S.C. ?? 1301-1304, 1321-1323 (Supp. IV 1974). 
Goals other than plan soundness are sought to be served, for significant provisions man- 
date meaningful disclosure of benefits and rights to plan participants, lay down participa- 
tion rules to prevent discrimination against certain kinds of employees, and establish 
vesting standards analogous to the nonforfeiture laws applicable to insurance policies. 
See Comment, supra note 24, at 566-80, 661-63. 
31. 15 U.S.C.A. ?? 80a-1 to 80a-52 (West 1971, Supp. 1976 & June 1976 Pamphlet) (in- 
cludes exceptions to registration requirements for small companies). 
32. An excellent introduction to the operation and regulation of investment companies 
appears in SEC REPORT ON THE PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF INVESTMENT COMPANY 
GROWTH, H.R. REP. No. 2337, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 33-77 (1966). This document does not, 
however, discuss the changes made by the Investment Company Amendments Act of 
1970, Pub. L. No. 91-547, 84 Stat. 1413 (codified principally in 15 U.S.C. ch. 2D). 
33. An open-end investment company, commonly known as a mutual fund, issues 
equity securities that may be redeemed at the option of the shareholders. 15 U.S.C. 
? 80a-5(a) (1970). Open-end investment companies are not permitted to issue senior 
securities, and borrowings from banks must meet a 3000% asset-coverage test. Id. ? 80a- must ~~ ~ /0agte.Id 
18(f). This might be termed a restriction on "technical" debt because the investment 
company's obligation to its shareholders has at least one characteristic that is reminiscent 
of some debt relationships: a shareholder may at any time force the company to redeem 
his shares at their current net asset value. Id. ?? 80a-2(a)(32), 80a-5(a)(l). Ordinarily, it 
takes a corporate decision, or a majority vote of shareholders, to effect a redemption. 
34. See generally Aldrich, Real Eslate Investment Trusts: An Overview, 27 Bus. LAW. 
1165 (1972); Carroll, Tax Policy for the Real Estate Investment Trusts, 28 TAx L. REV. 
299 (1973); Polubinski, The Effect of State Securities or Blue Sky Law Regulation Upon 
the Organizational Structure and Operations of Real Estate Investment Trusts, 30 Bus. 
LAW. 179 (1974); Note, Real Estate Investment d rust: State Tax, Tort, and Contract 
Liabilities of the Trust, Trustee, and Shareholder, 71 MICH. L. REV. 808 (1973). 
35. As Professor Loss observes, the Investment Company Act is a regulatory statute, 
not just a disclosure statute. 1 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 144 (2d ed. 1961). 
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terns of regulation by a variety of governmental agencies. As Part 
III of this article will show, however, the substantive, risk-reducing 
regulations applied to each type of financial intermediary find many 
parallels in the regulations applied to other types of intermediaries. 
II. Reasons for Regulating the Riskiness 
of Financial Intermediaries 
The forms of regulation that are aimed, actually or ostensibly, at 
the problem of the soundness of financial intermediaries comprise an 
impressive and variegated list.36 Any general reflection upon the pro- 
tective regulation imposed on financial intermediaries is bound to 
mire in a swamp of technical concepts unless one first thinks persistent- 
ly about the reasons for such regulation. By "reasons" I do not mean 
causal or historical explanations, such as a tracing of the precise ways 
in which depressions37 and scandals38 have led to legislation; instead, 
I mean considerations that justify regulation.9 Nor need the reasons 
examined consist of those considerations actually voiced by legislators 
and regulators in support of extant rules. 
To evaluate various prima facie reasons for regulation, a heuristic 
procedure is to see if any one rationale can justify the full range and 
the general nature of existing regulatory shackles on risk taking. I 
consider first the hypothesis that protection is sought for some reason- 
36. The list would include: special initial capitalization requirements; special re- 
straints on entry; limitations on line of business and geographical expansion; regulation 
of product prices; subjection to special agency rules, examinations, and reporting re- 
quirements; restraints on the nature of assets in which the intermediary may invest and 
the valuation of such assets on financial statements; restraints on the nature, amounts, 
and valuation of liabilities issued by the intermediary; continuing capital requirements, 
liquidity reserves, special surplus funds; special conflict of interest rules; requirements or 
incentives to enter a special system for providing insurance to customers against the 
intermediary's financial failure; and special insolvency procedures (outside federal bank- 
ruptcy proceedings). 
37. The Great Depression of the 1930s was, of course, the setting for the enactment 
of significant banking legislation, such as the statutes cited in notes 14, 15, 17 stupra, the 
Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (codified in scattered sections of 12, 15, 39 
U.S.C.), and the Banking Act of 1935, ch. 614, 49 Stat. 684 (codified in scattered sections 
of 11, 12, 15, 39, 40 U.S.C.), as well as the federal investment company legislation, cited in 
note 31 supra. Among the better early commentaries on the banking legislation are 
Kress, The Banking Act of 1935, 34 MICH. L. REV. 155 (1935); Westerfield, The Banking 
Act of 1933, 41 J. POLITICAL ECON. 721 (1933); and Willis, The Banking Act of 1933 in 
Operation, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 697 (1935). 
38. Important insurance legislation in New York was the product of the Armstrong 
Investigation of 1905-1906. For a report of this legislative investigation, see 10 REPORT OF 
THE LEGISLATIVE INSURANCE INVESTIGATING COMMITTEE, N.Y. ASSEMBLY Doc. No. 41 (1906). 
Accounts of that investigation appear in M. KELLER, THE LIFE INSURANCE ENTERPRISE, 
1885-1910, at 245-92 (1963); and in 1 M. PUSEY, CHARLES EVANS HUGHES 140-68 (1951). 
39. I do not mean to imply that a study of how depressions and scandals have led to 
regulation would not reveal possible justifications for regulation. The point is that ex- 
planation and justification are distinct. 
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ably definable class of persons. I then explore the more elusive notion 
that the restrictions perform some vitally important economic function 
beyond protection of a particular class of persons. 
A. Protection for a Class of Persons 
1. Identification of the Class 
Typically, though not inevitably, the financial failure of a corpora- 
tion exacts its heaviest toll from the investors who supply capital to 
the enterprise-its debtholders and stockholders. The corporation's 
customers and suppliers of raw material may suffer from the disloca- 
tion of an established business relationship or from a loss on credit 
extended to the business, but ordinarily the burden of insolvency will 
fall most heavily on the shoulders of the investors. Were it not for 
the more intense regulation of financial intermediaries, their suppliers 
of capital would bear the heaviest losses in an insolvency. This fact 
prompts an inquiry into the ways in which the suppliers of capital to 
a financial intermediary are different from the investors in ordinary 
industrial corporations. 
Individual investors in the bonds and stocks of ordinary industrial 
corporations are predominantly from an elite group of persons who 
inhabit the higher brackets of income or wealth.40 By contrast, the 
bulk of capital supplied to financial intermediaries comes from per- 
sons, usually debtholders or quasi-debtholders,4' who are extremely 
numerous and, on the average, of modest means. The class of capital 
suppliers to financial intermediaries is truly public: it includes nearly 
every adult, rich or poor. One way to explain the far greater regulation 
of the riskiness of financial intermediaries as compared to ordinary 
corporations, then, is to note that the increased regulation is intended 
to protect truly public suppliers of capital, as opposed to what might 
be called elite suppliers of capital.42 
40. See Blume, Crockett & Friend, Stockownership in the United States: Characteristics 
and Trends, 54 SURVEY OF CURRENT Bus., Nov. 1974, at 16. 
41. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Flow of Funds Accounts 1965- 
1973 (1974 Supplement), at 29, 33 (Sept. 1974). (fAt the end of .973, households had 
$458 million in commercial banks. Equity capital of commercial banks was $41 million.) 
Bank depositors and insurance policyholders are creditors. Shareholders in open-end in- 
vestment companies might be looked upon as quasi-debtholders. See note 33 supra. 
42. Indeed, some aspects of the law even suggest limiting protection to the less elite 
members of a "public" class. For instance, FDIC insurance now protects depositors against 
loss to the extent of $40,000. 12 U.S.C. ?? 1813(m), 1817(i), 1821(a), 1821(i) (Supp. IV 1974). 
The same limit applies to accounts insured by the FSLIC and to accounts insured under 
the Federal Credit Union Act. 12 U.S.C. ?? 1724(b), 1728(a), 1787(c) (Supp. IV 1974). In this 
article, however, "public suppliers of capital" refers to a class that will include some 
extremely wealthy members. 
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To note this much is not very satisfying. Construed in terms of dif- 
ferences in the average socioeconomic characteristics of the classes of 
capital suppliers, the heavy regulation of financial intermediaries may 
constitute no more than a brute political fact,43 or the regulation might 
be justified by reference to unique characteristics of public suppliers 
of capital. One's attitude toward this heavy regulation should be 
greatly influenced by the reasons, if any, that public suppliers of capital 
are thought to need special protection beyond the full-disclosure 
morality that federal law imposes for the benefit of elite suppliers of 
capital.44 
2. Reasons for Protection 
One can identify five plausible reasons for special protection of a 
financial intermediary's public suppliers of capital. First, it can be 
argued that it is easier for insiders to steal from financial intermediaries 
than from ordinary corporations.45 It is difficult to assess the general 
truth of this statement. Nevertheless, it is perhaps indicative that an 
extraordinary percentage of the failures of financial intermediaries has 
been ascribed to fraud, self-dealing, and other forms of unsavory be- 
havior on the part of managements.46 General studies of business 
43. One could argue that successful political power exercised through lawful channels 
is a sufficiently fundamental justification of law, but I would not grant Thrasymachos 
even this much. 
44. The principal securities laws do not impose the kinds of substantive restraints on 
industrial corporations that are placed on financial intermediaries. See Securities Act of 
1933, 15 U.S.C.A. ?? 77a-77aa (West 1971, Supp. 1976 & June 1976 Pamphlet); Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.A. ?? 78a-78hh (West 1971, Supp. 1976 & June 1976 
Pamphlet). A species of what I call reactive regulation, see pp. 86-90 infra, is provided 
for the benefit of securities investors by the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, 15 
U.S.C. ?? 78o, 78aaa-78111 (1970 9c Supp. IV 1974), but this applies to investors in their 
role as customers of broker-dealer firms, which are financial intermediaries. See note 
254 infra. 
45. This perception may have been behind the imposition of a higher standard of 
care on the directors of such institutions. See W. CARY, CORPORATIONS 525 (4th ed. 1969); 
pp. 77-78 infra. 
46. According to an FDIC analysis of the 80 insured bank failures between January 
1, 1960 and December 31, 1975, the basic causes of failures were as follows: in 42 cases 
(52.5%) improper loans to officers, directors, or owner, coupled in some cases with loans 
to out-of-territory borrowers or misuse of brokered funds; in 24 cases (30%) defalcation, 
embezzlement, or manipulation; in 14 cases (17.5%) managerial weaknesses in loan 
portfolio and general asset management. Letter to author from C.F. Muckenfuss III, 
Special Assistant to the Director, FDIC (Mar. 4, 1976) (on file with Yale Law Journal). 
Failed banks tend to be relatively small though recent events certainly show that this is 
not a universal rule. Id. 
McKinsey & Company, Inc. analyzed the 230 insurance company insolvencies (101 life 
companies and 129 property-liability companies) that occurred between 1963 and 1972. 
Among life companies, the main cause of insolvencies was dishonest management (77% 
of the cases). The primary cause of property-liability insolvencies was underwriting losses 
(59%' of cases)-as one might expect, given the risky nature of such insurance. But dis- 
honest management and dishonest or bankrupt agents or reinsurers were substantial 
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failures, though not completely comparable, indicate that only a neg- 
ligible proportion of the business failures of ordinary industrial 
corporations is due to fraudulent and self-dealing conduct.47 More 
pointedly (since ordinary corporations fail more frequently) the rate 
of failures due to such conduct is lower than that for financial in- 
termediaries.48 Fraudulent conduct prevents capital suppliers from 
knowing fully the risks actually posed by a firm, and thus may prevent 
markets from working perfectly. In principle, if not in a particular 
context,49 insider misconduct could justify legal intervention on behalf 
of both public suppliers of capital to financial intermediaries and in- 
vestors in ordinary corporations. The issue concerns the kinds of legal 
factors, being the primary causes in 34% and 6% of the cases, respectively. McKinsey & 
Company, Inc., Final Report to National Association of Insurance Commissioners, 
Strengthening the Surveillance System 3-1 to 3-3 (Apr. 1974). Other studies of insurance 
company insolvencies are cited in Epton & Bixby, Insurance Guaranty Funds: A Reassess- 
rnent, 25 DEPAUL L. REV. 227, 227 n.2 (1976). 
By contrast, terminations of private pension plans do not seem to have been due in 
significant part to insider misconduct. See J. BROOKS, CoNFLlcrs OF INTEREST: CORPORATE 
PENSION FUND ASSET MANAGEMENT 5 (1975) (the comparatively few disastrous pension 
plan failures have rarely been result of fiduciary misconduct). Such concern as has been 
expressed has been directed principally to union-controlled funds, which are a small 
segment of all pension funds. See Arroyo v. United States, 359 U.S. 419, 426 (1959); 105 
CONG. REC. 6523 (1959) (Sen. McClellan). In a sense, this negative evidence may reflect little 
more than the institutional context of private pension plans. The typical plan defines 
the benefits employees are to receive and calls upon the employer company (eventually) 
to fund them. Insider misconduct could theoretically flourish to an enormous extent-up 
to the point where the employer company itself was threatened with bankruptcy by the 
misconduct-induced increase in required contributions. More plausibly, insider miscon- 
duct on the part of plan trustees (normally, bank trust departments) is kept below such 
levels by the combined policing activities of employer companies and regulatory 
authorities. In any event, there was sufficient dissatisfaction with the failure of pre- 
ERISA law that known breaches of fiduciary responsibility were disclosed in congressional 
hearings. See Private Welfare and Pension Plan Legislation: Hearings on H.R. 1045, 
H.R. 1046, & H.R. 16462 Before the General Subcomn. on Labor of the House Comm. on 
Education and Labor, 91st Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 470-72, 475 (1970) (sample of 22 selected 
pension fund scandals, and observations by Secretary of Labor). 
47. See I REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF UNITED STATES, 
H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 53-54 (1973). 
48. Using Dun & Bradstreet's list of the number of failures per 10,000 listed in- 
dustrial concerns over the period 1960-1975, one can compute an overall annual failure 
rate of 47.6 per 10,000 firms. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., The Business Failure Record 1975, 
at 2 (Sept. 1976). If data from the last three years of the period are representative, an 
average of 0.9% of the failures were due to fraud (the only category of insider miscon- 
duct listed); the average annual rate of failure due to fraud over the 16-year period is 
therefore 0.4 per 10,000 firms. Id. at 12; Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., The Business Failure 
Record 1974, at 12 (Oct. 1975); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., The Business Failure Record 
1973, at 12 (Aug. 1974). Based on the data in note 46 supra, and on an assumption that 
there was an average of about 14,000 insured banks during the period, see note 246 
infra, the average annual rate of bank failure due to insider misconduct was about 3 per 
10,000 banks-more than seven times as great. (The total failure rate of banks was only 
4 per 10,000. Perhaps soundness regulation works.) Obviously, there are serious problems 
as to the reliability and comparability of the data. See note 217 infra. 
49. In some contexts, effective legal intervention may be more costly than the social 
waste caused by fraud. 
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tools that are appropriate in each case, taking into account the greater 
incidence of misconduct affecting intermediaries. 
While many aspects of the regulation of financial intermediaries 
might be justified as appropriate responses to the misconduct prob- 
lem,50 it is nonetheless impossible to explain all or even most of such 
regulation on this basis.5' The inescapable fact is that much regulation 
is directed toward putting a ceiling on the risk level and regulating the 
types of risks that an honest management can deliberately take. 
A second reason that might be proffered for regulation is that the 
risk level of a financial intermediary, absent deposit insurance or a 
similar regulatory backstop, is peculiarly subject to being changed 
abruptly and without timely notice to the capital suppliers. An ordinary 
industrial corporation's assets consist largely of tangible property such 
as plant and equipment or of intangible but illiquid assets such as 
franchises, patents, and licenses. The assets are sufficiently illiquid 
in secondary markets,52 and their values sufficiently tied to their posi- 
tion in the business as a going concern, that a wholesale transformation 
of the asset composition of the business is extremely difficult to effect 
quickly and without notice to the company's investors. Indeed, the 
prototypical wholesale transformation, a formal or de facto merger 
into another firm, often requires lengthy negotiation and, as a matter 
of state corporation law, notice to and the consent of the company's 
investors.53 By contrast, a financial intermediary's assets consist of 
intangible claims, evidenced principally by pieces of paper or book- 
keeping and computer entries, which are often quite readily market- 
able. Absent special regulation, it would be easy for the management 
of an intermediary to sell off its intangible assets and replace them 
with new claims that in the aggregate constitute a portfolio with a 
radically different level of risk. The shift would occur in the "ordinary 
course of business," so to speak, without involving a merger or any- 
thing else invoking the usual right of investors to vote or to dissent 
50. See pp. 77-79 infra. 
51. The many techniques grouped under the headings of anticompetitive regulation 
and portfolio regulation, see notes 69, 83, 84, 86, 88, 89, 125-127 infra, are not directed at 
insider misconduct. And reactive regulation, see notes 246-248, 252, 260-264 infra, responds 
to problems regardless of their source. 
52. Secondary markets for tangible goods are those in which second-hand goods are 
bought and sold. Secondary markets for financial assets are those in which the financial 
assets are bought and sold after having been bought from the original issuers. Common 
stock of public companies, for example, is usually issued via what is referred to as the 
"primary" distribution process. It is then traded for many years on the secondary 
market. Mutual fund shares, by contrast, are usually bought through a primary distribu- 
tion network, and also sold (back to the fund) in that network. 
53. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, ? 251 (Michie 1974 & Stipp. 1975); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW 
? 903 (McKinney Supp. 1975-76); ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ? 73 (1969). 
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and pursue an appraisal remedy.54 A particularly clear example of 
how the perception of this possibility influences regulation is the 
provision in the Investment Company Act restricting (perhaps fruit- 
lessly) management's ability to change the investment objectives of an 
investment company.55 
There is a great deal of truth in the notion that financial inter- 
mediaries can shift their aggregate risk levels more readily than other 
corporations.50 But this does not justify protective regulation of in- 
termediaries. The "risk shiftability" argument assumes that, absent 
regulation, information about shifts and risks would be inadequately 
communicated to investors. Managements, for instance, might be 
fraudulent, careless, or simply unwilling to have their major deci- 
sions subjected to public scrutiny. Yet this affords a reason only 
for requiring management to disclose proposed changes in risk levels 
and to give public suppliers of capital an opportunity to opt out at a 
fair price.57 Current regulation goes far beyond requiring disclosure 
and a fair exit opportunity, and this necessitates a further probe: Why 
is this strategy apparently believed to be inadequate to protect the 
financial intermediary's public suppliers of capital? Some insight into 
possible answers is gained by considering the third reason for special 
protection of public suppliers of capital. 
The third possible reason for regulating the risk levels of financial 
intermediaries is that public suppliers of capital are systematically 
disadvantaged by significant imperfections in the market for their 
funds. One such imperfection may be that the costs of obtaining ac- 
curate, relevant, intelligible, and personally usable information about 
the risks of alternative investments in financial intermediaries is 
excessively high for many public suppliers of capital in relation to 
the amounts to be invested. For example, an elderly retired person 
about to invest $200 in a savings account at an unregulated savings 
54. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, ? 262 (Michie 1974); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW ?? 623, 
910 (McKinney 1963 & Supp. 1975-76); ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ?? 80, 81 (1969). 
55. 15 U.S.C.A. ? 80a-13 (West 1971 & Supp. 1976). 
56. It is possible that an ordinary industrial corporation could easily change its risk 
level by suddenly incurring an enormous amount of debt. This usually could be done 
without violating state corporation statutes. But for most public corporations it is 
reasonable to assume that the procedure would violate the terms of existing loan agree- 
ments with institutional lenders or otherwise would be difficult to execute unilaterally. 
57. The response of ordinary business corporation law to mergers may be taken as a 
paradigm: The shareholder is informed of the impending event, in most cases is given a 
vote on it, and, if he is in a minority voting against the transaction, is remitted to ap- 
praisal rights. See, e.g., Eisenberg, The Legal Roles of Shareholders and Management in 
Modern Corporate Decision Making, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (1969); Manning, The Share- 
holder's Appraisal Remedy: An Essay for Frank Coker, 72 YALE L.J. 223 (1962); Voren- 
berg, Exclusiveness of the Dissenting Stockholder's Appraisal Right, 77 HARV. L. REV. 
1189 (1964). 
15 
This content downloaded from 130.132.173.207 on Wed, 5 Jun 2013 13:25:13 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 86: 1, 1976 
and loan association might find that a substantial portion of the in- 
vestment, as well as a significant amount of time and effort, would be 
consumed were he to seek and obtain information relevant to the 
risk presented by the account. An expenditure of money for financial 
statements might itself be purposeless, if he lacks the sophistication 
and training necessary to assess such information properly. Presumably 
he would have to find and pay an expert to decipher the information 
so that it could be integrated with information about his total in- 
vestment portfolio and preferences. The total expenditures might well 
exceed the expected return from the $200 investment. While the 
example is extreme, similar market imperfections undoubtedly affect 
many public suppliers of capital.58 
High information costs might not justify protective regulation if one 
could confidently expect that services, such as those supplied in Con- 
sumer Reports (in the case of tangible goods) or by Moody's and 
Standard &- Poor's (in the case of securities), would spring up to obtain 
and process information about risk levels and translate it into recom- 
mendations specifically geared to particular types of public suppliers 
of capital. The market would thus produce efficient institutions for 
reducing information costs to an acceptably low level.59 Alternatively, 
if such information intermediaries did not flourish in an unregulated 
world, one might argue that this fact simply demonstrated that even 
the efficient cost of getting usable information to the public suppliers 
of capital exceeded the benefits to be gained from it. Thus, regula- 
tion would be undesirable. 
Both of these alternative viewpoints are flawed if, as seems quite 
possible, it is difficult to keep this information from those who do 
not pay for it. Information cast in terms usable to public suppliers of 
capital might be efficiently produced and delivered by one or more 
producers, might cause an overall benefit greatly in excess of the cost 
of production and delivery, and yet might not be privately supplied 
58. This inefficiency in the financial markets dealt in by public suppliers of capital 
contrasts sharply with the extraordinary efficiency of the capital markets in which 
financial intermediaries deploy their funds. See B. MALKIEL, A RANDOM WALK DOWN WALL 
STREET 170-75 (1973); Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical 
Work, 25 J. FINANCE 383 (1970). 
59. The means of paying for information intermediation pose interesting problems. 
The financial intermediaries conceivably could produce and distribute information at 
their own expense or (as in the case of ratings of industrial bonds by Moody's and 
Standard & Poor's) pay for the production of relevant, digested information, thus spread- 
ing the cost over all capital suppliers and/or customers of the intermediaries. One obvious 
difficulty with this approach is that the intermediaries, or the risk evaluators paid by 
them, might produce a great deal of fraudulent information. 
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because of the difficulty of preventing people from using it without 
paying for it.6O 
Let us assume that the relevant information about the risk posed 
by financial intermediaries to public suppliers of capital creates this 
difficulty. Does that fact, by itself, justify the kind of regulation of 
financial intermediaries that we have? Apparently not. The special 
character of the information seems to call only for a system of publicly 
sponsored or financed information intermediaries. Regulation goes far 
beyond that, for it seeks to control risks, not merely to convey informa- 
tion about them. 
One could respond to this last assertion by suggesting that existing 
regulations are justified because they are simply a cheaper way of 
getting the relevant information to the public suppliers of capital. 
Government, under this rationalization, has chosen to deal with in- 
formation costs in a heavy-handed way-by changing the information. 
When the resulting information is radically simple, the costs of com- 
municating it should be minimal. Thus, relatively small claims against 
banks, thrift institutions, insurance companies, and pension plans are 
made virtually riskless through regulation, and over time the public 
comes to know this fact. Even the most ignorant of public suppliers 
of capital, the one who would have to expend the greatest amount to 
be able to understand and use relevant information, knows that if he 
wants safety he can just put his money in the bank. 
This response is simply not plausible if meant to imply that sub- 
stantive risk-reducing regulation is the cheapest way to achieve the 
bare goal of reducing information costs. That goal could be achieved 
at a lower cost if the regulatory agencies used the reports they already 
receive and the examinations they currently conduct to provide in- 
formation to public suppliers of capital."' Making such use of existing 
60. The problem arises because it is difficult to prevent customers from sharing the 
information with other individuals. Even if the organizations which sold information 
about financial intermediaries were given a property right in that information, the costs 
of enforcing that right might be prohibitive. For a discussion of goods for which there 
are high exclusion costs, see D. WINCH, ANALYTICAL WELFARE ECONOMICS 119-22 (1971). 
61. The experience of Pennsylvania in supplying consumers with cost rankings of life 
insurance companies and their policies provides an example. See The Life Insurance 
Industry: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3, at 1515-59 (1973) (prepared statement and 
testimony of Herbert Denenberg, former Pennsylvania Insurance Commissioner). There 
seems to be little doubt that the Pennsylvania Insurance Department's Shopper's Guides, 
reproduced in id. at 1583, 1623, 1648, 1835, were understandable, though perhaps with 
some effort, by an average consumer. Id. at 1537. Although Mr. Denenberg claimed that 
the Insurance Department was being driven "into bankruptcy due to the tremendous 
demands for the guides," id. at 1537, and could adduce particular instances of confusing or 
high-cost policies that were withdrawn from the market because of the guides, id. at 
1749-52, some industry commentary reported that the overall sales impact of the life 
insurance guide wast minimal, id. at 1762. 
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data and evaluations would entail little additional cost. Yet current 
regulation imposes costs far beyond what is necessary for obtaining 
and processing information from intermediaries. For example, sig- 
nificant additional costs arise from restrictive rules concerning lines 
of business and the investment and financing options open to in- 
termediaries. 
Some might argue that many public suppliers of capital would not 
comprehend, or would deliberately ignore, even simple, consumer- 
oriented ratings of financial intermediaries supplied by a government- 
sponsored source. Accordingly, it might be urged that the only ef- 
fective way of communicating information to public suppliers of 
capital is by changing the institutions to make them so safe that only 
the simplest signals ("absolutely safe" or "not absolutely safe") are 
needed.62 
But this subtly recasts the argument and appeals to a different 
reason for regulatory activity. That some public suppliers of capital 
literally could not comprehend government-sponsored ratings of 
financial intermediaries, so that no expenditure of resources would 
enable them to understand, seems to be more properly characterized 
as a reflection of human finitude, not of information costs. Even 
though all persons have finite abilities, it is hard to imagine that many 
people could not understand some feasible but simple rating systems. 
It seems more likely that some public suppliers of capital will delib- 
erately ignore the ratings, apparently finding other uses of their time 
more productive. If we nevertheless feel a desire to protect them from 
the consequences of this choice, it would appear to reflect a belief 
that their preferences are wrong in some sense. If public suppliers of 
capital could not understand the ratings or if they would simply ignore 
the ratings, regulation is supported by appeals to personal imperfec- 
tions rather than market imperfections. Perhaps, then, though market 
imperfections are a source of the need for regulation of some kind, the 
general form of our actual regulatory system can only be justified, if 
at all, by reference to perceived personal imperfections. 
The fourth reason for governmental protection of public suppliers 
62. One might compare the experience with truth-in-lending, which some com- 
mentators allege to be a failure. See Brandt & Day, Information Disclosure and Con- 
sumer Behavior: An Empirical Evaluation of Truth-in-Lending, 7 U. MicH. J.L. REF. 297 
(1974) (higher hopes of truth-in-lending have not been fulfilled; despite rise in knowledge 
about interest rates among middle and upper-income groups, effect of disclosure on 
credit search behavior and purchase behavior has been minimal); Kripke, Gesture and 
Reality in Consumer Credit Reform, 44 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1969) (credit buying patterns 
influenced more by credit availability than by cost information; truth-in-lending will not 
benefit low-income buyer). 
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of capital against very risky financial intermediaries is, therefore, that 
people need to be protected against themselves.63 Human finitude and 
normative error are the major sorts of personal imperfections: human 
beings have limited capacities to understand, to reason, and to predict, 
and they do not always know or choose the risks that under some moral 
theory they ought to prefer. That people have limited capacities is 
undeniable. But the proposition that a person's actual preferences for 
risk-taking should not be dispositive as a normative matter is not al- 
ways accepted. Solely for purposes of reference, I will call this view 
the thesis of human fallibility. According to this thesis, human beings 
are by nature prone to something identified as sin, valuational error, 
nonadaptive behavior, false consciousness, or "objectively" wrong 
preferences. For present purposes it is feasible to abstract from the 
differences among the concepts and from the many theories of the 
sources of fallibilism. It should be noted, however, that fallibilism is 
not confined to a special political group or historical period.04 
63. If everyone needs protection against his personal imperfections, it might seem odd 
to believe that the protection of any individual could be furnished by anyone else. It may 
be, however, that people more frequently make objectively rational analyses and "prop- 
er" moral evaluations of the conduct of others than they do of their own conduct. 
Moreover, both individuals and groups may foresee their own imperfections and take 
action to prevent them from having an impact on their future behavior. See Calabresi 
& Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the 
Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1113-14 (1972) (discussion of self paternalism and 
"true" paternalism). Ulysses' having himself tied to the mast when he sailed near the 
sirens is perhaps the classic example. 
64. Religious literature, for example, has from early times specified fallibilism in 
terms of original sin or the triumph of desire over the will. Compare AUGUSTINE, EN- 
CHIRIDION ch. XXVI with Romans 7:13. 
Similar conceptions often have appeared in secular literature. In the 20th century 
much self-defeating behavior has been attributed to the cunning of the subconscious. See, 
e.g., S. FREUD, A GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO PSYCHOANALYSIS 23-24 (J. Riviers trans. 1935). 
More recently, irremediable normative confusion has been portrayed as the inevitable 
residuum of conflicting instincts which result from the simultaneous operation of in- 
dividual and group selection processes in evolution. See E. WILSON, SOCIOBIOLOGY 129 
(1975). Wilson's point seems to be that many social animals, including man, are not 
rationally self-interested in any simple or exclusive sense. See also S. FREUD, CIVILIZATION 
AND ITS DISCONTENTS (1930). 
Other theorists suggest a fallibilism which stems from the vagaries of behavioral 
conditioning. Experimental and clinical psychology indicate that many actual preferences 
(i.e., behavior patterns) come into existence or pass away for essentially random reasons, 
yet may have deleterious biological consequences. See E. HILGARD, R. ATKINSON & R. 
ATKINSON, INTRODUCTION TO PSYCHOLOGY 482-83 (1975); F. KELLER & W. SCHOENFELD, 
PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY 308 (1950); B. SKINNER, SCIENCE AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR 84-87, 
104, 396-98 (1953). Once it is accepted that behavior patterns can be manipulated and 
changed, that they may result from a fortuitous sequence of events operating on an 
organism that adapts according to generalized rules that are not always appropriate, and 
that they occasionally have severe biological consequences, psychologists are frequently 
led to view human beings in a clinical light. These notions militate against the idea that, 
unless third parties will be injured, an individual's expressed preferences are to be 
carefully respected or tolerated. Analogy is more apt to be drawn to alcoholic addiction, 
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Fallibilism does not necessarily imply the need for governmental 
intervention, or a belief in a political theory that could be character- 
ized as "paternalistic." A person acutely conscious of human imper- 
fections may oppose governmental protection of citizens from their 
own errors because he thinks that it is impossible to choose rulers who 
know what is right or wrong about other people's preferences. Even if 
a person thinks public servants could identify serious moral error, he 
might still reject a system giving them control over the shaping and 
satisfaction of other people's preferences because he fears that public 
officials would use this power for their own benefit. Moreover, since 
fallibilistic theories strike many persons as an insult to human dignity, 
inevitably there is pressure to disguise these theories when they do 
underpin regulation. One seeks the comforts of projection by at- 
tributing the limitations and imperfections that cause misfortune to 
abstract markets and not to people.65 
Protective legislation concerning financial intermediaries thus may 
be viewed as an example of fundamentally paternalistic legislation 
masquerading as a response to market imperfections. Moreover, the 
idea that protective regulation responds to a combination of market 
and personal imperfections seems to justify the general form of exist- 
ing protective regulation better than the notion of market imperfec- 
tions alone. 
Nevertheless, paternalism cannot be a complete rationale, because 
regulation stops far short of attempting to compensate for all con- 
ceivable normative errors in risk taking. In general, because of the 
substantive, epistemological, and political reservations about paternal- 
ism, the law only protects people from themselves when the potential 
which many now regard as a "medical" problem rather than as an expression of 
preferences that have as equal a claim to respect as another person's values. 
Fallibilism also pervades some strands of political theory. Part of the writing on 
communism has been devoted to the proposition that the will of the people as ex- 
pressed in majority voting (or, indeed, in marketplace transactions) is not to be accepted 
as normatively relevant by the revolutionary. An extreme but interestingly direct attack 
on the "metaphysics" of democracy was made by Trotsky. L. TROTSKY, DICTATORSHIP VS. 
DEMOCRACY 15-19, 31-41, 48-59 (1922). See also V. LENIN, WHAT Is To BE DONE? (1929). 
65. To some extent, market and personal imperfections are simply different sides of 
the same coin. Some market imperfections, such as natural monopolies resulting from 
economies of scale, seem to owe nothing to anyone's personal imperfections. By contrast, 
information costs as a type of market imperfection often present a problem both because 
there are significant costs of physical transmission and because the limits of human 
intelligence and memory require that resources be committed to processing, formulating, 
and storing information in a way that would be superfluous if people were more in- 
telligent. Similarly, information costs and fraudulent proclivities may render certain 
market transactions prohibitively expensive, thus leading the transactions to be effected 
within the nonmarket organizational framework of a firm. See 0. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS 
AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS (1975). 
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consequences to the individual are severe. Protection of smaller bank 
depositors is strong. There is less protection of investors in investment- 
type financial intermediaries, and, a fortiori, of elite suppliers of capi- 
tal,66 since the latter groups are likely to be somewhat wealthier and 
to have invested discretionary dollars. 
That smaller investors receive more protection suggests a fifth pos- 
sible reason for protective regulation: the present system prevents and 
spreads losses that fall on the smaller capital suppliers because those 
losses will generally have a greater disutility for such suppliers than 
similar losses will have for wealthier capital suppliers. On this inter- 
pretation, heavier risk regulation than that provided by the securities 
laws is warranted because it will produce a great avoidance of sub- 
jective disutilities at a cost that collectively is felt to be tolerable. The 
notion that regulation must correct the imperfections of markets or 
people is denied or ignored. 
The problem with this reasoning is that it is hard to accept an 
undifferentiated desire to avoid suffering on the part of capital sup- 
pliers as a basis for governmental action. The urge to help the little 
fellow cries out for deeper justification. For example, a person may 
voluntarily make an investment knowing the chance of substantial 
gain is accompanied by the possibility of loss. If the loss occurs, 
society either accepts the proposition that the person had the right to 
take that type of risk, or it does not. If it does, it will naturally think 
that not compensating for such negative outcomes will maximize 
satisfaction of people's preferences (including those for risk taking of 
the sort in question). Society should also view it as inconsistent to say 
that one has a right to take certain risks and then, by protecting the 
risk taker from the adverse consequences of his risk taking, to make 
the risk into something that is not a risk at all. Obviously, the latter 
action would cast some doubt upon the seriousness with which the 
moral premise, the individual's right to take that type of risk, is held. 
If society does not think that the individual has the right to take 
the risk in question; then it may protect him from that risk; but some 
reason for denying the right should be given. The reason might be 
that eliminating the particular risk option will have beneficial systemic 
consequences-for example, that it will prevent panic runs on banks- 
66. The ceilings on deposit insurance protection, see note 42 supra, and their correlates 
in the case of the insurance-type intermediaries, e.g., ERISA ? 4022(a), (b)(3), (b)(6), 29 
U.S.C. ? 1322(a), (b)(3), (b)(6) (Supp. IV 1974); Epton & Bixby, supra note 46, at 240-42 
(ceilings on guarantee fund coverage), are striking examples of the general point. (Granted, 
the ceilings can be avoided in various ways, such as by allocating one's deposits to a 
number of different banks.) 
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yet will leave the individual free to take other risks. Or the reason 
might be a paternalistic belief that an individual's preferences are 
erroneous when they lead to his taking any risks with his family's 
nondiscretionary income or to his not paying a little extra for 
absolutely safe insurance. There might be other reasons. The point 
is, however, that the absence of reasons for the government's overriding 
some individual preferences and not others-an inevitable byproduct 
of all governmental action-makes the formless desire to alleviate 
suffering an indeterminate guide to action. Governmental intervention 
will be essentially random, a function of the most visible stimuli of 
the moment, and will eventually generate a plethora of programs and 
policies that quite obviously cannot all be achieved. 
Before proceeding to the second major kind of explanation for the 
regulation of risk levels of financial intermediaries, one should note 
both that some justifications of regulatory techniques in terms of their 
reducing risks presented to public suppliers of capital are disingenuous, 
and that some reasons for regulating financial intermediaries are not 
concerned at all with their riskiness. Under the former heading one 
can probably group some types of entry restrictions,67 branching and 
geographic restrictions,68 prohibitions on the payment of interest on 
demand deposits,69 and ceilings on the payment of interest on savings 
accounts.70 Regulations of this sort typically came into existence amid 
the belief that they helped reduce risk levels of financial intermedi- 
aries, and thus protected public suppliers of capital. Their continued 
existence, however, is often due not to their risk-reducing functions,71 
but to their role as restraints on competition which increase the chance 
that the shareholders of financial intermediaries, the elite suppliers of 
capital, will obtain monopoly rents. In general, this form of class 
legislation-or more exactly, class-oriented failure to change outdated 
legislation-is a result of political power on the part of benefited 
classes, and is difficult to justify in any other manner. 
Under the heading of regulation that is not risk-regarding one can 
place the bewildering tangle of regulatory aids and restraints designed 
to encourage money raised by financial intermediaries to flow into 
67. See note 86 infra. 
68. See notes 88, 89 infra. 
69. E.g., 12 U.S.C. ? 371a (1970) (member banks); 12 C.F.R. ? 329.2 (1976) (insured 
nonmember banks); CAL. FIN. CODE ? 854 (West 1968) (California banks). 
70. E.g., Regulation Q, 12 C.F.R. ? 217.3 (1976). 
71. Disinterested commentators find the risk-reducing functions of these restrictions 
either insignificant or unnecessary. See, e.g., Alhadeff, A Reconsideration of Restrictions 
on Bank Entry, 76 Q.J. ECON. 246 (1962); Klein, Competitive Interest Payments on Bank 
Deposits and the Long-Run Demand for Money, 64 AM. ECON. REV. 931 (1974). 
22 
This content downloaded from 130.132.173.207 on Wed, 5 Jun 2013 13:25:13 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
The Soundness of Financial Intermediaries 
legislatively favored sectors of the economy such as housing.72 To 
take an obvious example, consider the basic legislative plan of restrict- 
ing federal savings and loan associations to investment in either low- 
yielding government securities or residential mortgages.73 Regulations 
attempting to control an institution's allocation of funds, which com- 
prise a class of what are often called selective credit policies,74 are a 
topic for separate consideration. The only point of relevance is that 
they must be separated from any analysis of risk-regarding regulation. 
B. Special Economic Function 
An apparent alternative to the view that risk-regarding regulation 
of financial intermediaries derives from some combination of reasons 
for protecting public suppliers of capital is a justification resting on 
the alleged special economic function performed by financial inter- 
mediaries. Commercial banks, for example, could be said to occupy a 
peculiar and crucial role in the general economy, because they supply 
72. The ways in which the government seeks to aid housing are indeed numerous. 
Many could be put into one or more of four categories: (1) programs that subsidize 
demand, such as the Sections 235 and 236 programs administered by the Department of 
Housing and Urban Development, 12 U.S.C. ?? 1715z, 1715z-1 (Supp. IV 1974) (?? 235 and 
236 were added to the Housing Act of 1949, Pub. L. No. 171, 63 Stat. 413, by the Housing 
and Urban Development Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-448, ?? 101(a), 201(a), 82 Stat. 476), 
and, arguably, the rules that mortgage interest and real estate tax payments are de- 
ductible for federal income tax purposes, I.R.C. ?? 163(a), 164(a)(1); (2) programs designed 
directly to stimulate the supply of mortgage funds, such as those engaged in by the 
Federal National Mortgage Association ("Fannie Mae"), 12 U.S.C. ? 1717 (1970 & Supp. 
IV 1974), the Government National Mortgage Association ("Ginnie Mae"), id., and the 
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation ("Freddie Mac"), id. ? 1452 (1970); (3) ar- 
rangements for indirectly stimulating the supply of mortgage funds, such as the Federal 
Home Loan Bank System's readiness to make advances to its members, see T. MARVELL, 
supra note 13, at 56, the differential between interest ceilings on savings accounts at thrift 
institutions and those at commercial banks, see p. 37 infra, and, arguably, the tax 
law's generous rules as to the computation of the bad debt reserves of thrift institutions, 
see Clark, supra note 1, at 1633-35; and (4) programs which facilitate secondary market 
transactions in mortgages, such as FHA, 12 U.S.C. ? 1720 (1970), and VA, 38 U.S.C.A. 
?? 1810-1819 (West 1959, Supp. 1976 & Sept. 1976 Pamphlet), mortgage insurance. 
For an interesting assessment of whether these programs actually have an impact 
which is not eventually offset by the operation of market forces, see Cook, The 
Residential Mortgage Market in Recent Years, 60 FED. REs. BANK OF RICHMOND ECON. 
REV., Sept./Oct. 1974, at 3 (programs are significantly effective). 
73. 12 U.S.C.A. ? 1464(c) (West Supp. 1976). The exceptions have become so numerous 
that it is now difficult to discern from the face of this statute what its basic plan is 
supposed to be. 
74. See, e.g., Kaminow & O'Brien, Selective Credit Policies: Should Their Role Be 
Expanded?, FED. RES. BANK OF PHILADELPHIA Bus. REV., Nov. 1975, at 3. Recent samplings 
of theory and opinion are to be found in To Lower Interest Rates: Hearings on H.R. 
212 Before the Subcomm. on Domestic Monetary Policy of the House Comm. on Bank- 
ing, Currency and Housing, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); The Credit Allocation Act of 
1975: Hearings on H.R. 3160 & H.R. 3161 Before the House Comm. on Banking, Currency 
and Housing, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). 
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the means of payment.75 On the basis of a financial domino theory, 
government would be called upon to prevent or insure against com- 
mercial bank failures, the effects of which would be multiplied in 
the economy.76 As in the case of regulation to protect public suppliers 
of capital, most of the public would be protected by such legislation. 
There is thus significant overlap between the rationales, but there are 
differences in applicability and practical implications. For instance, 
even if commercial banks are thought to have a keystone role, it is 
difficult to make the same argument about other kinds of financial 
intermediaries.77 
Moreover, though the economic-function rationale may justify 
regulatory action, it alone does not clearly justify the precise form of 
current regulation. Deposit insurance, for example, may be necessary 
or desirable to prevent "panic" runs on banks, which can aggravate 
75. See, e.g., C. HENNING, W. PIGOTT & R. ScOrr, FINANCIAL MARKETS AND THE 
ECONOMY 114-17 (1975). 
76. See Scott & Mayer, Risk and Regulation in Banking: Some Proposals for Federal 
Deposit Insurance Reform, 23 STAN. L. REV. 857, 858 (1971). The theory is that a sharp 
reduction in the money stock, such as would be caused by large-scale uninsured bank 
failures, would depress the general level of economic activity. For example, Friedman and 
Schwartz contend that sharp reductions in the money stock resulting from widespread 
bank failures, together with the Federal Reserve System's failure to pursue corrective 
monetary policies, were primarily responsible for the Depression's severity. M. FRIEDMAN 
& A. SCHWARTZ, A MONETARY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES, 1867-1960, at 340-42, 351-59 
(1963). Similar conclusions about the failure of monetary policy during the period are 
expressed in L. CHANDLER, AMERICAN MONETARY POLICY, 1928-1941, at 94-96, 110-11, 148, 
349-55 (1971) by a researcher who had access to sources unavailable to Friedman and 
Schwartz. But other economists are not convinced. In a major, systematic, and rigorous 
study of forces underlying the Great Depression, Professor Peter Temin concludes: 
This study has shown that the spending hypothesis fits the observed data better 
than the money hypothesis, that is, that it is more plausible to believe that the 
Depression was the result of a drop in autonomous expenditures, particularly con- 
sumption, than the result of autonomous bank failures. This is of great interest. 
But . . . the economist who uses this conclusion or any other conclusion about the 
Depression as a basis for economic policy recommendations essentially is performing 
an act of faith. 
P. TEMIN, DID MONETARY FORCES CAUSE THE GREAT DEPRESSION? 178 (1976). 
As to the obverse question about banks in the Depression-what caused an unusual in- 
crease in bank failures in the first place-see Temin's account of the rash of bank failures 
in cotton-growing areas. Id. at 85, 90-93. 
77. The closeness of the liabilities issued by thrift institutions to money as tradition- 
ally conceived, and the potential importance of nonbank financial institutions in affecting 
spending, economic growth, and development are emphasized in J. GURLEY & E. SHAW, 
MONEY IN A THEORY OF FINANCE (1960). Evidence that money and so-called near-monies 
are not very good substitutes is provided in E. FEIGE, THE DEMAND FOR LIQUID ASSETS: A 
TEMPORAL CROSS-SECTION ANALYSIS (1964), whose conclusions are criticized in Lee, Sub- 
stitutability of Non-Bank Intermediary Liabilities for Money: The Empirical Evidence, 
21 J. FINANCE 441 (1966). Economists continue to disagree on the uniqueness and im- 
portance of "money" created by commercial banks. Whatever might be concluded about 
the similarities between commercial bank liabilities and thrift institution liabilities, it 
seems clear that it is significantly harder to extend the "keystone function" argument 
to the liabilities issued by insurance-type and investment-type financial intermediaries. 
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bank failures and accelerate the contraction of the money supply. This 
latter argument focuses on the macroeconomic consequences of failures 
rather than on depositors. Yet one can surely conceive a workable 
deposit insurance scheme that, unlike the existing one, would be in- 
voked only when serious adverse macroeconomic consequences would 
otherwise be expected to result. The President might be required by 
law to appear on the national news media whenever bank failures 
exceeded a prescribed rate and to declare that until further notice 
deposits in all failed banks would be promptly paid in full by the 
United States government. 
More generally, regulation to protect financial intermediaries in 
their role as economic keystones would tend to focus on financial 
intermediaries as groups having aggregative economic significance, and 
thus need not be greatly concerned with preventing or cleaning up 
individual financial intermediary failures during periods of economic 
stability. Broad economic policies, such as management of the money 
supply, would be stressed.78 The conceptual and institutional separa- 
tion of monetary and fiscal policy from traditional "regulatory" 
techniques such as investment restraints, net worth requirements, and 
special treatment upon insolvency, indicates that much risk-regarding 
regulation cannot be adequately understood or justified as protection 
of key economic functions.79 The need to protect key economic func- 
tions is a major, independent reason for regulation, not one that com- 
petes with reasons for protecting individual public suppliers of capital. 
In general, the reasons for protecting individual public suppliers of 
capital are more directly relevant to the strategies of regulation dealt 
with in this article than is an economic-function rationale. 
The implications of this discussion of the purposes of regulation for 
the succeeding analysis are limited but important. Although a number 
of reasons appear to have contributed to the existence of the risk- 
regarding regulation of financial intermediaries, two reasons explain 
the fullest range of regulations. First, high information costs dis- 
advantage public suppliers of capital in their dealings with unregulated 
intermediaries. Second, the public capital suppliers should be pro- 
tected from the more serious consequences of their own propensity to 
78. For a discussion of the relation between actions of the Federal Reserve Board and 
the money supply, see J. CULBERTSON, MONEY & BANKING 182-215 (1972). 
79. Fiscal policy is, of course, determined by the President and Congress and not 
by the regulatory agencies. Regulation is performed by many agencies, including a part 
of the Federal Reserve Board. Within the Board's organization only some persons are 
engaged in controlling the money supply; banking supervision is handled by a different 
group. See BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, THE FEDERAL RESERVE 
SYSTEM 150-53 (4th ed. 1961). 
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normative error in the matter of risk taking. Even though one might 
contest the validity of governmental regulation for the latter purpose, 
a fundamentally paternalistic basis for regulation will probably con- 
tinue to exist, disguised though it occasionally be. Therefore, the 
ensuing discussion will refrain from taking, as a universal premise for 
evaluation, the view that all risk-regarding strategies and techniques 
that are not designed to perfect the operation of market forces, or to 
compensate for their imperfections, should be abolished. Instead, it 
is assumed that at least the smaller capital suppliers somehow must be 
protected against personally serious losses caused by the failures of 
financial intermediaries, regardless of the degree of perfection of 
market forces. Within this constraint, however, it is quite appropriate 
to criticize regulation for excessive impairment of competition and to 
evaluate alternative or duplicative techniques of regulation on such a 
basis. 
III. The Four Strategies of Risk Regulation 
In the natural sciences, such as biology or chemistry, it has long 
been recognized that classification schemes are not incidental matters 
that can be taken for granted or left to unthinking descriptivists. Such 
schemes are absolute preconditions of successful theorizing and are 
only achieved with great difficulty. Earth, water, air, and fire will not 
do, even for a genius with reams of data. A table of elements, organized 
around some useful abstract principles, is necessary. Similarly, in order 
to study and debate risk regulation in a comprehensive yet coherent 
way, no precondition is more important than the existence of a 
logically organized taxonomy of techniques. The taxonomy tentatively 
offered below attempts to supply the needed framework. 
The rules and regulations affecting the risk levels posed by financial 
intermediaries to public suppliers of capital may be grouped accord- 
ing to the four strategies they principally implement. For convenience 
I give the four strategies labels: anticompetitive regulation, portfolio 
regulation, insider misconduct regulation, and reactive regulation. The 
first three strategies attempt to prevent the realization of the risks of 
institutional failures; the fourth copes with realized risks. One of the 
preventive strategies, anticompetitive regulation, attempts to control 
the external financial environment in which financial intermediaries 
operate. The other two preventive strategies regulate risks internally. 
Of the internally oriented strategies, portfolio regulation is designed 
to ensure the rationality of the means employed to achieve the legally 
specified modicum of safety. This strategy is evident in the manifold 
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attempts to determine within limits what the portfolio of assets and 
liabilities of the intermediary will be. The other internally oriented 
strategy, insider misconduct regulation, is directed toward ensuring 
allegiance on the part of management and other employed personnel 
to contractual and legal goals-typically, those of providing a minimum 
level of safety for the public suppliers of capital and maximizing re- 
turns, within that constraint, to the elite suppliers of capital. Reactive 
regulation responds to actual liquidity crises and insolvencies. It com- 
prises techniques such as emergency loans to troubled intermediaries or 
insurance payments to a failed intermediary's public suppliers of 
capital. 
The question here posed and answered affirmatively is whether 
anything useful can be said that applies generally to all or many of 
the regulatory techniques that as a group comprise a given strategy. 
To be sure, there will always remain much to be learned about the 
characteristics and values of particular techniques, but the ability to 
make even speculative generalizations about the four broad strategies 
should prove helpful in attempting to harmonize what is now a 
cacophony of regulatory pronouncements. 
An obvious approach to the analysis of the four strategies is to con- 
template whether and how their costs and benefits can be expected to 
differ. In such an analysis one must seek the elusive golden mean. One 
must attempt no greater precision or certainty than the nature of the 
subject and present knowledge allow;80 yet the inability to satisfy the 
methodological standards of the laboratory or the courtroom should 
not halt the quest for understanding. Perhaps the best technique for 
assessing costs is to divide them into several categories which intuitively 
seem to have discoverable interrelationships. When regulators use 
risk-restraining techniques, they face at least four types of problems 
which create their own peculiar costs: (1) primary formulation costs, 
the costs of originally formulating a specific type of regulatory re- 
straint; (2) secondary formulation costs, those incurred in trying to 
enforce the underlying purpose of an existing restraint (including the 
costs of detecting avoidance tactics and formulating new regulations, 
litigating the broad language of an existing statute or regulation in 
order to fix its specific meanings and applications, and urging new 
law); (3) direct enforcement costs, the costs of achieving compliance 
with the literal terms of a restraint;8' and (4) indirect costs occasioned 
80. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. I, ch. 3 (discussion of proper level of discourse 
for normative inquiries). 
81. Obviously, under my definitions it will sometimes be necessary to decide whether 
the primary function of a given type of litigation is the practical specification of general 
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by implementing the restraint. The term "indirect costs" refers gen- 
erally to three sorts of undesirable side effects of regulation: a regula- 
tory restraint may serve an end ulterior to protection of the public 
from institutional failures, and the ulterior end may not be a sound 
goal of public policy; a restraint may lead to unfair discrimination 
among groups of persons; and a restraint may prevent business goals, 
such as the maximization of intermediary profits, from being efficiently 
achieved, leading in some cases to a misallocation of resources. As will 
be shown, it appears possible to make plausible generalizations about 
the different categories of costs typically generated by each strategy, 
and about the interrelationships among cost levels in the different 
categories. 
In evaluating the anticipated benefits of a given regulatory strategy, 
three factors are involved: the type of protection, its likely order of 
magnitude (i.e., the success of regulation at preventing failures or 
mitigating their consequences to public suppliers of capital), and its 
certainty of occurrence. The different "types" of protection include 
protection against competitive forces, against the management's delib- 
erate taking of high risks, against managerial incompetence, dis- 
honesty, or self-dealing, or against some combination of the preceding 
-each of which may raise the probability of a business failure of an 
intermediary and of loss to its public suppliers of capital. 
A. Anticompetitive Regulation 
The basic theory of the anticompetitive strategy, when unsullied by 
the claims of special interest groups or by special policy objectives, is 
that the legal system can reduce the number of failures of financial 
intermediaries by weakening the competitive forces operating on those 
institutions. Sheltered from competition, the intermediary may be 
able to earn some monopoly rents; if those rents are not stolen, 
squandered, taxed away, or paid out as dividends, they may serve to 
absorb later losses arising during unprofitable periods. If the strategy 
works, financial intermediaries should prove more resistant to the 
pestilential vapors of recession, managerial inefficiency, and tech- 
nological backwardness. 
For present purposes, the techniques for implementing the strategy 
rules or the overcoming of recalcitrance about obeying reasonably clear rules, or to make 
some assessment of the relative importance of the two functions. This problem might be 
mitigated by defining "secondary formulation costs" as costs of enforcing regulatory 
restraints by detecting avoidance behavior and formulating new regulations or urging 
new statutes, and "direct enforcement costs" as costs of enforcing regulatory restraints 
by examinations, reporting requirements, prosecutions, administrative proceedings, in- 
formal "jawboning," and the like. I am not sure that this choice of definitions would 
make much difference; I avoid it because it deemphasizes the distinction between the 
purpose and the letter of legal rules. 
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may be divided into price restraints and limitations on entry into 
markets. Price restraints restrict the economic return or the amount 
of financial services that financial intermediaries may provide to their 
public suppliers of capital. Among those restrictions are the prohibi- 
tion against payment of interest on demand deposit accounts,82 the 
ceilings on the payment of interest on time deposits and savings ac- 
counts in depository financial institutions,83 and the requirement of 
state insurance laws that premiums for fire and casualty policies-and, 
sometimes, life insurance policies-be "adequate."84 Some govern- 
mental interferences with the prices of transactions involving financial 
intermediaries, however, aim not at promoting the financial safety of 
the intermediaries, but instead seek to benefit other parties such as 
the intermediaries' customers or retailers.85 
Among the second group of techniques, the limits on market entry, 
are the requirements that specific regulatory approval be given to new 
charters, to doing business in a new state, to new branches of depository 
financial institutions, to mergers, and to acquisitions by holding com- 
panies-all pursuant to a criterion that the event in question will serve 
the "public convenience and need."86 These requirements, here col- 
82. See note 69 supra. 
83. E.g., Regulation Q, 12 C.F.R. ? 217.3 (1976) (member banks of Federal Reserve 
System); id. ? 329.3 (insured nonmember banks); id. pt. 526 (members of Federal Home 
Loan Bank System). 
84. E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ? 20-341 (West 1976); N.Y. INs. LAW ? 186 (McKinney 1966); 
TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 5.01 (Vernon 1963). 
85. Examples are provided by usury ceilings on loans made by intermediaries, e.g., 12 
U.S.C. ?? 85, 86 (1970 & Supp. IV 1974) (restrictions on maximum interest rate that 
national banks may charge); by the resale price maintenance scheme mandated for in- 
vestment companies, Investment Company Act of 1940 ? 22(d), 15 U.S.C. ? 80a-22(d) 
(1970); and by requirements of state insurance laws that premiums not be "excessive" or 
"unfairly discriminatory," e.g., N.Y. INS. LAW ? 186 (McKinney 1966) (superintendent may 
order adjustment of excessive or unfairly discriminatory rates; applies to life insurance 
and casualty insurance). 
86. I assume the traditional view that the "convenience and need" criterion was in 
fact designed to prevent excessive competition ("overbanking" and its parallels in the 
case of nonbank intermediaries) and, consequently, to curb the number of failures. See 
Scott, In Quest of Reason: The Licensing Decisions of the Federal Banking Agencies, 42 
U. CHI. L. REV. 235, 285-86 (1975). A revisionist interpretation of the criterion would be 
that the regulator is supposed to satisfy himself that low-cost financial services will be 
made available, or at least not be jeopardized, by the action in question. One might 
think that low-cost services to intermediary customers would eventually be jeopardized, 
for example, by the acquisition of a large local bank by a huge outside bank, if one 
thought that the outside bank would eventually "dominate" the local market and that 
the increased level of concentration would lead to higher prices to borrowers. Though 
very strong doubts can be raised about this line of reasoning, see note 116 infra, it con- 
ceivably rationalizes the presence of both the need criterion and procompetitive exhorta- 
tions in some statutes defining regulatory standards for entry approval, see note 87 
infra. More likely, such a twin standard simply reflects the legislators' perception of the 
tension between the values of competition and the values of preventing intermediary 
failure: the responsibility is passed to the regulator, who is often left to strike a balance 
or decide whether anticompetitive effects are "outweighed" by the transaction's contribu- 
tion to convenience and need. 
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lectively referred to as the "need criterion," deserve special attention 
because they affect more types of financial intermediaries than other 
anticompetitive techniques.87 Another subgroup of limits on market 
87. Statutes and regulations imposing limits on market entry in terms of a "con- 
venience and need" test, or something like it, are quite numerous in the corpus of law 
governing financial intermediaries. A sampling of major legal rules of this sort is 
provided below; the comments attempt to give some sense of the other-sometimes con- 
tradictory-aspects of the rules. 
COMMERCIAL BANKS 
A. National Baniks: 12 U.S.C. ? 26 (1970) (Comptroller investigates after receiving 
certificate from proposed national banking association); 12 C.F.R. ? 4.2(b) (1976) (Comp- 
troller considers adequacy of proposed capital structure, earnings prospects, convenience 
and needs of community to be served by proposed bank, character of management, and 
banking experience and ability of proposed officers and employees); 12 U.S.C. ? 36(c) 
(1970) (if Comptroller approves and state law permits state banks to establish branches 
on same basis, national bank may establish branches) ; 12 C.F.R. ? 4.5(c) (1976) (Comp- 
troller has complete discretion as to approval of new branch); 12 U.S.C. ? 1828(c)(2)(A), 
(c)(5) (1970) (Comptroller not to approve merger resulting in national bank unless anti- 
competitive effects found to be clearly outweighed in public interest by probable effect 
of transaction in meeting convenience and needs of community to be served); id. ? 1842 
(c)(2) (same standard for approval by Board of Governors of bank holding company 
acquisitions of banks). 
B. State Member Banks: id. ? 322 (Board of Governors, after receiving application for 
membership, considers bank's financial condition, character of management, and whether 
corporate powers consistent with Federal Reserve Act); Regulation H, 12 C.F.R. ? 208.5(a) 
(1976) (Board also considers convenience and needs of community, adequacy of capital 
structure, and earnings prospects); 12 U.S.C. ? 321 (1970) (branching requirements same 
as for national banks, except that Board rather than Comptroller approves); Regulation 
H, 12 C.F.R. ? 208.9 (1976) (branching); 12 U.S.C. ? 1828(c)(2)(B), (c)(5) (1970) (Board 
may approve merger resulting in state member bank if anticompetitive effects outweighed 
by public convenience and need); id. ? 1842(c)(2) (same test for holding company 
acquisitions). 
C. Other State Banks: id. ? 1816 (FDIC Board of Directors, after receiving application 
for deposit insurance, considers adequacy of capital, earnings prospects, character of 
management, convenience and needs of community, financial history and condition, and 
whether corporate powers are consistent with purposes of Federal Deposit Insurance Act); 
id. ? 1828(d) (branching requires FDIC approval, standards coincide with those of ? 1816); 
CAL. FIN. CODE ?? 362, 503 (West 1968) (California chartering and branching rules, test of 
public convenience and advantage); N.Y. BANKING LAW ?? 29, 105 (McKinney 1971 & Supp. 
1975-76) (New York chartering and branching rules, test of public convenience and ad- 
vantage); 12 U.S.C. ? 1828(c)(2)(C), (c)(5) (1970) (FDIC may approve mergers resulting in 
insured nonmember banks if anticompetitive effects outweighed by public convenience 
and need); id. ? 1842(c)(2) (Board of Governors applies similar test to holding company 
acquisitions of banks). 
THRIFT INSTITUTIONS 
A. Mutual Savings Banks (MSBs): MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 168, ? 78 (Michie/Law. Co-op 
1970 & Supp. 1975) (board of bank incorporation employs public convenience and ad- 
vantage test for proposed bank); id. ? 5 (branching: inter alia, a public convenience and 
advantage test); id. ? 72 (MSBs may merge if terms are approved by 2/3 of each board of 
trustees and by commissioner in writing; request for commissioner's approval shall be 
accompanied by $1000 investigation fee); N.Y. BANKING LAW ? 24 (McKinney 1971 & 
Supp. 1975-76) (superintendent, after receiving application of proposed savings bank, 
considers whether public convenience and advantage will be promoted, and whether 
character, responsibility, and fitness of persons applying are such as to command con- 
fidence of honesty and efficiency); id. ? 240 (McKinney Supp. 1975-76) (branching rules 
parallel those for commercial banks); id. ? 601 (McKinney 1971) (written plan of merger 
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entry, the more mechanically formulated geographical restraints such 
as restricted lending areas88 and both intrastate and interstate branch- 
submitted to superintendent along with $1000 investigation fee and certificate verifying 
that each board of directors has voted in favor of merger by at least two-thirds vote; 
plan "shall be in form satisfactory to the superintendent"); id. ? 601-b (approval of 
superintendent is based on (i) the general policy statement of id. ? 10, (ii) whether 
merger shall yield MSB larger than sound banking and effective competition dictate, (iii) 
whether merger may lessen competition so as to be injurious to public interest or tend 
toward monopoly, and (iv) public interest and needs and convenience thereof). 
B. Savings and Loan Associations: 12 U.S.C. ? 1464(e) (1970) (Federal Home Loan Bank 
Board (FHLBB), after receiving application for new federal S&L, considers character 
and responsibility of applicants, necessity of another S&L in community, probability of 
success, degree of injury to existing S&Ls); CAL. FIN. CODE ? 5513 (West 1968) (application 
for new S&L: inter alia, public convenience and advantage test); 12 C.F.R. ? 545.14(c) 
(1976) (standards for FHLBB approval of new branch of S&L include necessity for 
branch); CAL. FIN. CODE ? 6002 (West 1968) (branching rule includes public convenience 
and advantage test); id. ?? 9202, 9204 (West Supp. 1976) (commissioner approves merger 
if he finds terms fair, just, and equitable and in conformity either to California corpora- 
tion law with respect to domestic S&Ls or to federal laws and FHLBB rules and 
regulations with respect to federal S&Ls); 12 U.S.C. ? 1464(d)(11) (1970) (FHLBB rule- 
making powers for mergers); 41 Fed. Reg. 9133 (1976) (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. 
? 571.5) (FHLBB policy on S&L mergers; factors considered include: antitrust laws; S&L 
holding company regulations; economic impact on competition as, determined by (i) 
market concentration, (ii) actual or potential competition, (iii) trends toward concentra- 
tion, (iv) overlap of branching systems of merging banks, and (v) extent to which rates 
paid appear to be competitively determined; convenience and needs of communities to 
be served; experience and performance record of persons to be in key managerial posi- 
tions; probability of success; adequacy of net worth; fairness of merger plan; full dis- 
closure of plan; officer compensation; employment contracts). 
LIFE INSURANCE COMPANIES 
N.Y. INS. LAW ? 191(2) (McKinney 1966) (superintendent, passing upon insurance 
license, considers public demand for another insurance company); id. ? 40(4) (foreign and 
alien insurers must have license, which may be refused if superintendent judges refusal 
in public interest; license permits statewide operation); id. ?? 486, 69-f (McKinney Supp. 
1975-76) (approvals of mergers and holding company acquisitions do not invoke need test 
or similar criterion). 
PRIVATE PENSION PLANS 
The organization and operation of pension plans are not afflicted with a convenience 
and need test. 
PROPERTY AND LIABILITY INSURANCE COMPANIES 
Id. ? 328 (McKinney 1966) (certificate for motor vehicle insurer depends on super- 
intendent's finding that public interest is being promoted); id. ?? 40, 42 (McKinney 
1966 & Supp. 1975-76) (rules for foreign and alien insurers same as in case of life in- 
surance companies). 
INVESTMENT COMPANIES 
In general, investment companies are governed, insofar as requirements for chartering, 
doing business, merging and the like are concerned, by ordinary state business corpora- 
tion law (or, in some cases, trust law). Even the federal rule governing investment com- 
pany reorganizations (a term which includes mergers), Investment Company Act ? 25, 
15 U.S.C. ? 80a-25 (1970), is essentially concerned with fairness, not competitive impact 
and public need. Cf. 15 U.S.C. ? 80a-11 (1970) (offers to exchange securities). 
88. E.g., 12 U.S.C. ? 1464(c) (1970 & Supp. IV 1974) (federal S&L may lend only on 
security of first mortgage on real estate within 100 miles of home office or within 
state or on security of savings account in S&L; exceptions noted). 
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ing rules,89 seem confined to depository financial institutions. 
In general, anticompetitive techniques are not applied to as many 
kinds of financial intermediaries as are techniques implementing the 
other strategies-for example, the technique of using insolvency funds 
to pay the claims of public suppliers of capital when an intermediary 
fails.90 Private pension funds are not ordinarily governed by a need 
criterion, and price restraints on life insurance companies, private 
pension funds, and investment companies are nonexistent, weak, or not 
oriented to institutional safety.91 Most interestingly, geographically 
framed limits on the establishment of new offices are conspicuously 
absent or unimportant in the case of life insurance companies, private 
pension funds, fire and casualty companies, and investment companies. 
It is possible that the focus of much anticompetitive regulation on 
depository institutions merely reflects a judgment that anticompetitive 
strategies are more likely to be effective in the regulation of those 
intermediaries. Restraints on the physical location of offices, to take 
the clearest case, may at least appear to have a prima facie chance of 
89. Intrastate branching rules generally affect only commercial banks and mutual 
savings banks. A state may permit statewide branching, something less than statewide 
branching (e.g., countywide branching), or no branching at all. E.g., CAL. FIN. CODE ? 500 
(West 1968) (statewide branching of commercial banks); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 16% ? 106 
(Smith-Hurd 1972) (no branch banking); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 167, ? 60 (Michie/Law. 
Co-op 1970) (countywide mobile branch banking); id. ch. 168, ? 5 (Michie/Law. Co-op 
1970 & Supp. 1975) (savings banks may branch in same town and also into other towns 
of county that do not contain head offices of other savings banks or where commissioner 
opines that public convenience and advantage served); N.Y. BANKING LAW ?? 29, 105, 240 
(McKinney 1971 & Supp. 1975-76) (branching throughout state permitted except that 
outside city or village of head office, bank cannot branch into city or village of population 
less than 50,000 in which principal office of another bank is located; applied to com- 
mercial and mutual savings banks). National banks follow the rules of the state in which 
they are located. 12 U.S.C. ? 36(c) (1970). 
No state currently permits banks chartered in another state or national banks whose 
home offices are in other states to establish new branches within its borders. Nor does 
any state permit acquisitions of in-state banks by out-of-state bank holding companies. A 
Maine statute that becomes effective on January 1, 1978, will permit the establishment or 
acquisition of Maine financial institutions by out-of-state holding companies if the state 
in which the holding company's subsidiary financial institutions principally operate sub- 
stantially reciprocates the permission. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 9-B, ? 1013 (West 1975 Pamphlet). 
The refusal by states expressly to allow acquisitions by out-of-state bank holding com- 
panies indirectly prohibits a bank holding company from acquiring a new bank in a state 
other than that in which its existing banks are located. See 12 U.S.C. ? 1842(d) (1970) 
(unless state law explicitly permits acquisition of out-of-state bank, Board not to approve 
acquisition by bank holding company). By contrast, the bank holding company device 
may enable a banking organization to circumvent, within a state, a no-branching or 
county-wide-branching rule; since federal bank holding company law does not prohibit 
this technique, the holding company's ability to use it will depend on whether the state 
has enacted stricter legislation concerning bank holding company acquisitions. Some states 
have, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. ? 8-901 to -904 (1974); some have not, eg., MASS. ANN. LAWS 
ch. 167A (Michie/Law. Co-op 1970 & Supp. 1975). 
90. See pp. 86-90 infra. 
91. See D. MCGILL, LIFE INSURANCE 776 (rev. ed. 1967) (life insurance rates not 
directly regulated); note 87 supra. 
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protecting depository institutions from competition (alias "overbank- 
ing"), while offering no hope whatsoever of effectively sheltering other 
institutions. Demand deposits and savings accounts are desired by many 
individuals precisely because of their extreme liquidity. Since millions 
of contingencies befall individuals who then desire prompt con- 
version of their savings into cash, depository institutions engage in 
frequent, continuous, and speedy transactions with their public sup- 
pliers of capital. With traditional technology, the only way of handling 
such high-volume, no-delay transactions was through face-to-face con- 
tacts at conveniently located outlets of the financial institution. Trans- 
actions with a life insurance company or pension fund are much less 
frequent and more leisurely. And until the advent of streamlined tech- 
niques for liquidating one's investment in a money market mutual 
fund,92 dealing with a mutual fund seemed cumbersome in comparison 
to a depositor's dealings with a bank. Thus, it is only the practical 
importance of many convenient outlets to depository institutions 
that ever suggested to legislators that restrictions on the physical lo- 
cations of offices could effectively reduce competition. 
All this may change, of course, as the revolution in electronic funds 
transfer systems progresses.93 Customer-operated remote computer 
terminals can be deemed to be branch banks on the ground that they 
perform functions similar to those of traditional branches. Yet the 
technical ease with which these terminals can proliferate will in- 
evitably make the cumbersome procedures for approving a new branch 
bank seem about as appropriate as having a special legislative enact- 
ment to charter each new bank or corporation-a practice which met 
a natural death from similar causes more than a century ago.94 Ex- 
tensive litigation has already been stirred by these terminals,95 and the 
92. See, e.g., Daily Income Fund, Inc., Prospectus 7-8 (July 3, 1974); Dreyfus Liquid 
Assets, Inc., Prospectus 9-10 (May 15, 1974). More recently two Dreyfus funds have 
advertised that their shareholders can withdraw money simply by writing checks. Wall 
St. J., Oct. 21, 1976, at 43, col. 5. 
93. See Note, Customer-Bank Communication Terminals and the McFadden Act Def- 
inition of a "Branch Bank", 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 362 (1975). 
94. See H. BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONs 37-41 (rev. ed. 1946). 
95. See, e.g., Illinois ex rel. Lignoul v. Continental Illinois Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 
536 F.2d 176 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 184 (1976) (customer banking com- 
munication terminals (CBCTs) of national banks are branches); Independent Bankers 
Ass'n of America v. Smith, 534 F.2d 921 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (CBCTs are branches for Mc- 
Fadden Act purposes); Missouri ex rel. Kostman v. First Nat'l Bank, 405 F. Supp. 733 
(E.D. Mo. 1975) (off-premise electronic tellers constitute branch banking); Colorado ex 
rel. State Banking Bd. v. First Nat'l Bank, 394 F. Supp. 979 (D. Colo. 1975) (receipt of 
deposits by CBCT makes it branch; cash withdrawals do not); Independent Bankers v. 
Camp. 357 F. Supp. 1352 (D. Or. 1973) (since state law does not specifically permit auto- 
mated tellers, national bank cannot use them). 
Recently, the Comptroller of the Currency was ordered to rescind formally its ruling 
that CBCTs are not branches and to give written notice that any national bank that 
33 
This content downloaded from 130.132.173.207 on Wed, 5 Jun 2013 13:25:13 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 86: 1, 1976 
results, though favorable to the antagonists because of the way in which 
existing statutes are written, will probably not survive future legislative 
action. In other words, some types of anticompetitive regulation are 
rotting as a result of technological change, and explicit policy analyses 
of the sort here engaged in may have the easy task of pushing over a 
deadwood structure. 
1. Costs 
Like the other strategies, the anticompetitive one does not appear to 
generate particularly high primary formulation costs. The need crite- 
rion, for example, does not appear to have been the product of massive 
empirical study and analytical debate. Even though direct enforce- 
ment costs tend to be low, secondary formulation costs are relatively 
high. For example, the cost of enforcing literal compliance with certain 
price restraints of a mechanical nature, e.g., the interest ceiling on 
savings accounts, does not appear to be very high at all. Banks, unlike 
speeders on the highways, are too conspicuous and too stodgy to engage 
in widespread, straightforward disregard of numerical legal standards. 
Furthermore, once the obvious attempts at circumvention (like giving 
toasters or tennis rackets to new depositors) are identified and out- 
lawed, bankers' compliance with the literal terms of regulation can be 
expected to follow automatically. But the low costs of direct enforce- 
ment of mechanical anticompetitive rules are almost inevitably 
matched by high secondary formulation costs. This proposition follows 
because many people who run financial institutions are marvelously 
ingenious and want to compete, at least when they think that their 
institution will benefit. There are tenacious attempts by many in- 
termediaries to defeat the purposes of anticompetitive rules. Few 
things are so demoralizing-or, depending upon one's viewpoint, awe- 
inspiring-as were the succession of moves and countermoves engaged 
in by commercial banks and the Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System during the late 1960s and early 1970s, when the Board 
decided to curb bank competition for funds.9Y 
operates a CBCT without specific branching approval from the Comptroller's office is 
in violation of an explicit court of appeals decision. Independent Bankers Ass'n of 
America v. Smith, [Current] FED. BANKING L. REP. (CCH) 1 96,901, at 82,158 (D.D.C. July 
29, 1976), enforcing 534 F.2d 921 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 
96. The process in the 1965-1973 period is traced in DePamphilis, The Short-term 
Commercial Bank Adjustment Process and Federal Reserve Regulation, NEw ENGLAND 
ECON. REV., May/June 1974, at 14. To avoid the impact of interest ceilings and reserve re- 
quirements banks resorted to creation or expansion of devices such as the federal funds 
market, negotiable certificates of deposit, the Eurodollar market, loan participation 
certificates, bank-related commercial paper, &mall-denomination "capital notes," the sell- 
ing of ineligible acceptances, and the making of guaranties (in the guise of standby 
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Although high, the secondary formulation costs generated by the 
need criterion, which limits market entries and extensions, differ from 
those caused by mechanical price restraints. Price restraints are costly 
because of the necessity for continuous formulation of new regulations. 
The need criterion, by contrast, is costly because it is so vague and 
because its operational specifications are rarely formalized in regula- 
tions.97 Institutions that feel threatened by an applicant for entry 
therefore are frequently able to challenge the application. The result 
is a mass of extended cases and administrative proceedings.98 
The nearly universal requirement that insurance premiums not be 
inadequate constitutes a special case among the anticompetitive regula- 
tions. Some believe that insurance departments are so influenced by 
political considerations that their primary concern is to make a show 
of protecting consumers by resisting excessive rates rather than to 
protect insurance companies by encouraging adequate rates.99 Insofar 
as that belief is true, direct enforcement and secondary formulation 
costs are low for the trivial reason that regulators are not seriously 
trying to make the standard of "adequate" rates effective. If they were 
trying, the pattern of costs would probably duplicate that generated 
by the equally vague need criterion. 
In addition to high secondary formulation costs, techniques imple- 
letters of credit) instead of loans. Most of the avoidance attempts were eventually met 
by new regulations. Given the interconnectedness of financial markets, the diversity of 
legal and organizational forms for achieving private objectives, and the unlikelihood that 
regulatory agencies will be able to recruit personnel who are significantly more ingenious 
than decisionmakers in the private sector, it is unrealistic to assume that mechanical 
anticompetitive rules can often be found which preclude expensive gamesmanship of 
this sort. 
One might compare, the story of bank fund competition to the insurance holding 
company movement of the late 1960s. Although the movement seems to have been a 
product of many forces, some specific activities were clearly aimed at circumventing 
mechanical legal rules, such as investment restrictions (or portfolio regulation generally) 
or laws such as N.Y. INS. LAW ? 213 (McKinney 1966 & Supp. 1975-76), which imposes 
limitations on certain expenses of life insurers. See N.Y. INS. DEPT., REPORT OF THE 
SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON INSURANCE HOLDING COMPANIES 10 (1968); Note, The Insurance 
Holding Company Phenomenon and the Search for Regulatory Controls, 56 VA. L. REV. 
636 (1970). 
97. The need criterion and other aspects of the bank licensing decisions have been 
entertainingly discussed and debated in Scott, In Quest of Reason: The Licensing Deci- 
sions of the Federal Banking Agencies, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 235 (1975); and Murphy, What 
Reason for tile Quest?: A Response to Professor Scott, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 299 (1975). 
98. Admittedly, the costs of these proceedings conceivably could be classified as 
direct enforcement costs, even given my special definitions of "direct enforcement costs" 
and "secondary formulation costs." P. 27 supra. The classification actually chosen em- 
phasizes the function of these proceedings as modes of specifying the law, rather than 
as ways of overcoming recalcitrance. 
99. See, e.g., Mayerson, Ensuring tile Solvency of Property and Liability Insurance 
Companies, in INSURANCE, GOVERNMENT, AND SOCIAL POLICY 146, 190 (S. Kimball & H. 
Denenberg eds. 1969). 
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menting the anticompetitive strategy display a second general prop- 
erty: a tendency to generate substantial amounts of all three types of 
indirect costs. Obviously, any kind of anticompetitive rule tends to 
take on a life independent of its original raison d'etre because there 
will always be inefficient producers who appreciate shelter from com- 
petition and lobby accordingly. This is vividly illustrated by the in- 
terest ceilings on time deposits and savings accounts and by the pro- 
hibition against payment of interest on demand deposit accounts. 
Originally the ceilings were thought necessary to prevent recurrence 
of the ruinous competition that led to many bank failures during the 
Great Depression; prohibiting interest on demand deposits was more 
specifically linked to a desire to prevent the flow of funds from 
country regions to city banks, which would make "speculative" use of 
them.'00 Prominent modern students of the Depression assign virtually 
no causal role to the erstwhile freedom of banks to pay interest on time 
deposits and savings accounts.101 Nor has the general rule against in- 
terest on demand deposits proven particularly effective in denying 
city banks the use of funds from country regions. This ideal has been 
thoroughly thwarted by the federal funds market,'02 and is probably 
unattainable in a modern, nationally integrated economy. All this is 
known, but the prohibition against interest on demand deposits and 
the interest ceilings on savings accounts and time deposits generally 
continue to apply. Their subsistence seems to depend on the political 
muscle of the many banks that fear competition.109 
Apart from serving ends ulterior to institutional safety, anticom- 
petitive regulation may well lead to another kind of indirect cost: the 
unequal treatment of different socioeconomic classes. Some of this 
inequity results from the fact that market forces overcome and par- 
100. 77 CONG. REC. 3729, 4165-66 (1933) (Sen. Glass); see S. REP. No. 94-487, 94th Cong., 
1st Sess. 10-11 (1975), reprinted in 121 CONG. REC. S21813-23 (daily ed. Dec. 11, 1975). 
101. See L. CHANDLER, supra note 76; M. FRIEDMAN & A. SCHWARTZ, supra note 76; P. 
TEMIN, supra note 76. None of these commentators assign any role to the lack of ceilings. 
Temin concludes that the crisis of November and December 1930 was principally due to 
a rash of bank failures in cotton-growing areas and to the failure of one large New 
York bank (the Bank of the United States) because of fraud. Id. at 85, 90-93. 
102. S. REP. No. 94-487, supra note 100, at 20. Federal funds, narrowly defined, are the 
reserve funds of member banks of the Federal Reserve System that are lent or borrowed 
among member banks. A broader definition would include certain transactions with in- 
stitutions other than member banks. On the operation of the federal funds market in 
general, see M. MAYER, THE BANKERS 206-23 (1974). 
103. As passed by the Senate, the Financial Institutions Act of 1975, S. 1267, 94th 
Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 121 CONG. REC. S12837-45 (daily ed. Dec. 11, 1975), im- 
plemented many of the earlier recommendations of the Hunt Commission, REPORT OF 
THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON FINANCIAL STRUCTURE AND REGULATION (1971), including 
the elimination of interest rate ceilings and differentials. The bill's failure in the House 
was attributed to intense lobbying. See Bus. WEEK, Apr. 26, 1976, at 36. 
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tially negate the impact of anticompetitive regulation in an uneven 
manner. For instance, the differential between the interest ceilings on 
savings accounts in thrift institutions and those in commercial banks 
has as one purpose the prevention of successful competition by com- 
mercial banks for savers' money, so that the money can be captured in 
institutions that will use more of it for mortgage loans.'04 Thus, the 
ulterior purpose is to help housing, which is among the most 
enthusiastically promoted of our national priorities.'05 During all re- 
cent periods of tight money, however, the ceilings have actually caused 
massive disintermediation,106 as savers have withdrawn their funds 
from savings accounts and invested them in non-price-regulated, 
higher-yielding investments like treasury bills and negotiable certif- 
icates of deposit.107 Regulatory action has repeatedly encouraged 
disintermediation even though it is a highly predictable phenome- 
non.'08 A tragic consequence has been that the impact of the interest 
ceilings is borne by savers whose accounts are so small or whose 
financial sophistication is so limited that the transaction and informa- 
tion costs of switching to higher-yield investments are prohibitive.'09 
During periods of disintermediation it is only the money of the smallest 
savers, who are often in the lower economic classes, that is captured at 
below-free-market prices for the ostensible1 benefit of home buyers, 
104. S. REP. No. 94-487, supra note 100, at 13. 
105. See note 72 supra. 
106. "Disintermediation" is the process whereby financial intermediaries in general, 
or some classes of them, experience a net outflow of funds to capital suppliers. Ordinarily, 
the term connotes removal by capital suppliers of funds from financial intermediaries for 
the direct purchase of stock, bonds, government securities, mortgages, and other financial 
assets issued by ultimate investors (those who invest in real assets). Disintermediation 
typically occurs when the rate of return on directly held financial assets exceeds the rate 
of return paid by intermediaries by more than a normal margin. 
107. S. REP. No. 94-487, supra note 100, at 9-15. 
108. Cook, supra note 72, at 8. 
109. Some of the discrimination has been coldly deliberate, as in the case of the 
Treasury Department's decision in 1970 to raise the minimum denomination in which 
treasury bills could be purchased from $1,000 to $10,000; the evidence is that this deci- 
sion quite effectively and abruptly curbed the disintermediating activities of small 
savers. Mullineaux, Interest-Rate Ceilings and the Treasury-Bill Market: Disintermedia- 
tion and the Small Saver, NEw ENGLAND ECON. REV., July/August 1973, at 19, 23-26. This 
is not to say that the housing advocates would not like to curb the disintermediat- 
ing activities of large savers; they simply lack the power, since large investors have so 
many investment alternatives that anticompetitive regulation of all of them is not 
feasible. 
110. Whether home buyers actually benefit even from successful governmental at- 
tempts to reduce the level of disintermediation is debatable. There are reasons to expect 
slippages between governmental programs and the cost and availability of mortgage 
credit for new and existing homes: bolstering funds held by thrift institutions may cause 
discretionary mortgage lenders, such as commercial banks and many mutual savings banks, 
to leave the mortgage market; and borrowers may step in who receive mortgage loans 
other than for the purchase of a home, e.g., to finance a child's college education. See 
Cook, supra note 72, at 13. 
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who are typically in higher income groups.1"' The amount of interest 
income thus exacted from small savers is not a trivial sum.112 
Another example of the inequity caused by the unevenness of anti- 
competitive regulation is a combined product of the price restraints 
and market entry limits on commercial banks. Such restrictions have a 
questionable impact on the competition faced by banks, with the ex- 
ception that they may curb competition for loans to small, local 
business borrowers and for the checking and savings accounts of small 
depositors. 13 
Finally, as for the third type of indirect cost, it is likely that anti- 
competitive regulation generates a misallocation of resources insofar as 
it shields inefficient intermediaries and sustains a market structure 
different from that which would be dictated by unfettered competition. 
For example, almost all studies of bank profitability and economies of 
scale in banking suggest that the median size of commercial banks in 
the United States is too small to be efficient.114 Therefore, an enormous 
111. See Financial Institutions and the Nation's Economy (FINE) "Discussion Prin- 
ciples": Hearings Before the Subcomnn. on Financial Institutions Supervision, Regulation 
and Insurance of the House Comm. on Banking, Currency and Housing, 94th Cong., 1st 
& 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 113-14, 121 (1975-76) (oral and prepared statements of Prof. E.J. Kane 
of Ohio State University). 
112. Dr. E.J. Kane, a visiting senior economist at the FDIC, recently testified that 
subsidizing the American homebuyer has cost the American saver $30 billion since 1966. 
I FINE STUDY PAPERS, supra note 3, at 309. 
113. See pp. 41-43 infra. 
114. Empirical studies of bank costs and scale efficiencies agree that there are 
economies of scale in banking, although they do not agree on the size levels necessary 
to achieve maximum efficiency. See D. ALHADEFF, MONOPOLY AND COMPETITION IN BANK- 
ING 83 (1954) (costs declined until banks reached $200 million asset level); L. GRAMLEY, A 
STUDY OF SCALE ECONOMIES IN BANKING (Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City 1962), 
cited in Wu & Connell, Merger Myopia: An Economic View of Supreme Court Decisions 
on Bank Mergers, 59 VA. L. REV. 860, 879 n.104 (1973) (ratio of bank costs to bank assets 
declined from 2.78% for banks with $1 million in assets to 2.39%o for $10 million banks 
and to 2.00% for $100 million banks); Greenbaum, Competition and Efficiency in the 
Banking System: An Empirical Research Project and its Policy Implications, 75 J. POLI- 
TICAL ECON. 461, 473-74 (1967) (reduction in number of U.S. banks to approximately 100 
would save $1 billion a year in banking costs); Greenbaum, A Study of Bank Costs, 4 
NAT'L BANKING REV. 415, 434 (1967) (optimum bank size about $300 million). See also 
Benston, Economies of Scale and Marginal Costs in Banking Operations, 2 NAT'L BANK- 
ING REV. 507 (1965) (for most banking services except business loans, number of deposit 
accounts and loans explained much more of variance in operations costs than did average 
size of deposit accounts or loans). 
An important qualification of the results of such studies is provided by other studies 
which indicate that the scale economics that clearly apply to individual banking offices 
do not extend to branching operations. F. BELL & N. MURPHY, COSTS IN COMMERCIAL 
BANKING: A QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF BANK BEHAVIOR AND ITS RELATION TO BANK 
REGULATION 46-68, 181, 215, 217 (Federal Reserve Bank of Boston Research Rep. No. 41, 
1968) (economies of scale may be offset by branching costs); Gilbert & Longbrake, The 
Effects of Branching by Financial Institutions on Competition, Productive Efficiency and 
Stability: An Examination of the Evidence, 4 J. BANK RESEARCH 154, 298, 304-06 (1973-74) 
(conclusions similar to Bell & Murphy); W. Longbrake, Productive Efficiency in Com- 
mercial Banking: The Impact of Bank Organizational Structure and Bank Size on the 
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amount of misallocation is almost certainly being endured.115 Only 
those who make a fetish of large numbers are likely to be persuaded 
by a response that justifies entry restraints by pointing to the uncertain 
Cost of Demand Deposit Services (FDIC Working Paper 72-10, 1972) (scale economies 
largely limited to banking offices). It has also been suggested that some scale efficiencies 
achievable by the use of automated equipment may be available to small banks through 
computer time-sharing. Baker, Banking Competition in the Age of the Computer, 90 
BANKING L.J. 193, 206-07 (1973). 
Evidence on bank profitability also strongly suggests that larger banks are more ef- 
ficient. One study of profit statistics for all federally insured banks for the years 1954- 
1974 discovered that return on net assets rose from 11.43% for banks with deposits of less 
than $5 million to 15.71% for banks with assets of more than $100 million. Gallick, Bank 
Profitability and Bank Size, FED. RES. BANK OF KANSAS CITY MONTHLY REV., Jail. 1976, 
at 11, 12. For studies identifying other factors that affect bank profitability, see Ford, 
Profitability: Why do some banks perform better than the average?, 66 BANKING, Oct. 1974, 
at 29; Olsen, How high-profit banks get that way, 67 BANKING, May 1975, at 46. 
Since the total assets of all United States banks approach $1 trillion, Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal Reserve Statistical Release H.8 (Sept. 
8, 1976), an optimal bank size between $300 million and $100 million in assets would 
imply that the efficient number of banks in the United States might be as low as 3,300 
to 10,000 banks. The actual number of banks is much higher (over 14,500). See note 246 
infra. 
115. One may consider new bank entry, branching, merger, and price restraints in 
succession. Logically, if the elimination of the need criterion as a restraint on new 
entrants were to have any impact at all, it would lead to beneficial challenges to large 
or small inefficient banks previously possessed of some local monopoly power. Empirical 
research on the impact of new bank entries under existing regulations seems, however, to 
have focused principally on the impact of new entrants oil high concentration levels. 
High levels of concentration may pose policy problems because the banks dominating 
the concentrated markets are larger than is necessary to realize scale economies. Gen- 
erally, the impact of new entrants oil concentration has been found to be slight. See, e.g., 
Alhadeff & Alhadeff, Bank Entry and Bank Concentration, 20 ANTITRUST BULL. 471 (1975). 
There is also evidence that new entry has salutary effects on the price of banking 
services, at least in the short run. Fraser & Rose, Bank Entry and Bank Performance, 27 
J. FINANCE 65 (1972), studied de novo entry by independent bank units into certain small, 
well-defined banking markets in the Eleventh Federal Reserve District and did find 
significant changes in the services offered by the established banks in these markets. 
Loan-asset ratios increased, greater emphasis was placed on business and consumer loans, 
while the prices for key banking services apparently did not rise relative to those for 
markets in which there was no new bank entry. 
Eliminating restrictions on branching might well have a noticeable impact. In view of 
the findings that branching costs may offset scale economies, see note 114 supra, ex- 
pansion by banks via the branching technique may do little or nothing for the efficiency 
of the expanding bank. Nevertheless, if a large, efficient bank with its corresponding low 
costs opens a new branch in a new local market, it may prod existing banks toward 
greater efficiency. Or, if the regulators were to allow it, the new bank could drive the 
older, smaller banks out of business. 
In addition, eliminating the need barrier to entry by merger (but not the applicability 
of sound antitrust principles) may have a desirable effect, but solid empirical evidence is 
sorely lacking. A study comparing 81 merging and 81 nonmerging banks in the Fourth 
Federal Reserve District found some evidence to suggest that, during the post-merger 
period, merging banks attempted to provide more credit to their respective communities 
than nonmerging banks. Smith, The Performance of Merging Banks, 44 J. Bus. 184, 187 
(1971).f 
Finally, abolition of price restraints would probably lead to the improvement or demise 
of some inefficient institutions. The possibilities should not be overstated, however, since 
the prohibition against interest on checking accounts and the interest ceilings on savings 
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and perhaps controllable contingency that unrestrained competition 
would result in an unbearably concentrated banking industry domi- 
nated by a few national giants.110 
2. Benefits 
Even if effective, anticompetitive regulation provides only one type 
of benefit in terms of ensuring soundness-protection against failures 
due to the workings of competition. More generally, when effective, 
anticompetitive regulation reduces competitive pressures and creates 
monopoly rents which may serve to save some institutions that would 
otherwise have failed for reasons other than competitive pressure. 
These hypothetical institutions might have failed because they were 
operated inefficiently or dishonestly, or because management, reflect- 
accounts and time deposits have not in fact prevented a substantial amount of com- 
petition among banks for funds. Instead of offering higher returns on deposits, banks 
have offered more services such as free checking, gifts, credit cards, and longer hours. In 
one study, the assumption that Regulation Q, 12 C.F.R. pt. 217 (1976), and the prohibition 
of interest on demand deposits are totally ineffective was used to derive an equation for 
the demand for money which yielded a better explanation of the monetary aggregates 
over the period 1880-1970 than would use of the opposite assumption. Klein, Competitive 
Interest Payments on Bank Deposits and the Long-Run Demand for Money, 64 AM. ECON. 
REV. 931 (1974). Klein explains the result on the theory that time and demand deposits 
provide a nonpecuniary return-their liquidity-which is not subject to regulation. Cer- 
tain extra services, such as longer hours, directly affect the liquidity of a particular bank's 
deposits to its customers. 
116. Yet essentially this argument seems to have been made. Verkuil, Perspectives on 
Reform of Financial Institutions, 83 YALE L.J. 1349, 1363-66 (1974). 
Whatever the consequences of dreadful concentration in the apocalyptic world of 
'only" 100 to 500 United States banks, studies of the effects of existing levels of market 
concentration on loan interest rates have been inconclusive. In an early study relied 
upon in Verkuil, supra at 1364 n.97, Edwards examined business loan survey data for 48 
metropolitan areas for 1955 and 1957. In the 1955 data, he found that a 20% increase in 
the market share held by the three largest banks did result in an increase in interest rates 
charged to small borrowers. In the 1957 data, he found no correlation between market 
concentration and interest rates. Edwards, Concentration in Banking and Its Effect on 
Business Loan Rates, 46 REV. ECON. & STATIsTIcs 294 (1964). A second study of 19 banking 
markets, using the two-bank market share as an index of concentration, found positive 
correlations. Edwards, The Banking Competition Controversy, 3 NAT'L BANKING REV. 1 
(1965). But Edwards's methodology has been criticized. Bell & Murphy, Impact of Market 
Structure on the Price of a Commercial Banking Service, 51 REV. ECON. & STATISTICs 210, 
210 (1969); Phillips, Competition, Confusion, and Commercial Banking, 19 J. FINANCE 32, 
37 n.18 (1964). Moreover, other studies of the effects of market concentration on interest 
rates or price of other banking services lh.ave concluded that there is no significant 
correlation. Fleschig, The Effect of Concentration on Bank Loan Rates, 20 J. FINANCE 298 
(1965); Phillips, supra; Taylor, Average Interest Charges, the Loan Mix and Measures of 
Competition, 27 J. FINANCE 793 (1968). But see Bell & Murphy, supra at 213 (concluding 
that concentration is positively correlated with cost of checking account services); Kauf- 
man, Bank Market Structure and Performance: The Evidence from Iowa, 32 So. EcON. 
J. 429 (1966) (interest charged on loans directly related to concentration); Phillips, Evidence 
on Concentration in Banking Markets and Interest Rates, 53 FED. REs. BULL. 916, 925 
(1967) (weight of evidence is that-with effects of loan size, bank size, region, and time 
removed-concentration was positively associated with interest rates in 19 metropolitan 
areas studied). 
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ing its own risk-return preferences or those of its elite suppliers of 
capital, deliberately took high risks. Yet anticompetitive regulation 
itself does not prevent incompetence, dishonesty, or the deliberate 
taking of high risks. There is no assurance that the monopoly rents 
generated by effective anticompetitive regulation will be sufficient to 
prevent an unacceptably high rate of intermediary failures due to 
causes other than competition. 
One receives no greater encouragement from consideration of the 
magnitude and the certainty of the protection that anticompetitive 
regulation will provide. There are grave doubts whether it is very 
effective in reducing competitive pressures-doubts prompted by the 
ingenious responses of the regulated industry and the efficient adjust- 
ments of the capital markets to price restraints.117 Consequently, there 
is reason to question the size of the reservoir of monopoly rents that 
it creates. 
The need criterion for entry, which affects many types of financial 
intermediaries, can be taken as an example for extended analysis. Entry 
regulation may well have an impact on the number of new institutions 
formed in a given period'18 and, together with related restraints, may 
affect firm size generally. But several sets of reasons indicate that the 
criterion is likely to be substantially ineffective in reducing the com- 
petitive pressures faced by many institutions and, more importantly, 
in preventing their failure. In the first place, the criterion is vague 
and difficult to apply. If the index of need is whether the new entrant 
will be profitable, regulators will engage in the difficult art of market 
forecasting.'19 Nor is the regulator likely to take into account subjec- 
tive but vitally important factors such as the aggressiveness and imagi- 
117. See note 96 supra. Good, direct statistical evidence that anticompetitive regula- 
tion does not prevent many failures is hard to come by because of the difficulty of 
identifying satisfactory control groups. All commercial banks are subject to many kinds 
of anticompetitive regulation, for example, and to compare bank failures today with 
some long-past era of virtually unregulated banking would establish little. Similarly, 
whether the existing different intensities of anticompetitive regulation of various classes 
of banks lead to differences in the failure rate is a difficult question: a real impact might 
be obscured by other factors, while an apparent impact might result from other dif- 
ferences. 
118. See Peltzman, Entry in Commercial Banking, 8 J.L. & ECON. 11 (1965); Peltzman, 
Bank Entry Regulation: Its Impact and Purpose, 3 NAT'L BANKING REV. 163 (1965). 
Edwards & Edwards, Measuring the Effectiveness of Regulation: The Case of Bank Entry 
Regulation, 17 J.L. & EcON. 445 (1974), criticize an earlier study by Peltzman which found 
that regulation had reduced bank entry by 57% over the period 1937-1962. Using Peltz- 
man's data and methodology, but including revisions required by their criticisms, the 
authors concluded that Peltzman had overstated the restrictive effect of regulation by 
almost 45%. Id. at 451. 
119. Objective data such as the fact that existing institutions are not earning excessive 
accounting profits will prove nothing, since this fact is consistent with the incumbents' 
having some market power and using it to enjoy the inefficient life. 
41 
This content downloaded from 130.132.173.207 on Wed, 5 Jun 2013 13:25:13 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 86: 1, 1976 
nation of the applicants. The regulator's judgment will prevail over 
that of the budding entrepreneurs and will anticipate the verdict of 
the market instead of testing it. If the index of need is the adequacy of 
existing institutional facilities, problems arise because there are a great 
number of factors that might be considered in determining adequacy; 
for example, there will be difficulty in securing information or con- 
sensus about the existing provision of services and difficulty in fore- 
casting whether the new entrant would really do anything about the 
deficiencies. 
Even if the need criterion were more precise, its application might 
have little effect on competition in the various lines of business.120 
Suppose, for example, that the strict application of the need criterion 
succeeds in keeping only one bank in each town in a state. Suppose 
also that there are the usual prohibitions against interest on demand 
deposit accounts and the usual interest ceilings on savings accounts and 
time deposits. Individual banks might superficially appear to have a 
stranglehold on local liquid savings, but in fact they will have to com- 
pete against suppliers of deposit substitutes. Corporate depositors might 
switch in part to Treasury bills; middle-class depositors to money 
market mutual funds; smaller depositors to thrift institutions. More- 
over, the legal restrictions will not prevent the level of this competi- 
tion from increasing sharply because of general economic develop- 
ments, such as rising interest rates. Nor, if towns are close enough, 
will the restrictions prohibit some banks from competing among 
themselves in terms of longer hours, special services, and special 
products such as travelers' checks and credit cards. 
Nor will the one-bank-per-town arrangement do much to ease com- 
petition on the investment side. Banks use their funds in five principal 
credit markets. They invest heavily in securities: in United States 
government securities, which are bought and traded in a decidedly 
national, competitive, and efficient market; in municipal securities, 
which are often purchased and traded in statewide or national markets; 
and in other widely traded investment securities. Banks also make 
consumer loans, for which they must compete with many retail stores, 
finance companies, and other nonbank lenders. They supply mort- 
gage funds, but again must contend with other institutions-the thrifts, 
the life insurance companies, the REITs, mortgage companies, and 
others. In addition, they engage heavily in making short and medium- 
term business loans. Here they clearly predominate over other kinds 
120. For a fuller exposition of the arguments on competitive impact, see Alhadeff, 
supra note 71, at 252-60. 
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of lenders, but they still may have to compete with one another be- 
cause many loans, especially the larger ones, are made in national 
markets. A bank in Chicago is quite able to participate in a lending 
syndicate that makes a loan to a business borrower in Savannah. 
Finally, many of them lend the use of their reserve balances in the 
federal funds market, which is basically national.'2' 
In short, all that is left of the grandly anticompetitive aspirations of 
the system of banking fiefdoms is an ability of the lords to exact some 
modest monopoly rents from individual checking account holders, who 
have trouble finding convenient substitutes or competitive accounts, 
and small business borrowers, who often must rely on the local bank. 
All the other vassals have fled the manor. 
Whether competition leads to an unacceptable number of failures is 
ultimately an empirical question, given some normative stipulation of 
the "unacceptable number." In considering the precise way in which 
competition might be expected to work its mischief, it seems unlikely 
that anticompetitive regulation will be an efficient or reliable device. 
Competition reduces earnings, and earnings pressures arguably lead 
institutions to shift to high-risk, high-return (i.e., "unsound") invest- 
ments. The extent to which high-risk investments are made because of 
competition-induced earnings pressure is unknown. Moreover, the 
complex of actual anticompetitive regulations does not begin to con- 
trol all factors that can cause earnings pressures,122 so the linkage 
between anticompetitive regulations and sound investments is likely 
to be weak. One would therefore suppose that regulation would be 
more sensibly geared to deal directly with unsound investment port- 
folios; anticompetitive regulation could be dropped and the task of 
ensuring such soundness left to portfolio regulation.123 
Lastly, even when anticompetitive regulation results in the financial 
institution's obtaining some monopoly rents, it is not clear that the 
precious cushion of safety will stay in its proper place. It is possible 
that the prize will be defiled in some secular environment of liberal 
dividends, generous compensation of management, or comfortable ex- 
pense allowances.124 
121. See note 102 supra. 
122. For example, regulation neither squelches all competition from nonbank bor- 
rowers, lenders, and investors, nor controls fluctuations in the demand for and supply 
of funds that are due to recessions, changes in the local or regional economy, and other 
general economic developments. 
123. This suggestion assumes that portfolio regulation itself can be effective and 
otherwise desirable, a proposition disputed below. 
124. It should be observed that there is no obvious general reason why drains on an 
institution such as losses due to insider dishonesty will not often absorb or even exceed 
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3. Summary 
The preceding analysis yields three observations about anticompeti- 
tive regulation as a strategy for reducing the riskiness of financial 
intermediaries. That strategy tends to generate high secondary formu- 
lation costs. It often leads to substantial amounts of each of the three 
kinds of consequences herein classified as indirect costs. And it is 
remarkably ineffective. If any of the other strategies prove to be 
reasonably effective and less costly, anticompetitive regulation could 
readily be dismissed as redundant and even harmful. 
B. Portfolio Regulation 
Much of the effort that has gcne into legal regulation of financial 
intermediaries has focused on their internal financial condition. 
An extensive array of legal rules has been developed to restrict the 
kind, amount, and valuation of assets in which each particular type of 
financial intermediary may invest.125 There has been equally extensive 
the institution's monopoly rents. Even if the insider were following a prudent parasite 
rule ("Don't take so much that you kill the host organism"), he might find the rate of 
failure among firms without monopoly rents, or even a higher rate, a prudent risk. 
125. It is difficult to generalize meaningfully about asset restraints, beyond saying 
that they are usually designed to restrict institutions to less risky classes of investments. 
Thus, a common theme is to allow carte blanche investment in U.S. government securities, 
but to prohibit or limit investment in common stock or direct ownership of real estate. 
Another theme is to require minimal diversification, according to some simple mechanical 
rule. The asset restraints applicable to financial institutions include: 
COMMERCIAL BANKS 
A. National Banks: Under authority of statute, 12 U.S.C. ? 24, para. Seventh (Supp. IV 
1974), the Comptroller has issued regulations regarding the investment securities of 
national banks. 12 C.F.R. ?? 1.1-.410, 18.6 (1976). There are also other statutory restric- 
tions, e.g., 12 U.S.C. ?? 29, 371 (1970 & Supp. IV 1974) (real estate); id. ? 84 (loans to one 
borrower). 
B. State Member Banks: 12 U.S.C. ? 335 (1970) (same restrictions as id. ? 24, para. 
Seventh (Supp. IV 1974)). 
C. Other State Banks: Some states restrict real estate holdings to use for a bank's of- 
fices and require the sale of other acquired real estate. E.g., CAL. FIN. CODE ?? 750, 751 
(West 1968); N.Y. BANKING LAW ? 98 (McKinney 1971). Other regulations mandate rules 
for the valuation of assets. E.g., id. ? 104. 
THRIFT INSTITUTIONS 
A. Mutual Savings Banks: Some statutes provide for lists of assets which MSBs may 
legally hold. E.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 168, ? 51 (Michie/Law. Co-op 1970 & Supp. 1976); 
N.Y. BANKING LAW ?? 35, 235 (McKinney 1971 & Supp. 1975-76). New York also imposes 
the same asset-valuation rule as for commercial banks. Id. ? 242 (McKinney 1971). 
B. Savings and Loan Associations: Both federal and state laws restrict the investments 
S&Ls may make. E.g., 12 U.S.C. ? 1464(c) (Supp. IV 1974); CAL. FIN. CODE ? 6702 (West 
1968). There are also valuation rules. E.g., 12 C.F.R. ?? 545.18, 563.17-1(b) (1976); CAL. 
FIN. CODE ? 8702 (West 1968). 
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regulation of the kinds of liabilities or equity claims that each in- 
termediary may issue, the preconditions of their issuance, and the 
methods of valuing them on balance sheets prepared for regulatory 
purposes.126 Finally, there are important and sometimes complex rules 
LIFE INSURANCE COMPANIES 
For examples of minimum capital investment requirements, asset restrictions, and 
valuation rules for stocks and bonds, see N.Y. INS. LAW ?? 46-a, 79 to 82, 91 (McKinney 
1966 & Supp. 1975-76). Roughly speaking, these provisions require the company, to the 
extent of its minimum capital or required policyholders' surplus, to invest in certain 
securities thought to be extremely safe. They permit investment of other funds in the 
more numerous, elaborately defined classes of "reserve investments," which are still 
quite conservative. 
PRIVATE PENSION PLANS 
Under federal law, pension plans are basically free from direct restraints on invest- 
ment. There is a restriction on the amount of an employer's stock that certain plans may 
own. ERISA ? 407, 29 U.S.C. ? 1107 (Supp. IV 1974). And there are valuation rules. Id. 
?? 103(b)(3)(C), 302(c)(2), 29 U.S.C. ?? 1023(b)(3)(C), 1082(c)(2) (Supp. IV 1974). 
PROPERTY AND LIABILITY INSURANCE COMPANIES 
For regulations concerning minimum capital investment, reserve and surplus fund in- 
vestments, and valuation rules, see, e.g., N.Y. INS. LAW ?? 79, 80(2), 85, 85-a, 91 (Mc- 
Kinney 1966 & Supp. 1975-76). Unlike New York life insurers, these companies, after 
meeting "minimum capital" investment requirements, need invest amounts equal to only 
one-half of their reserves in cash and "reserve" investments. Other funds may be in- 
vested in a category of "residual and surplus fund" investments which includes all but 
certain prohibited securities (e.g., stock of insolvent companies). This difference partially 
explains why property and liability insurers invest so much more heavily than life in- 
surers in common stocks. Other reasons are financial rather than legal. 
INVESTMENT COMPANIES 
Portfolio regulation of investment companies is radically different from that applied 
to most other financial intermediaries. The emphasis is not on permitted and forbidden 
classes of financial assets, but on ensuring that fund shareholders know, in a rough way, 
the risks they are facing. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. ?? 80a-8(b)(1), -12(a), -13 (1970); 17 C.F.R. 
? 210.6-02(f)(1) (1976). The Investment Company Act's paucity of direct asset restraints is 
similar to ERISA's; but, since ERISA's funding rules are much more drastic than the 
Investment Company Act's restraints on leveraging, see notes 126 & 127 infra, an overall 
comparison would indicate that ERISA is geared much more to the substantive control 
of intermediary riskiness than is the Investment Company Act. 
126. Some limitations on the types, amounts, and valuation of liabilities are listed 
below. Some of them, such as the prohibition against interest-bearing demand deposits, 
have already been classified under the anticompetitive strategy. This duality is not 
anomalous: although the strategies are analytically distinct, nothing prevents particular 
rules from exemplifying more than one strategy. As a historical matter, though, prohibi- 
tions against interest-bearing demand deposits were probably designed more to curb 
competition than to foreclose the type of portfolio of assets and liabilities that a risk- 
loving management might create, even in a noncompetitive environment. See p. 36 supra. 
COMMERCIAL BANKS 
A. National Banks: Restrictions on indebtedness and on standby letters of credit are 
included in 12 U.S.C. ? 82 (1970); 12 C.F.R. ?? 11.7(c)(9)(viii), 14.5 (1976). 
B. Member Banks: 12 U.S.C. ? 371a (1970) (prohibiting issuance of interest-bearing de- 
mand deposits); id. ? 372 (restrictions on bank's acceptance of certain instruments). Regula- 
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concerning the initial level of capitalization for the intermediary and 
the maintenance over time of certain levels of net worth, capital, or 
tion Q, 12 C.F.R. ? 217.3 (1976), imposes limits on the payment of interest on savings 
accounts and time deposits. Regulation H, id. ? 208.8(d), provides that a standby letter 
of credit counts as a loan for purposes of statutory limits on loans. 
C. Other State Banks: Among the restrictions on payment of interest on deposits are 
12 U.S.C. ? 1828(g) (Supp. IV 1974); 12 C.F.R. ? 329 (1976); CAL. FIN. CODE ? 854 (West 
1968). For capital requirements tied to total indebtedness, see, eg., id. ? 660. Under 12 
C.F.R. ? 337.2 (1976), standby letters of credit are treated as loans. 
THRIFT INSTITUTIONS 
A. Mutual Savings Banks: States prohibit MSBs from accepting certain deposits and 
regulate the interest and terms of deposits; they may also restrict nondeposit borrowings. 
E.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 167, ? 18B (Michie/Law. Co-op Supp. 1976); id. ch. 168, ? 66; 
N.Y. BANKING LAW ?? 234, 237 (McKinney 1971 & Supp. 1975-76). 
B. Savings and Loan Associations: No checking is allowed on savings accounts at insured 
S&Ls except in certain states. 12 U.S.C.A. ? 1832(a) (WVest June 1976 Pamphlet); 41 Fed. 
Reg. 9297 (1976), amending 12 C.F.R. ? 545.4-1(a) (1976) (FHLBB rule against checking). 
Similar rules are contained in CAL. FIN. CODE ? 5003 (West Supp. 1976). For examples of 
federal and state limits on borrowing, see 12 C.F.R. ? 563.8 (1976); and CAL. FIN. CODE 
? 6717 (West 1968). 
LIFE INSURANCE COMPANIES 
Regulation of insurance companies includes limits on the interest paid on preferred 
stock issued by the company. E.g., N.Y. INS. LAW ? 48(7) (McKinney Supp. 1975-76). Other 
regulation requires specific policy provisions and limits issuance of new policies to 
control the company's rate of growth. E.g., id. ?? 208-a, 212 (McKinney 1966 & Supp. 
1975-76). There are also rules for the valuation of life insurance and annuity contract 
reserve liabilities. E.g., id. ? 205. Valuation of reserve liabilities is at the heart of port- 
folio regulation of life insurance companies, just as the question of capital adequacy 
dominates discussions of commercial bank regulation. The difference stems from the 
fact that life insurance reserve liabilities are remote, contingent, and, though actuarially 
computable, can be valued at very different amounts depending on assumptions, for ex- 
ample, as to interest and mortality, and on the actuarial method. Commercial banks, by 
contrast, principally have liabilities which are short-term, fixed in amount, and not 
worth discounting to present value; the amounts and yields of their assets and liabilities 
are subject to short-term and intermediate-term fluctuations, creating a need for liquidity 
buffers and capital cushions. For an excellent discussion of problems inherent in the 
normal method of computing life insurance reserves, see Belth, Life Insurance Reserves 
and the Regulatory Process, in INSURANCE, GOVERNMENT, AND SOCIAL POLICY 95 (S. Kimball 
& H. Denenberg eds. 1969). 
PRIVATE PENSION PLANS 
In a sense, the participation rules, vesting standards, and benefit accrual requirements, 
ERISA ?? 201-211, 29 U.S.C. ?? 1051-1061 (Supp. IV 1974), constitute limitations on the 
kinds of liabilities that private pension plans may have. But these rules are designed to 
ensure fairness to individual participants and beneficiaries and to protect them from 
disappointment of just expectations, rather than to protect them as a group from the 
financial failure of the plan. The portfolio-type rules that do look toward plan sound- 
ness are the funding rules, discussed in note 127 infra. 
PROPERTY AND LIABILITY INSURANCE COMPANIES 
There are restrictions on certain risks and limits on certain expenses. See, e.g., N.Y. 
INS. LAW ?? 315, 321, 324, 351 (McKinnCy 1966 & Stipp. 1975). Most important, however, 
are the provisions on reserve liabilities. E.g., id. ?? 74, 326, 352. For a good discussion of 
reserve liabilities, see S. HUEBNER, K. BLACK & R. CLINE, supra note 21, at 571-81. As 
in the case of life insurance reserves, most unearned premium and loss reserves of 
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surplus.127 Together, these restraints make up what is here called port- 
folio regulation, since they seek to reduce the riskiness of a financial 
intermediary by affecting its portfolio of assets and liabilities. 
property and liability insurers represent contingent liabilities, which by ordinary ac- 
counting conventions are left off the face of balance sheets. But because of their 
great importance and essential relevance to the insurance business, they must some- 
how be accounted for in insurance company financial statements. Loss reserves are 
estimated by various accepted techniques. Unearned premium reserves, however, are 
computed by simply applying to prepaid premiums the fraction of the total insurance 
period that has yet to run. For example, if a homeowner has paid $250 for a two-year 
fire insurance policy and 18 months have passed, the company's unearned premium 
reserves will include $62.50 on account of that policy. (In practice, reserves are not 
computed for each policy and then added up; less precise, short-cut techniques are 
applied to whole blocks of policies.) These reserves are set up in recognition of at least 
three contingencies: policy cancellations, which tinder nonforfeiture laws entitle the 
policyholder to get back part of the premium paid; losses not yet incurred and therefore 
not reflected in loss reserves; and expenses not wet accrued in connection with such 
losses. But, unlike the method of dealing with life insurance reserves, the valuation of 
unearned premium reserves does not require a projection of expected outgo items of these 
three sorts, together with a discounting of the expected payments to present value. This 
difference appears to reflect the fact that property and liability insurance policies are 
usually written for much shorter terms than life insurance policies, thus making discount- 
ing to present value less important. Also, property and liability contingencies are less 
susceptible of precise actuarial treatment, thus making projections of outgo items riskier. 
INVESTMENT COMPANIES 
A registered open-end company cannot issue senior securities, but it may borrow from 
banks, subject to a 300% asset-coverage test; also, it is basically restricted to one class of 
preferred stock. 15 U.S.C. ? 80a-18(f) (1970). 
127. In considering the sample of such restraints given below, the vacuity of ordinary 
business corporation law's capitalization requirements should be kept in mind. 
COMMERCIAL BANKS 
A. National Banks: Initial capital requirements of national banks are set out in 12 
U.S.C. ? 51 (1970) ($100,000, with exceptions). Prohibitions on withdrawal or reduction of 
this specified "legal" capital are given in id. ?? 56, 59. These rules are still fairly weak. 
Regulatory urgings toward maintenance of 'capital adequacy" as a bank grows larger 
appear to rest on no specific statutory rule or delegation of rulemaking power to the 
Comptroller. 
Although bank reserve requirements now seem principally to function as mechanisms 
for controlling the money supply, they were originally designed to provide a modicum 
of liquidity to protect against business fluctuations. R. ROBINSON, THE MANAGEMENT OF 
BANK FUNDS 73-75 (2d ed. 1962). National banks must, of course, be members of the 
Federal Reserve System. See 12 U.S.C. ?? 142, 282, 462 (1970). Actually, a bank's reserves 
are now among its most illiquid assets. 
B. State Member Banks: The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System sets 
capital and surplus requirements for state banks applying for membership in the System; 
after admission, capital stock may not be reduced without the Board's prior approval. Id. 
? 329; Regulation H, 12 C.F.R. pt. 208 (1976). Within statutory limits, the Board also sets 
reserve requirements as percentages of deposits. 12 U.S.C. ? 461(b) (1970); Regulation D, 
12 C.F.R. pt. 204 (1976). 
C. Other State Banks: States set minimum legal capital requirements for banks 
chartered under their laws, often according to the population of the location of the 
bank's head office. Amounts may range between $50,000 and $300,000. E.g., CAL. FIN. 
CODE ?? 380, 381, 384 (WVest 1968 & Supp. 1976); N.Y. BANKING LAW ? 4001 (McKinney 
1971). They may also provide a remedy for capital impairment and regulate capital 
reduction. E.g., CAL. FIN. CODE ?? 660, 661 (West 1968 & Supp. 1976); N.Y. BANKING LAW 
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1. Costs 
Secondary formulation costs of portfolio regulation are at least 
moderate, because the perceived suboptimality of many current regula- 
tions has caused some regulatory agencies to engage in continuing 
research into both existing and potential rules and procedures.128 Some 
of the research is so fundamental that it should be allocated to primary 
formulation costs and classified as oriented to the eventual production 
of new types of rules and procedures rather than to the improvement 
of existing ones. Unlike most of the primary formulation costs attrib- 
? 114 (McKinney 1971). States also establish reserve requirements. E.g., CAL. FIN. CODE 
?? 1251, 1253 (West 1968 & Supp. 1976); N.Y. BANKING LAW ?? 14(j), 107 (McKinney Supp. 
1975-76). 
THRIFT INSTITUTIONS 
A. Mutual Savings Banks: State law requires minimum initial funds to incorporate, and 
also surplus funds for operation. E.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 168, ? 77 (Michie/Law. Co-op 
1970); N.Y. BANKING LAW ?? 233, 243, 244 (McKinney 1971). 
B. Savings and Loan Associations: The FHLBB promulgates rules (including minimum 
capital requirements) for organizing federal S&Ls and sets liquidity requirements. 12 
U.S.C. ?? 1425a, 1464(a) (1970); 12 C.F.R. ? 543.2(g) (1976); 41 Fed. Reg. 6062 (1976), 
amending 12 C.F.R. ? 523.11 (1976). Some states also have minimum net worth require- 
ments. E.g., CAL. FIN. CODE ?? 6901, 6902(a) (West Supp. 1976). 
LIFE INSURANCE COMPANIES 
For examples of minimum capital requirements, see N.Y. INS. LAW ?? 77, 91(2), 191 
(McKinney 1966 & Supp. 1975-76) ($1 million normally the minimum capital; other rules 
as to investment of capital funds and special reserve fund). 
PRIVATE PENSION PLANS 
Minimum funding standards are contained in ERISA ?? 302, 305, 29 U.S.C. ?? 1082, 
1085 (Supp. IV 1974). ERISA's funding requirements, when viewed in conjunction with 
the sponsoring employer's liability for underfunding to the extent of 30% of its net 
worth, ERISA ?? 4062(a), (b), 4068, 29 U.S.C. ?? 1362(a), (b), 1368 (Supp. IV 1974), are 
the functional equivalent of a substantial net worth or capital adequacy requirement. If 
the plan's asset values decline or the actuary's projections prove too optimistic, the 
employer company will have to make larger contributions. The company finds out about 
such adjustments every three years, when the plan is valued. The system is analogous to 
an assessment plan of life insurance, which requires the premium payers periodically to 
adjust their premiums in light of the company's experience. The chief difference is that 
under ERISA the entity subject to varying premiums is usually a fairly large business 
entity, possibly possessed of more assets and less need for level premiums than the 
ordinary individual consumer of life insurance. 
PROPERTY AND LIABILITY INSURANCE COMPANIES 
In New York, for example, the types and number of lines of business determine the 
required paid-in capital. See N.Y. INS. LAW ? 311 (McKinney 1966). 
INVESTMENT COMPANIES 
In general, the required minimum net worth is $100,000. 15 U.S.C. ? 80a-14 (1970); 17 
C.F.R. ?? 270.14a-1, -2 (1976) (exceptions). 
198. On the Federal Reserve Bank of New York's evolving research into an effective 
early-warning system, see note 170 infra. On the Comptroller's National Bank Surveillance 
System, see I FINE STUDY PAPERS, supra note 3, at 368-69, 398-99. 
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utable to the other strategies, these are ongoing rather than sunk 
costs and are thus relevant to current policy choices. 
Direct enforcement costs connected with portfolio regulation are 
apt to be very high, depending on whether regulators make it a practice 
to test for compliance by examining the records concerning each 
transaction.'99 In making this assessment, I have allocated to the 
category of direct enforcement costs a large portion of the costs of 
enforcing the elaborate reporting requirements imposed on all fi- 
nancial intermediaries and most of the costs of on-site examinations of 
all depository-type and most insurance-type financial intermediaries. 
This seems to be in accord with the common understanding of the 
regulators and regulated firms as to the main thrust of the examina- 
tion and reporting processes.'30 Whether direct enforcement costs of 
effective portfolio regulation are inherently very high, however, is an 
open question. It is possible that costs could be substantially reduced 
without any significant loss of effectiveness by eliminating some of 
the details examiners must investigate.131 It is also possible that good 
mechanical rules, if possible to develop, could be enforced primarily 
through the reporting process, supplemented by special investigations 
in lieu of regular examinations. 
Indirect costs other than the inefficiencies generated by portfolio 
regulation tend to be low. Although such regulation occasionally serves 
ends ulterior to safety, this is not an essential or general trait. Some 
129. A very rough idea of the order of magnitude of direct enforcement costs is sug- 
gested by the bank regulatory agencies' employment figures. (Figures for insurance 
departments would be lower because the industry is so much smaller than the com- 
mercial banking industry. See Clark, supra note 1, at 1605-06 nn.3, 6, 7.) As of December 
31, 1974, for example, about 72% of the 2,808 persons employed by the FDIC were bank 
examiners. [1974] FDIC ANNUAL REPORT 23. The Comptroller of the Currency, in a 
report to Congressman Reuss dated December 23, 1975, stated that his office had ap- 
proximately 2,150 employees participating in bank examinations. I FINE STUDY PAPERS, 
sitpra note 3, at 362-64. By December 31, 1974, the professional staff of the examination 
departments of the Federal Reserve Banks had increased to 789 persons. Id. at 525. State 
examination departments vary, of course. One now-dated estimate put the total number 
of active bank examiners in the United States at about 7,500. M. MAYER, THE BANKERS 
371 (1974). 
As the text indicates, direct enforcement costs slloul(1 also include most of the costs of 
preparing and submitting financial reports to regulatory agencies. But no figures are 
available from which to estimate those costs. 
130. this is not to deny that examiners may discover violations of regulatory pro- 
visions that are not principally concerned with affecting the intermediary's portfolio. 
They may, for example, discover evidence of insider misconduct. Similarly, detailed re- 
porting requirements alert regulators to possibly adverse changes in the financial con- 
dition of the reporting intermediaries, thereby leading the regulators to investigate the 
company and, perhaps, to discover misconduct. 
131. For example, bank examiners traditionally evaluated all or most of a bank's 
loans. Following the recommendations of a study by Haskins & Sells, however, some bank 
examiners will stress review of a bank's internal controls, such as audits and prudent 
credit and investment rules. I FINE STUDY PAPERS, supra note 3, at 359, 395-98. 
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rules ostensibly geared to safety have indirect costs because they are 
animated by the desire of special interest groups to capture the funds 
of a given intermediary for investment in a favored sector. More typ- 
ically, however, portfolio restraints are consciously directed by the 
legislature to ends other than institutional soundness because of the 
perceived public benefits of those ends. Perhaps the most striking 
example is the general restriction of savings and loan associations to 
investments in residential real estate mortgage loans. Similarly, a 
regulation like that prohibiting an institution from owning more 
than five percent of the outstanding voting securities of any one 
issuer'32 is designed to prevent institutional dominance of portfolio 
companies rather than to ensure portfolio safety. 
As for the second indirect cost, portfolio regulation may conceivably 
have discriminatory effects. It may make capital markets more favorable 
for governmental units (whose securities are frequently favored by 
statutory asset restraints and legal lists) than for the private sector. But 
the presence of unregulated investors, conflicting investment regula- 
tions, the interrelationship of capital markets, and the ineffectiveness 
of much portfolio regulation should considerably mitigate such effects. 
The third indirect cost-the prevention of the efficient achievement 
of legitimate business goals-requires much more extended discussion. 
In analyzing this type of cost, useful insights are gained from portfolio 
theory, which is concerned with the proper methods of conceptualizing 
risks faced by investors and with methods of setting risk levels con- 
sistent with the highest possible return at each level.133 If the costs of 
implementing new schemes of portfolio regulation are zero, it is un- 
exceptionable that the law ought to constrain the portfolio risk of 
financial intermediaries through those techniques that least restrict 
management's ability to achieve the highest rate of return at the ceiling 
risk level.134 If there are costs of implementation, no new scheme 
should be inaugurated unless the marginal social costs of implementing 
a less restrictive alternative do not exceed the marginal expected return 
that it produces for the intermediary.135 
132. Generally applicable rules of this nature were proposed by Senator Lloyd Bentsen 
in 1974. See Stockholders Investment Act of 1974: Hearings on S.2842 & S.2787 Before the 
Subcomm. on Financial Markets of the Senate CoItnin. on Finanwce, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 5, 
12-23 (1974). 
133. For introductions to portfolio theory, see J. FRANCIS & S. ARCHER, PORTFOLIO ANAL- 
Ysis (1971); and K. SMITH, PORTFOLIO MANACEMENT (1971). 
134. A move from existing techniques to these "least restrictive" techniques would 
make the elite suppliers of capital better off without making the public suppliers of capital 
worse off. An economist would characterize this as a "Pareto superior" move. 
135. Public policy might dictate that regulated intermediaries internalize the marginal 
social costs of a less restrictive mode of portfolio regulation-for example, by charging 
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An investor evaluating her investment alternatives ought to consider 
not only the expected returns from prospective assets but also the 
riskiness of those assets, i.e., some appropriate measure of the dis- 
persion of numerous possible returns around the expected return. 
These risk-return characteristics of the assets should then be tested 
against the investor's preferences-the relative utilities to her of dif- 
ferent combinations of risk and return.136 Moreover, portfolio theory 
teaches that because of the phenomenon of covariation,137 evaluation 
of investment assets should proceed in terms of alternative portfolios 
of assets, not on an asset-by-asset basis. The investor may be able to 
them the additional costs of examinations and litigation occurring under the less restric- 
tive mode. 
Several viewpoints are possible. One is that the beneficiaries of regulation-taxpayers in 
general or the public suppliers of capital, depending on what one conceives the reasons 
for regulation to be-should bear all costs of achieving the targeted maximum level of 
portfolio risk, since risk regulation is for their benefit. Moreover, costs should be defined 
to include reductions in the portfolio returns reasonably expected by elite suppliers of 
capital. Moving to less restrictive portfolio regulation would then be viewed as a way of 
minimizing, among other costs, the amount portfolio returns are reduced (which the 
public capital suppliers bear directly and/or through compensation of the elite capital 
suppliers). 
Lawmakers might choose instead simply to make the elite suppliers of capital bear all 
the costs of portfolio regulation, i.e., to impose a "tax" on them for the benefit of the 
beneficiary class. The elite capital suppliers would "buy" less restrictive portfolio regula- 
tion by absorbing all the extra costs associated therewith. A tax of this kind will fall 
heavily upon the initial generation of elite capital suppliers. But if capital markets are 
reasonably efficient, the tax will eventually be reflected in the prices of the inter- 
mediaries' stocks, so that elite suppliers of capital to financial intermediaries would re- 
ceive rates of return comparable to those earned by other elite capital suppliers. The tax 
might, however, permanently distort the allocation of resources between financial inter- 
mediaries and other sectors of the economy. 
According to a third view, the beneficiaries should bear all costs strictly necessary to 
achieve the targeted ceiling on portfolio risks, and costs should be defined to exclude the 
reduction in expected return to elite capital suppliers. Regulated intermediaries (prompted 
by representatives of the elite capital suppliers) would be able to buy less restrictive port- 
folio regulation by bearing the additional costs of any regulatory mode that is more ex- 
pensive to implement. 
136. J. FRANCIS & S. ARCHER, supra note 133, at 17-21; K. SMITH, supra note 133, at 59-68. 
137. R. BREALEY, AN INTRODUCTION TO RISK AND RETURN FROM COMMON STOCKS 115-16 
(1969). To illustrate the impact of covariation in a simple case, consider three assets, A, 
B, and C, selling at an identical price. The investor can afford and wants to buy only 
two of the assets. A, B, and C each present an identical expected return and are equally 
risky by some appropriate measure. Variations from the expected return due to a con- 
tingent event, for example, a war, are expected to be positive for A and B but negative 
for C. Should the opposite state of affairs (peace) obtain, variations from the return are 
expected to be negative for A and B but positive for C. In all other respects, external 
economic changes affect the three assets identically. It should be obvious that the in- 
vestor would do better to buy A and C or B and C rather than A and B. The total risk 
of the portfolio can be decreased, without reducing the expected return by choosing 
the assets whose returns covary negatively, since this characteristic should result in a 
partial smoothing of the fluctuations in future annual earnings that would be expected 
in a portfolio of positively covarying assets. 
More practically-since negatively covarying securities are not common-a decrease in 
portfolio risk may result from selection of individual securities whose returns do not 
covary positively to a great degree. 
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reduce the risk of her total portfolio by choosing individually safer 
securities; by finding assets whose returns covary negatively or not too 
positively; and by increasing the number of her holdings.'38 While 
effective diversification depends heavily on one's ability to find assets 
whose returns do not have a strong positive covariance, returns on 
many kinds of investment assets covary positively to a significant 
degree.'39 
Given portfolio theory's emphasis upon the whole portfolio, it has 
been easy to show that some traditional legal techniques of investment 
regulation are arbitrary and perhaps fruitless.'40 A state in excellent 
financial condition, for example, could restrict the state employees' 
pension fund to purchases of general obligations of the state, or to 
municipal securities and United States government securities.'4' To be 
sure, the fund may be made extremely safe by this decision. But the 
same level of safety might have been attained or exceeded by any 
138. Id. at 123-24. Brealey argues that while the riskiness of individual holdings and 
the degree to which they are independent of each other are important, increasing the 
number of holdings beyond a relatively small number (about 20 securities) typically has 
little impact on risk. Id. at 124-31. Not everyone, however, agrees with Brealey's ap- 
parent conclusion that there is no need to have more than 20 stocks in a portfolio. 
Langbein and Posner found that a carefully selected portfolio of about 30 stocks would 
be as much as 90-95% correlated with market movements. That portfolio would not 
eliminate all of the diversifiable risk (i.e., unnecessary risk: a portfolio could be as- 
sembled which produced the same return at a lower risk level). Only when the port- 
folio reaches about 200 stocks is the range within which its return can be ex- 
pected to fall reduced to 1% on either side of the market's return. Langbein & Posner, 
The Revolution in Trust Investment Law, 62 A.B.A.J. 887, 889 (1976); see also Langbein 
& Posner, Market Funds and Trust-Investmnent Law, 1 AM. B. FOUNDATION RESEARCH J. 
1 (1976). Since selection of so many stocks can be quite costly if each is individually 
evaluated in relation to the portfolio, and since investment-fund managers have not 
systematically outperformed market averages, id. at 2, new funds are springing up which 
simply hold an extremely diversified portfolio of securities designed to approximate some 
broad index of capital-asset performance, such as Standard & Poor's 500 or the entire 
New York Stock Exchange. Id. at 1-2. 
139. See Cootner, The Liquidity of the Savings and Loan Industry, in I STUDY OF 
THE SAVINGS AND LOAN INDUSTRY 283, 293 (I. Friend ed. 1969). The high correlation of 
yields is generally thought to be a reflection of the gross substitutability of financial 
assets and the degree to which the various capital markets are efficient and interrelated, 
rather than segmented. 
140. See Note, The Regulation of Riskv Investments, 83 HARV. L. REV. 603 (1970); 
see also Bines, Modern Portfolio Theory and Investinent Management Law: Refinement 
of Legal Doctrine, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 721 (1976). Langbein and Posner argue that at 
least the most general standard of investment regulation, the prudent man rule applicable 
to trustees, ought to be interpreted by the courts as permitting use of modern portfolio 
theory, e.g., as allowing a trustee to invest in a market fund. Langbein & Posner, Market 
Funds and Trust-!nvestnient Law, stipra note 138. Statutory legal lists, of course, cannot 
be changed by judicial interpretation. 
141. The example in the text is extreme, but it is not unknown for a state's legal 
lists for governmental pension plans to give a conspicuous place to securities issued by 
its own instrumentalities. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. ? 7-447 (West 1969) (permits in- 
vestment of municipal employee retirement funds in accord with investments permitted 
to savings banks, id. ? 36-9(, (WVest 1969 & Supp. 1976)). 
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number of more flexible asset restraints, under which the fund man- 
agers, employing negative covariation, could have achieved a higher 
level of return for the plan participants and beneficiaries. If this be 
the case, the narrow rule is unduly restrictive. Although the example 
chosen may seem extreme, there is empirical evidence that conven- 
tional asset restraints applied to a large segment of all possible in- 
vestors, such as a rule affecting commercial banks, may significantly 
shift demand for different classes of securities and affect the allocation 
of funds to them.'42 
In its broadest sense, financial intermediation is a form of exploita- 
tion of market imperfections, since the intermediaries are skilled at 
reducing the transaction costs of matching capital suppliers and in- 
vestors. But when, as in this article, attention is restricted to entities 
that pool risks in addition to matching savings and investments, fi- 
nancial intermediation may be characterized simply as the pooled 
exploitation of positive covariance.'43 The intermediaries make posi- 
tive covariance work for them by owning some debt securities and 
issuing others. In this way positive covariance of the returns on dif- 
ferent classes of financial assets may lead to decreased overall risks. For 
instance, imagine an intermediary that raises funds by selling, princi- 
pally to small savers, three-month time deposits that pay 6% interest. 
It invests the funds in short-term (three-month) construction mort- 
gages yielding 8%. Obviously, if market returns on such mortgages and 
prevailing yields on such deposits covary positively with external 
economic forces, the business of the financial intermediary is safer, 
not riskier, than if the opposite were true. Thus, whether mortgage 
142. One study concluded that restrictions on the quality of bonds that national banks 
may hold altered the yield differential between investment-grade bonds and lower-grade 
bonds. West, Bond Ratings, Bond Yields and Financial Regulation: Solne Findings, 16 
J.L. & ECON. 159 (1973). West's statistical analysis suggested that the best explanation 
for the change in yields was that the Banking Act of 1936 gave the Comptroller the 
power to promulgate a rule restricting bank investments in bonds. Although the initial 
rule was nebulous, by 1938 a new rule had made it clear that banks were virtually re- 
stricted to investment-grade bonds. This led to extra demand for such bonds and 
lowered their yields. 
It has also been found that a change in the way banks must account for earnings from 
government securities purchased at a discount resulted in a change in the yields on 
those securities. Prior to December 1964, the coupon income from bonds held as invest- 
ments was reported as operating earnings. The gain from purchasing a bond at a dis- 
count and holding it to maturity was not reported as operating income but was added 
to capital. Since bank performance is usually measured by bank earnings, bankers pre- 
ferred to invest in high-coupon bonds rather than in discount bonds. When Regulation 
F was revised in December 1964 to require that bond discounts be accrued to earnings, 
this extra demand for high-coupon bonds was eliminated, and the corresponding higher 
yields on discount bonds evaporated. See Wolf, Regulation F and the Yield Structure of 
the U.S. Government Securities Market, 2 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 112 (1970). 
143. See Cootner, supra note 139, at 293-95. 
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yields go to 9% and deposit yields to 7%, or mortgage yields drop to 
6% and deposit yields to 4%, the intermediary maintains its 2% gross 
spread. By contrast, given negative covariance, the external events in 
a given period might be such that mortgage yields go up to 9% while 
deposit yields go down to 5%, or they might produce mortgage yields 
of 7% and deposit yields of 61/2%, leaving a gross spread that is in- 
adequate to cover expenses. Because of the greater likelihood of large 
fluctuations in earnings, the negative covariance situation is riskier. 
Financial intermediation thus transforms positive covariance from an 
evil to the isolated saver into a good for collectivities of savers. Analysis 
of this aspect of the process helps one to understand why the capital 
structures of financial intermediaries are characterized by much higher 
leverage than those of ordinary industrial corporations or ordinary 
individual investors.'44 Indeed, under certain conditions a financial 
intermediary may operate safely, and even optimally, with nearly zero 
equity capital.'45 
Application of ordinary portfolio theory to financial intermediaries 
requires one major expansion of its focus that is of the utmost im- 
portance to profit-maximizing managements and safety-conscious reg- 
ulators. In the simplest cases dealt with by portfolio theory, one 
imagines an investor with a fixed supply of capital that can be used to 
acquire any one of a great number of portfolios of financial assets. 
The investor attempts to discern a frontier of efficient portfolios. 
Each portfolio on the frontier is such that there is no portfolio at its 
risk level with a higher expected return. Depending on her particular 
risk-return preferences, the investor would select a portfolio some- 
where on the efficient frontier. 
This simple case is inevitably complicated by the theorists. They 
add the assumptions that the investor can add leverage to a portfolio 
by borrowing and can make it safer by adding risk-free assets such as 
United States government securities. Given these assumptions, they 
derive the so-called separation theorem, which asserts that the task of 
finding the optimal portfolio of risky assets is independent from that 
144. At the end of 1971, financial intermediaries as a group had liabilities estimated 
at $1,400 billion and a net worth of $100 billion. R. ROBINSON & D. WRIGHTSMAN, FINAN- 
CIAL MARKETS: THE ACCUMULATION AND ALLOCATION OF WVEALTHi 229 (1974). Ordinary 
business corporations, of course, leverage to a much lesser degree; typically, common 
stock is significantly more than half a company's total capital. See B. GRAHAM, D. DODD 
& S. COTTLE, SECURITY ANALYSIS 546-47 (4th ed. 1962). 
Of course, positive covariance is only part of the leverage story: if the spread between 
asset yields and liability yields is too small, high leverage may be unsafe. The spread in 
turn depends on persistent market imperfections. 
145. Pringle, The Capital Decision in Conlnmercial Banks, 29 J. FINANCE 779, 788-89 
(1974). 
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of achieving the desired level of portfolio risk. In other words, the 
rational investor can identify the optimal portfolio on the efficient 
frontier without regard to her individual risk-return preferences. The 
latter are accommodated by adjusting the mix between risky assets 
(the optimal portfolio) and risk-free assets, or by leveraging. Putting 
some of the fixed supply of capital into risk-free assets rather than 
investing all of it in the optimal portfolio will produce a total port- 
folio with lower overall risk and smaller expected returns. Putting all 
of the equity capital plus the proceeds of borrowed funds into the 
optimal portfolio will produce a greater overall risk and higher ex- 
pected returns. Note that changes in the amount of equity or debt 
capital an investor has and uses enter the analysis only in a subsidiary 
way. Borrowing is one way of adjusting risk and getting the advantage 
of the optimal portfolio, and it is assumed to be within the control of 
the investor, at least to the extent necessary to achieve the desired risk 
level.146 
When portfolio theory is applied to financial intermediaries, this 
approach simply will not suffice. It is a salient characteristic of most 
financial intermediaries that flows of capital into and out of the en- 
tity are (1) continuous, varying, and only statistically predictable, and 
(2) to a significant degree, not within the immediate or short-run 
control of the intermediary. Commercial banks, for example, are 
legally obligated to pay when depositors request withdrawals from 
their demand deposits. The withdrawals are not uniform, and it thus 
becomes a matter of greatest importance to the bank, in deciding upon 
its investment, lending, and borrowing strategies, to predict the levels 
of deposit shocks and the probabilities of different variations from 
these expected changes.147 
If an extraordinarily large number of withdrawals are requested on 
a given day, the unprepared bank may be faced with the immediate 
problem of having exhausted all its cash, highly liquid securities, and 
"instant" borrowing avenues. It may be forced to sell comparatively 
illiquid assets such as long-term municipal securities or business loans 
at distress prices, and it may have to incur excessive transaction costs.'48 
146. On efficient frontiers, the separation theorem, and other basic aspects of port- 
folio selection, see R. BREALEY, supra note 137, at 115-21; J. FRANCIS & S. ARCHER, supra 
note 133, at 22-26, 59-75, 111-17; and K. SMITH, supra note 133, at 124-54. 
147. One recent study of bank portfolio behavior assigned great weight to the role 
of deposit variability. See D. HESTER & J. PIERCE, BANK MANAGEMENT AND PORTFOLIO 
BEHAVIOR 19-23, 35-37, 46-48, 67-71, 202-12 (1975). 
148. By distresss prices" I mean prices that are lower than those available in the 
market to sellers who are allowing themselves a greater (but not abnormal) time for 
selling. By "excessive transaction costs" I refer to those extra (though routine) transaction 
costs that are incurred by disposing of relatively illiquid securities to meet liquidity 
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Of course, if the bank keeps a liquid assets buffer larger than it needs, 
it sacrifices the higher returns usually associated with less-liquid assets. 
Thus, whatever the ideal mix between safety and pursuit of profit, it 
will be impossible to achieve it efficiently without a careful projection 
of expected deposit shocks and their expected range of variation.'49 
Similarly, a life insurance company expects a certain future stream of 
premium receipts-taking account of lapses, forfeitures, surrenders, 
renewals, and the like. The company has no choice but to pay out 
benefits when an insured person dies, whether or not the market values 
of its long-term bonds have dropped. Instead of maintaining a buffer 
of liquid assets to meet such contingencies, life insurance companies 
seek to predict them with the greatest possible accuracy. The actuary is 
thus as indispensable to investment strategy as is the analyst of invest- 
ment assets. 
Put differently, investment portfolio risk must be assessed in light 
of the investor's liquidity needs, which may be great or trivial. An 
extended but more accurate statement is that in order to evaluate the 
risk-return combination presented by a particular financial inter- 
mediary, one must examine not only the expected asset yields, the un- 
certainty surrounding each yield, and the covariance among them, but 
also the expected inflows and outflows of capital funds,150 the un- 
certainty surrounding those capital flows, and the covariance among 
capital flows and investment yields. 
Not surprisingly, the old-fashioned, piecemeal approach to ensuring 
asset safety by restraining the riskiness of assets on a one-by-one basis 
finds a parallel in regulatory techniques that attempt to constrain the 
riskiness of investment assets and to restrain the risk presented by the 
intermediary's obligations almost as if they were independent and un- 
related matters.'5' Even the occasionally astute commentator relying 
needs, and that exceed the extra yield obtained from such securities. In practice, dif- 
ferences in routine transaction costs involved in using cash or converting other kinds of 
assets into cash appear to be more important in shaping the details of liquidity manage- 
ment practices than are possible sales at distress prices. See Barth & Bennett, Deposit 
Variability and Commercial Bank Cash Holdings, 57 REV. ECON. & STATISTIcs 238 (1975). 
149. Because of this article's concern with soundness regulation, the discussion is 
focused on sudden net deposit withdrawals. How a bank uses sudden net deposit in- 
fluxes obviously has much to do with its relative profitability. See D. HESTER & J. PIERCE, 
supra note 147, at 231-49. 
150. By "capital funds" I mean both debt and equity capital, including monies paid 
by public suppliers of capital (e.g., insurance premiums). Conversely, "outflows of capital 
funds" encompasses payouts of all sorts, including insurance payments, deposit with- 
drawals, and mutual fund dividends. 
151. Most obviously, thrift institutions are pressured by legal rules into lending too 
long in relation to their liabilities, which are predominantly short-term. For most other 
intermediaries, asset regulation does take account of liability structure, or vice versa, in 
a very rough way. The problem lies in the roughness. 
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on modern portfolio theory has been led astray.'52 The regulatory 
devices that do exist for looking at riskiness holistically, such as bank 
"capital adequacy" requirements, are crude and inadequate. 
That the nature of the obligations becomes overwhelmingly im- 
portant when portfolio theory is applied to financial intermediaries 
can be appreciated from a somewhat different perspective if one thinks 
about two traditional categories of risks. The first is the risk that the 
investment analyst's favored projection of future cash flows from a 
security will turn out to be wrong. In the case of common stocks, this 
risk is captured in statistical notions of "variance" from projected 
earnings; for convenience, it will be termed "variance risk." In the 
case of debt securities, such variance has a simpler structure and may 
be termed "default risk." The basic response to either kind of risk is 
efficient diversification. A second category of risk is market risk: the 
risk that the market price of a debt security will go up or down be- 
cause of a general decrease or increase in yields on other debt securities 
of comparable default risk, or the risk that the price of a particular 
common stock will fluctuate as a result of changes in the general rate 
of capitalization applied by the securities market to other stocks of 
comparable variance risk.153 
The market risk theoretically presented by different classes of assets 
only presents a real risk to financial intermediaries when their obli- 
gations have certain characteristics; the risk to the intermediary varies 
with the degree of abstract market risk and the severity of its liquidity 
problems.154 The literature of portfolio theory often appears to ignore 
the relations between abstract market risk and liquidity needs.'55 
152. E.g., Note, supra note 140. Although this excellent Note uses modern portfolio 
theory as a basis for criticizing existing legal regulation of the investments of institution- 
al investors, it does not adequately emphasize the relationship between an institution's 
assets and its obligations. 
153. For a simple discussion of the distinction between market risk and variance 
risk, see V. BRUDNEY & M. CHIRELSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATE FINANCE 997 
(1972). 
154. An intermediary that is able to keep its assets and redeem them at their ma- 
turity dates is not affected by intervening fluctuations in market prices of the assets. 
For an intermediary forced by liquidity problems to redeem some of its assets before 
maturity, market risk creates a real danger that the obtainable price will not equal the 
planned-for maturity value, thus aggravating the liquidity problems. See also note 207 
infra. 
155. Unlike basic portfolio theory, recent literature on the theory of the term struc- 
ture of interest rates has been explicitly concerned with the impact upon investment 
decisions of the different liquidity needs of different investors. In general, "term struc- 
ture" is the name applied to the pattern of yields on securities which differ only in 
their term to maturity. See generally B. MALKIEL, THE TERM STRUCTURE OF INTEREST 
RATES (1966); D. MEISELMAN, THE TERM STRUCTURE OF INTEREST RATES (1962); C. NELSON, 
THE TERM STRUCTURE OF INTEREST RATES (1972); McElhattan, The Termn Structure of 
Interest Rates and Inflation Uncertainty, FED. RES. BANK OF S.F. ECON. REV., Dec. 1975, 
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Furthermore, though the theory's expansion to include this kind of 
problem is not conceptually difficult, it may be a costly and tedious 
matter to work out practical applications. Consider, for example, 
that it is not always the case that the obligational context should 
be taken simply as an exogenous variable, and the asset structure 
adjusted accordingly. The nature and amount of obligations, as well 
as the nature and amount of assets, may be determinable by man- 
agement to a certain extent. In the case of an institution with con- 
siderable flexibility on both sides, such as a commercial bank, the 
problem of efficiently reducing risks becomes complex. It is not sur- 
prising that formal econometric models of the process of bank portfolio 
management so far have had to simplify the problem by assuming that 
variations in bank liabilities are of external origin,'56 even though 
bankers themselves have purported to rely heavily in recent years upon 
"liability management" as a way of meeting liquidity needs. 
The current and potential achievements of portfolio theory suggest 
grave doubts about the wisdom of continuing many existing techniques 
of portfolio regulation. Legal rules currently in effect were not framed 
with the lessons of standard portfolio theory in mind, nor, obviously, 
in light of the sophisticated expansions of that theory which are clearly 
required.'57 They thus seem likely to be arbitrary and unduly restric- 
tive. 
Of course, the criticism of undue restrictiveness can apply, if at all, 
only to types of portfolio regulation that actually restrict the ability 
to take risks. If other types of portfolio regulation are ineffective, the 
appropriate criticism is that they create costs without producing bene- 
fits. Such fruitless regulations should be eliminated even before less 
restrictive alternatives are found. Which regulations should be elim- 
inated depends upon an assessment of the benefits generated. 
2. Benefits 
Although incomplete, the type of protection provided by portfolio 
regulation is more closely linked than that of anticompetitive regula- 
tion to the ultimate goal of preventing public suppliers of capital from 
bearing the consequences of an intermediary's failure. Portfolio regula- 
at 27; Modigliani & Shiller, Inflation, Rational Expectations, and tile Term Structure 
of Interest Rates, 40 ECONOMICA 12 (1973); Modigliani & Sutch, Innovation in Interest 
Rate Policy, 56 AM. ECON. REV. 178 (1966). 
156. See D. HESTER & J. PIERCE, supra note 147, at 38, 65-66. 
157. Attempts have already been made to apply modified portfolio theory to financial 
intermediaries. E.g., Hart & Jaffee, On the Application of Portfolio Theory to Depository 
Intermediaries, 41 REV. ECON. STUD. 124 (1974). 
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tion tries to prohibit management from taking excessive risks in the 
financial decisions that are a necessary part of financial intermediation. 
Risks arising from managerial dishonesty and self-dealing are occasion- 
ally the thrust of an asset restraint, such as the prohibition on loans 
by pension funds to a "party in interest,' 58 but these rules are here 
stipulated to belong under the heading of insider misconduct regula- 
tion, which is treated subsequently.'59 By definition, then, portfolio 
regulation aims only at preventing failures due to a subclass of the 
important risks faced by financial intermediaries. It is possible, how- 
ever, that strict portfolio regulation tends indirectly to reduce insider 
misconduct.'60 
a. Effectiveness: The Empirical Evidence 
The order of magnitude and the certainty of protection afforded by 
portfolio regulation may be treated together as the question of its 
"effectiveness," with attention given to the separate elements only 
when to do so would be especially illuminating. In considering how 
effective portfolio regulation is likely to be, it is useful to distinguish 
direct restrictions on the kinds of assets an institution may acquire 
from what will be referred to as "balance-sheet shaping rules." The 
direct asset restraints include, for example, the prohibition against 
banks owning common stock in their own right'6' and the restriction 
of life insurance company bond investments to high-grade issues.162 
The balance sheet restraints include complexes of interrelated rules 
concerning valuation of assets and liabilities, leverage, capital, liquid- 
ity, and investment limitations that vary with the preceding factors. 
There is no doubt that asset restraints, embodied in legal lists or 
rules about permissible kinds of investments, can be made (and have 
been made) effective reducers of risk if they are sufficiently extreme. 
In fact, the makers of legal lists of bonds for various kinds of institu- 
tional investors have succeeded in pinpointing securities with low 
default risk.'63 Just as clearly, however, it is difficult to formulate 
158. ERISA ? 406(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. ? 1106(a)(1)(B) (Supp. IV 1974). 
159. See pp. 77-86 infra. 
160. One study suggests that embezzlement frequently takes the form of fictitious 
loans entered upon the books over time. Meyer & Pifer, Prediction of Bank Failures, 25 
J. FINANCE 853 (1970). This is not to say that detection of embezzlement by inspection of 
the earnings record is a reliable procedure. See pp. 60-63 infra. 
161. Banks usually cannot own stock other than as trustees because the power to do 
so is not given to them in the laws governing corporate powers. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. ? 24, 
para. Seventh (Supp. IV 1974) (explicit denial of power to purchase stock for own ac- 
count). The rule is cluttered with exceptions. 
162. See, e.g., N.Y. INS. LAW ? 81(2) (McKinney Su'pp. 1975-76). 
163. W. HICKMAN, CORPORATE BOND QUALITY AND INVESTOR EXPERIENCE 211-14 (1958). 
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effective asset restraints that do not generate serious costs by being too 
restrictive. 
Moreover, less primitive restraints may reduce costs but greatly im- 
pair the effectiveness, or at least the certainty of protection. Consider 
again the example of the state employees' pension fund that is restricted 
by law to investment in government securities. Allowing the fund to 
invest in any bonds, but not in stocks, would make it possible for the 
fund to approach more closely the investment portfolio that offers the 
highest return at the maximum risk level countenanced by legal 
regulation. But, since risky bonds are not unknown, it would be 
possible for the fund to exceed the desired maximum risk level with- 
out violating a specific legal rule. Sailing between the Scylla of in- 
effectiveness and the Charybdis of indirect costs requires no mean 
navigational skill. If existing regulation reflects that skill, the f t has 
not been objectively demonstrated. 
Balance-sheet shaping rules are much more difficult to evaluate. 
Their use is based upon a mediating assumption: if information from 
balance sheets and other financial statements can be used to predict 
bank failures, then rules requiring that balance sheet quantities and 
ratios have certain properties may help prevent failures. Faith in the 
effectiveness of the existing kinds of rules is virtually instinctual; they 
continue to be used in spite of a fair amount of negative empirical 
evidence. To be sure, financial ratios have been successfully used to 
predict the failures of industrial corporations.'64 The ratios have been 
less useful, however, in predicting failures of financial intermediaries. 
Meyer and Pifer applied multivariate discriminant analysis with 
160 variables derived from financial statements to explain insured 
commercial bank failures between 1948 and 1965.165 Using a score 
employing the nine variables found most significant,'66 they could pre- 
164. Altman, Financial Ratios, Discrimninant Analysis and the Prediction of Corporate 
Bankruptcy, 23 J. FINANCE 589, 609 (1968). Using a technique known as multivariate dis- 
criminant analysis, Altman combined five financial ratios of industrial firms to produce 
a score for each firm. The variables used were: (1) ratio of working capital to total assets 
(liquidity), (2) retained earnings/total assets (age of firm), (3) earnings before interest 
and taxes/total assets, (4) market value of the equity/book value of the total debt, and 
(5) sales/total assets (capital turnover). In 947%O and 96% of the cases in two samples, 
firms with scores falling below a certain cutoff point were correctly predicted to go 
bankrupt within two years. Obversely, predictions of nonbankruptcy for firms above the 
cutoff was 79% accurate in the extreme case of firms with prior losses, and better for 
others. Later work produced similar results. Altman & McGough, Evaluation of a Com- 
pany as a Going Concern, 138 J. ACCOUNTANCY, Dec. 1974, at 50 ("Z" scores based on dis- 
criminant analysis better predictors of failure than auditor). 
165. Meyer & Pifer, supra note 160. 
166. The significant variables, when using data up to one reporting period prior to 
failure, were: 
(1) the error in predicting the ratio of cash and securities to total assets (i.e., a 
measure of abrupt changes in the bank's liquidity); 
60 
This content downloaded from 130.132.173.207 on Wed, 5 Jun 2013 13:25:13 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
The Soundness of Financial Intermediaries 
dict failures with modest success. But if it were thought important from 
a regulatory viewpoint that the cutoff point catch a very high propor- 
tion, say 99%, of the forthcoming failures, then perhaps half of all banks 
would be classified as potential failures.'67 The lower predictive power 
of the technique for bank failures than for industrial corporation bank- 
ruptcies might be attributed to the greater incidence of embezzlement 
in banks'68 and the difficulty of detecting it in financial statements. 
With the predictive net so undiscriminating in its catch, regulatory 
requirements that various financial ratios meet certain levels would 
be arbitrary, unfair, and unduly restrictive. This recognition has per- 
colated into the consciousness of some of the bank regulatory 
agencies,'69 but ratio analysis by bank examiners is still common and 
(2) the variability in the interest rate paid on time deposits; 
(3) the ratio of time deposits to demand deposits for the year previous to the last 
full calendar year of operation; 
(4) the ratio of operating income to total assets for the year previous to the last 
full calendar year of operation; 
(5) the growth of the ratio of consumer loans to total assets; 
(6) the growth of the ratio of cash and securities to total assets; 
(7) the variability of total loans; 
(8) the ratio of real estate loans to total loans; and 
(9) the ratio of fixed assets to total assets for the year previous to the last full 
calendar year of operation. 
Id. at 860-63. Note that no recognized capital adequacy ratio is included in the list. 
167. The figures given in the text are guesses, but they appear to be reasonable 
guesses. (I resort to guess because predicting 99% of failures forthcoming in, say, the next 
two years strikes me as an intuitively plausible regulatory goal.) The estimate in text 
is interpolated from a table in id. at 863. 
168. See pp. 12-13 & notes 45-48 supra. 
169. The Comptroller of the Currency has emphasized that ratio analyses are sug- 
gestive and that other, less tangible factors are considered in examinations. Although he 
set forth a new ratio test in 1974, he also said, "While some statistics and ratios are 
necessary, please understand that I am depending primarily upon your [bank examiners'] 
professional ability and judgment, not ratios, to disclose those serious banking matters 
requiring our attention." Problem Banks: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, 
Housing and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1976). 
Likewise, Governor Robert Holland, on behalf of the Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System, stated: 
Although there are benchmark measurements for some of these factors as illustrated 
in the attached description of the uniform system for rating banks . . . , considerable 
judgment by individuals with years of experience is brought to bear in the final de- 
cision as to whether or not a particular institution should be considered as war- 
ranting special surveillance. 
Id. at 131. Similar remarks were made in another context by Frank Wille, then Chairman 
of the FDIC. Financial Disclosure by Banks and Bank Holding Companies: Hearings 
Before the Senate Commn. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 94th- Cong., 1st Sess. 
39-40 (1975). 
These concessions to empiricism are less than ws holly reassuring for a number of 
reasons. First, as the cited remarks indicate, examiners do continue to rely on unproven 
ratio analyses; these analyses may even predominate in practice. Second, the "professional 
judgment" of examiners has not been proven to be any better than ratio tests as a 
medium-term predictor of failure. See note 173 in f-a. Lastly, the imprecision of ratio 
tests is not necessarily perceived by legislators; yet their support for new regulatory di- 
rections is quite important. 
61 
This content downloaded from 130.132.173.207 on Wed, 5 Jun 2013 13:25:13 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 86: 1, 1976 
still important in their overall evaluations of banks. Meanwhile, 
researchers are suggesting that their results at least have utility in 
enabling regulators to reduce the number of banks requiring close 
scrutiny and, thus, to make more efficient use of examining personnel. 
Indeed, recent work using multivariate discriminant analysis has 
focused on predicting from financial reports whether examiners will 
give a bank a low rating'70 or put it on the problem bank list.171 
How much is gained from an ability to predict from periodic reports 
submitted by banks whether they will be rated as problems on their 
next examination is not entirely clear. Post-examination regulatory 
ratings of banks are certainly not conclusive. A significant number of 
failed banks were not on problem bank lists.172 And the lists contain 
many banks that do not fail, though the extent to which this reflects 
regulatory medicine rather than spontaneous remission is not known. 
Moreover, one study of an important aspect of examinations, the 
examiners' criticism of loans, concluded that evidence is lacking to 
support the agencies' belief that loan criticism prevents or even pre- 
dicts loan losses.173 There is more than enough doubt to warrant 
further research into what, if anything, is being accomplished by the 
nation's several thousand bank examiners. In any event, financial early 
warning systems that predict evaluations by examiners have a solipsistic 
quality. Capital adequacy ratios, for example, will have "predictive 
Some state regulatory agencies are also acutely aware of the drawbacks of present 
modes of financial regulation. See, e.g., N.Y. INsURANCE DEP'T, REGULATION OF THE FI- 
NANCIAL CONDITION OF IN$URANCE COMPANIES (1974) (a remarkably perceptive report). 
170. Stuhr & van Wicklen, Rating the Financial Condition of Banks: A Statistical 
Approach to Aid Bank Supervision, 56 FED. RES. BANK OF N.Y. MONTHLY REV. 233 (1974) 
(attempt to isolate objective variables from examination reports which "explain" overall 
bank ratings by examiners); Korobow & Stuhr, Toward Early Warning of Changes in 
Banks' Financial Condition: A Pi-ogress Report, 57 FED. RES. BANK OF N.Y. MONTHLY REV. 
157 (1975) (extends Stuhr & van Wicklen but uses reported data instead of examination 
data and examiners' ratings); Korobow, Stuhr & Martin, A Probabilistic Approach to Early 
Warning of Changes in Bank Financial Condition, 58 FED. RES. BANK OF N.Y. MONTHLY 
REV. 187 (1976) (best six variables for producing efficiency gains in personnel allocation). 
171. Sinkey, A Multivariate Statistical Analysis of the Characteristics of Problem Banks, 
30 J. FINANCE 21 (1975) (Type I error probability (failure to classify a problem bank) was 
28%, and Type II error probability (classifying a non-problem bank as a problem) was 
21%). See also Sinkey & Walker, Problem Banks: Identification & Characteristics, 5 J. 
BANK RESEARCH 208 (1975). 
172. Sinkey 8c Walker, supra note 171, at 211, point out that between 1959 and 1972, 
60 insured banks failed, and of these 36 were on the problem bank list. The other 24 
were apparently embezzlement and fraud cases-as, probably, were some of the 36. 
173. Benston & Marlin, Bank Examiners' Evaluation of Credit, 6 J. MONEY, CREDIT & 
BANKING 23 (1974). An earlier study, Wu, Bank Examiner Criticisms, Bank Loan De- 
faults, and Bank Loan Quality, 24 J. FINANCE 697 (1967), found some predictability ad- 
hering to examinations, though accuracy fluctuated widely among batiks. Benston and 
Marlin note that this accuracy could be a mere reflection of bank management's candor 
with examiners, if, as seems likely, management can predict as accurately as the examiner. 
Id. at 42. This view would explain the wide fluctuations. 
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power" of this sort simply because regulators use them in bank 
evaluations, but this skirts the issue of whether they have much to 
do with prediction or prevention of failures.174 
In addition to doubting whether prediction of bank failures from 
financial statements is accurate enough to warrant balance-sheet shap- 
ing rules, one may also raise questions about specific rules such as 
those pertaining to capital adequacy. Since before the turn of the 
century, banking regulators have been concerned with the adequacy 
of a bank's capital cushion, and over time have measured it in various 
ways: the ratio of capital to deposits, the ratio of capital to total assets, 
the ratio of capital to risky assets, an adjusted risk-asset approach that 
takes account of liquidity factors, and the ineffably refined and in- 
clusive ratio of the Federal Reserve Board. The agencies now differ in 
their approaches. In any event, it is known that capital ratios have 
been declining since the early 1800s.175 This fact may indicate a decline 
in regulatory effectiveness or it may reflect developments favorable to 
financial intermediation in general, such as increased efficiency in the 
securities markets and higher positive covariance among securities 
yields,176 the implementation of last-resort lending, deposit insurance, 
and other governmental back-up schemes. 
The consensus of those testing the ratios is that the level of bank 
capital has not been established as a material factor in determining 
whether banks survive general banking crises or whether they fail in 
periods of economic stability.177 Yet the search for the optimal capital 
measure continues, apparently in the belief that capital cushions must 
have something to do with bank soundness.'78 And they probably do, 
in certain situations. The question is whether these situations are 
present to a significant degree in the real world. The subject of capital 
adequacy has recently generated a staggering amount of commentary 
174. Compare the variables employed by Meyer & Pifer, supra note 160, with those 
used in the studies cited in notes 170 & 171 supra. In most of the latter, but not the 
former, capital adequacy ratios were used. 
175. G. VOJTA, BANK CAPITAL ADEQUACY 8 (1973); I FINE STUDY PAPERS, supra note 3, 
at 376 (selected capital ratios for national banks, 1920-1974). 
1716. See p. 52 supra. 
177. G. VOJTA, supra note 175, at 8-13. The study was a production of First National 
City Bank and contains a certain amount of pro-bank propaganda. After pointing out the 
lack of firm evidence for believing that regulator-desired capital levels will significantly 
promote bank soundness, Vojta does not hesitate to propound new measures of capital 
adequacy-stressing, as one might expect, the importance of bank earnings-without 
justifying those measures by reference to relevant empirical studies. Id. at 31. 
178. A most interesting finding is that bank holding company stock prices are deter- 
mined, in a statistically significant way, by degree of leverage; investors do think they 
perceive different degrees of risk in banks with different capital structures. Beighley, 
Boyd & Jacobs, Bank Equities and Investor Risk Perceptions, 6 J. BANK RESEARCH 190 
(1975). 
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by bankers.'79 Some commentators argue that safety is not the real 
reason for capital adequacy requirements: the agencies are really using 
capital adequacy as a tool to control bank expansion or, perhaps, the 
money supply.180 
As a final irony, one study concluded that regulators have been un- 
able to affect the levels of bank capital; that is, current capital levels 
are generally the same as those that bank shareholders, acting according 
to a normal profit-maximizing model, would have chosen. Nor have 
regulators prevented banks from substituting deposit insurance for 
capital in their decisions to operate at certain risk levels.181 
Reserve requirements comprise another group of specific balance- 
sheet shaping rules of doubtful effectiveness. Almost no one questions 
that the reserves required of members of the Federal Reserve System 
are no longer aimed at their original purpose, providing a liquidity 
buffer. Instead, the requirements are alternative and perhaps unneces- 
sary means of controlling the money supply. One side effect of the 
179. E.g., Carey, Reassessing the Role of Bank Capital, 6 J. BANK RESEARCH 165 (1975) 
(earning power vital to capital adequacy; role of capital to provide investment funds for 
productive assets); Friedman & Formuzis, Bank Capital: The Deposit-Protection Incentive, 
6 J. BANK RESEARCH 208 (1975) (argument that one of three reasons for bank capital, pro- 
tection of uninsured depositors in case of bank failure, should be discarded); Gallant, 
Approaches to Capital Planning, 6 J. BANK RESEARCH 173 (1975) (adequate capital is that 
which maintains confidence of depositors, investors, regulators, etc. during periods of 
stress); Johnson, Capital Planning, 58 J. COM. BANK LENDING, July 1976, at 24 (elements 
of good capital structure policy for bank); Watson, A Regulatory View of Capital Ade- 
quacy, 6 J. BANK RESEARCH 170 (1975) (earning power key ingredient in determining capi- 
tal adequacy). 
180. Golembe, Capital Adequacy and Bank Losses, 57 J. Com. BANK LENDING, Aug. 
1975, at 11 ("new" function of capital adequacy is to control bank expansion); McQuown, 
Bank Capital: The Fall Guy, 6 J. BANK RESEARCH 163 (1975) (monetary control theory). 
181. Peltzman, Capital Investment in Commercial Banking and Its Relationship to 
Portfolio Regulation, 78 J. POLITICAL ECON. 1, 20 (1970). Peltzman's study has been sup- 
ported by Mayne, Supervisory Influence on Bank Capital, 27 J. FINANCE 637, 639, 650 
(1972). To Mayne must go the credit for conducting a survey to which bankers responded 
that they resist regulation in proportion to the stringency of the regulation. Id. at 650. 
This may be the key datum in the controversy. 
From a legal perspective, it is possible to conceive why regulators' efforts to control 
capital adequacy levels might be ineffective. The federal banking laws do not explicitly 
give power to any of the agencies to make rules on the subject of capital adequacy that 
will apply on a continuing basis. The Federal Reserve Board may condition approval 
of an application under the Bank Holding Company Act on compliance with its capital 
adequacy guidelines; the FDIC may threaten a cease and desist order on the ground 
that capital is so low as to be an "unsound or unsafe" banking practice, and so forth. 
But these responses may be too spotty or extreme for comprehensive use. Cf. Continental 
Bank & Trust Co. v. Martin, 303 F.2d 214 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (Board's "novel order" to 
state member bank to increase capitalization not final and appealable where no provision 
made for fine, penalty, or sanction). 
One study that contradicted Peltzman's results was Mingo, Regulatory Influence on 
Bank Capital Investment, 30 J. FINANCE 1111 (1975). Following Peltzman's methodology 
and using data for 1970 covering 323 randomly selected banks from the 32 states not 
permitting statewide branching, Mingo found that regulators have a statistically signifi- 
cant influence on capital investment in banks. 
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continuation of the requirements has been an exodus from the Federal 
Reserve System because the stringent reserve requirements are felt 
to impinge too greatly on earnings or, in some cases, on the avail- 
ability of credit to local borrowers.'82 
The results of studies of commercial bank regulation are mirrored 
by studies in the insurance field. A theme common to all the studies 
is the present imprecision of regulation, which results from a failure 
adequately to consider expected cash flows. A widely used method 
of valuing life insurance reserves183-the net-level-premium method 
-has been found seriously inaccurate because of this deficiency.'84 
A side effect is the method's tendency to impose a ceiling on a 
company's rate of growth,185 perhaps discriminating against newer 
companies. 
In the property and liability insurance field, legally required or 
permitted methods of computing reserve liabilities186 are also recog- 
nized as imperfect. Loss reserves tend to be no more than rough esti- 
mates;187 and both loss and unearned premium reserves are legally 
required to be computed in an unrealistically conservative way.'88 
182. The empirical research on this issue is admirably summarized in a nontechnical 
article by Rose, Exodus: Why Banks are Leaving the Fed, 158 BANKERS MAGAZINE, Winter 
1975, at 43. 
183. On the valuation of life insurance reserves, see note 126 supra. 
184. Belth, supra note 126. Under the net-level-premium method the "reserve at a 
valuation date is the excess of the present value of the future death benefits . . . over 
the present value of the future valuation premiums." Id. at 98. The valuation pre- 
mium (or net premium) is selected so that its present value at issue date equals the 
present value at issue date of the death benefits of a group of policies. Belth argues 
that the method is too simple-in computing present values it considers only interest and 
mortality and ignores expenses and lapses--and that it overemphasizes the use of con- 
servative assumptions and methods, rather than employing the best actuarial methodology. 
185. Id. at 107. The growth limitation results from the combination of regulatory re- 
quirements (e.g., minimum surplus amounts) and the tendency of the valuation method 
to require higher reserves than other methods. Thus, in the first years after issuing a 
group of policies, the premium inflow exceeds the outflow to beneficiaries. By requiring 
more reserves than are necessary during that period, the company is deterred from issuing 
new policies until it can build up sufficient surplus amounts. 
186. On the computation of property and liability insurance reserves, see note 126 
supra. 
187. Loss reserves are the amounts set aside for claims that have been incurred but 
have not been paid. See Clark, supra note 1, at 1665 n.219. 
188. Reserve liabilities are usually required to be computed on the basis of gross pre- 
miums, i.e., the premiums charged the policyholder with no deduction for expenses. Re- 
serve liabilities are thus written down at a rate slower than actual expenditures and 
experience would suggest. An insurer might write $10,000 in new premiums, disburse 
$3,500 in commissions and other costs by the end of the first month (thus reducing its 
assets by that amount), and yet (at the end of the first month) have to show its reserve 
liabilities under the new policies to be about $9,500. The insurer's surplus will therefore 
be reduced by about $3,000, even though, if the insurance experience works out as as- 
sumed, the surplus position will have returned to normal and even increased to the 
extent of the profit generated by the new business. The effect of the redundancy in re- 
serve computation is to cause an apparent surplus "drain" on rapidly growing companies. 
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Some proof of the latter proposition is given by the fact that po- 
tential purchasers of a stock casualty insurance company, when figuring 
how much the company is worth to them, may add a significant amount 
to the net worth accounts appearing on the financial statements used 
for regulatory purposes.'89 
One ratio-type test used in the property and liability insurance 
field deserves special mention because of the empirical research done 
upon it. Under the so-called Kenney rule, which was prompted by 
Depression-era events,'90 a company restricts what is variously referred 
to as its operating, insurance, or underwriting leverage (as opposed to 
its financial leverage'91) in accordance with a mechanical "two to one" 
rule. In any year, up to two dollars of premiums may be written for 
each dollar of the company's surplus, with surplus defined to include 
legal capital and the other net worth accounts. The rule thus bears 
a close kinship to some versions of a capital adequacy test for banks. 
Recent research shows that, given a regulatory decision that a com- 
pany may not operate so as to exceed a specified probability of ruin, 
the maximum permissible operating leverage varies quite significantly, 
depending on the company's investment mix (proportion of stocks 
versus bonds) and the method of valuing the company's bonds.'92 
Generally, when bonds are valued on an amortized basis, a much 
higher operating leverage may be permitted a company investing 
only in bonds, since bond yields so computed exhibit less positive 
covariance with underwriting profits than stock yields do. But when 
See S. HUEBNER et al., supra note 21, at 580-81; C. KULP & J. HALL, supra note 21, at 
762-63, 999-1004. Kulp and Hall contend, however, that the inaccuracy is not a serious 
fault, since the inaccuracy is in the direction of safety. Id. at 1004. 
Even without deliberate conservatism, insurance company financial statement data may 
be only tenuously relevant indicators of financial strength. See pp. 67-73 supra. 
189. One is reminded of the man who, in order not to be late for appointments, keeps 
his watch set 20 minutes ahead of time, and then engages in endlessly repeated calcula- 
tions to figure out what the real time is. For an illustration of the valuation of in- 
surance companies see C. KULP & J. HALL, supra note 21, at 763; cf. Belth, supra note 
126, at 118 (similar practice in valuing life insurers). 
190. See R. KENNEY, FUNDAMENTALS OF FIRE AND CASUALTY INSURANCE STRENGTH 206-12 
(1949). 
191. Financial leverage might be expressed by the ratio of the insurer's reserve lia- 
bilities, or some important part of them (e.g., loss reserves for casualty companies), to the 
company's surplus (net worth). This expression generally corresponds to the familiar debt/ 
equity ratio used in general discussions of corporate finance. Leverage might also be ex- 
pressed by the "policyholders' surplus ratio," the number of dollars of surplus or net 
assets per dollar of insurance obligations. Some consider this to be the single best 
measure of insurer strength. A policyholders' surplus ratio for casualty companies might 
average $0.82 for stock companies and $0.49 for mutual companies (which may have a 
more stable surplus). See C. KULP & J. HALL, supra note 21, at 761-62. 
192. Bachman, Premium-to-Surplus Ratios, Investment Portfolio Composition and In- 
surer Solvency, 75 BEST'S REV., April 1975, at 10 (property/liability ins. ed.). 
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fair market values of bonds are used, the maximum permitted op- 
erating leverage goes to the companies with a more evenly balanced 
mix of investments. Since the question of the relevant method of bond 
valuation depends heavily on a company's liquidity needs193 and the 
purposes of valuation, it is unlikely that an unarguable answer to the 
question will ever be given.'94 In any event, this research shows the 
crudity and potential irrationality of the Kenney rule. Subsequent 
research has extended the point: the maximum permissible operating 
leverage also depends on the proportion of property versus liability 
insurance that the company writes.'95 
It seems clear, then, that portfolio regulation is crude and imprecise 
when it goes beyond identifying and responding to imminent failure 
and tries instead to predict failure in the intermediate-term future, 
building asset restraints and balance-sheet shaping rules on the basis 
of theories of such prediction-all in the name of ensuring soundness. 
The continued existence of balance-sheet shaping rules in the absence 
of solid evidence that they work very well stems in part from a failure 
to understand why they might not work. Accordingly, in order to put 
in context the available empirical evidence and to appreciate the need 
for more, it is helpful to go beyond the rules to a rudimentary con- 
sideration of financial failure, balance-sheet presentations of a com- 
pany's condition, and the reasons why useful predictions of the former 
from the latter might not be possible. 
b. Balance Sheets and Financial Failure 
i. Four Kinds of Insolvency and Their Lach 
of Necessary Relationships 
A conservative approach to the regulation of financial intermediaries 
would equate soundness with freedom from insolvency or the danger 
of becoming insolvent. Yet the concept of insolvency is deeply am- 
biguous. Particular specifications of it may yield indicators of financial 
condition of very different relevance and value to the fundamental 
goals of risk regulation. 
193. See p. 57 supra. 
194. It is possible to have a mixed system, of course, under which a proportion of 
portfolio bonds, those with an X% probability of having to be liquidated before ma- 
turity or during time period Y, would have to be carried at market, while the others 
could be carried on an amortized basis. Such a system would be based on liquidity pro- 
jections and on a somewhat arbitrary choice of cutoff points. Although inelegant, that 
system might be better than existing ones. 
195. Bachman & Lang, Investment Portfolio Composition, Product Line Mix, and 
Their Impact Upon Operating Leverage and Solvency, 76 BEST'S REV., April 1976, at 20 
(property/liability ins. ed.). 
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It is helpful to distinguish four important notions of insolvency. 
"Bottom line insolvency," which can be paraphrased as unavoidable 
and massive contractual failure, occurs when a firm is generally un- 
able to pay its debts as they become due. "Unable to pay" means that 
the firm cannot pay its due and payable debts without governmental 
intervention of the sort provided by the FDIC, even though the firm 
tries its best to obtain refinancing or to liquidate its assets at the best 
immediately available price.'96 "Traditional equity sense insolvency" 
also occurs when a firm is generally unable to pay its debts as they be- 
come due. But here, inability to pay means that the firm cannot meet 
its due and payable obligations without engaging in a liquidation of 
assets at distress prices or jeopardizing the debtor's ability to meet 
future maturing obligations. "Accounting insolvency" occurs when a 
firm's balance sheet, prepared in accordance with generally accepted 
accounting principles, shows an excess of liabilities over assets (a nega- 
tive net worth). Accountants value many kinds of assets at their his- 
torical costs, less depreciation. "Bankruptcy Act insolvency" occurs 
when a firm's liabilities exceed its assets, where the assets (but not the 
liabilities) are valued at their fair market or intrinsic value.'97 The 
first two concepts pertain to short-term capacity to meet imminently 
due obligations; the latter two are "balance sheet" notions that try to 
take account of all or nearly all liabilities and the firm's long-term 
ability to meet them. 
Ultimately, I assert, all risk-regarding regulation of the soundness 
of financial intermediaries is directed toward preventing or coping 
with bottom line insolvency. To put the point another way, if reactive 
regulation were ruled out as a strategy, one could say that the objec- 
tives of regulation would be defeated only if claims are not paid when 
due-thus invoking the specter that either public suppliers of capital 
will be injured or that the government will have to intervene to meet 
the intermediary's obligations. Because the law aims at preventing 
contractual failure, regulatory tests of insolvency, or related, propae- 
196. "Immediately available" is intended to be taken literally: a price that can be 
realized in usable form before the first instant when the debts to be satisfied out of 
the proceeds are, or otherwise would be, in default, by virtue of a contractual definition 
of default or general legal principles. If the cashless institution waits until an obligation 
has become due and payable, and if payment has been demanded before the institution 
decides to sell an asset, the "best immediately available price" at which the asset can 
be liquidated is, under this usage, zero. 
197. A person shall be deemed insolvent within the provisions of this title whenever 
the aggregate of his property, exclusive of any property which he may have con- 
veyed, transferred, concealed, removed, or permitted to be concealed or removed, with 
intent to defraud, hinder, or delay his creditors, shall not at a fair valuation be suf- 
ficient in amount to pay his debts. 
Bankruptcy Act ? 1(19), 11 U.S.C. ? 1(19) (1970). 
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deutic concepts such as minimum net worth and capital adequacy, are 
tests of insolvency or unsoundness in a more remote and abstract sense 
than bottom line insolvency. The relevant question then becomes 
whether there is a significant correlation between these remote tests 
and freedom from future bottom line insolvency. 
As an a priori matter, the relationships among the four concepts of 
insolvency are largely indeterminate; there are few logically or analyti- 
cally necessary relationships among them. Since bottom line insolvency 
is the touchstone of policy, five negative propositions about indications 
(and, a fortiori, predictions) of its presence should be expressly noted. 
First, as is clear from the definitions, traditional equity sense insol- 
vency does not imply bottom line insolvency.'98 Second, accounting 
insolvency does not imply bottom line insolvency.199 Third-a point 
198. Historically, it was correctly perceived that traditional equity sense insolvency did 
not even imply either kind of balance sheet insolvency. That is why Congress, to pro- 
tect debtors from the stigma and improvident liquidations of bankruptcy, generally re- 
stricted involuntary bankruptcy to debtors insolvent in the Bankruptcy Act sense. Six 
acts of bankruptcy are listed in 11 U.S.C. ? 21a (1970). Of those six, two, the suffering 
of certain judicial liens or of a receivership, refer explicitly to the debtor's insolvency. 
Two others, making fraudulent or preferential transfers, indirectly implicate tests of in- 
solvency. The last two, making a general assignment for the benefit of creditors and a 
written admission of inability to pay debts and of willingness to be adjudged bankrupt, 
should be expected to occur only rarely absent insolvency. See Bonbright & Pickett, 
Valuation to Determnine Solvency Under the Bankruptcy Act, 29 COLUM. L. REV. 582, 
583-84, 587-88 (1929). 
199. For example, consider a corporation with the following conventional balance 
sheet: 
Assets Liabilities 
Cash $100 Current Liabilities $100 
Receivables 100 Funded Debt 300 
Fixed Asset 100 Net Worth (100) 
The fixed asset is a machine that produces the tangible goods sold by the com- 
pany; on this balance sheet the machine is valued at historical cost less accumulated de- 
preciation. The cash is kept in a non-interest-bearing checking account to serve as a 
buffer in case emergency expenditures must be made. Assume that the receivables will 
be collected before the current liabilities, which are non-interest-bearing, become due 
within the coming year. Even though the company is insolvent in a balance sheet sense, it 
may be in perfectly sound financial condition. Suppose, for example, that the fixed asset 
has a fair market value (FMV) of $600 at current capitalization rates. Specifically, it nets 
$60 in excess of expenses and amounts set aside for its replacement at the end of its 20- 
year useful life. The entire principal amount of the funded debt, however, is payable 
in one sum 20 years from the date of the balance sheet and bears interest of 8%, payable 
annually. Since income from the receivables covers the current liabilities, and since the 
$60 yielded by the fixed asset will more than cover the $24 annual debt service, the com- 
pany's profit will be $36 per year. Therefore, if these basic facts and all relevant external 
conditions remain constant, the company should experience no difficulty in refinancing 
its funded debt at the end of the 20-year period. If the company were averse to the risk 
of being unable to refinance at the later time, it might set aside the yearly profit in a 
sinking fund or use it to expand operations. If the annual return on the use of the 
profits should prove to be 10%, for example, the company would have a fund, or assets 
with a fair market value, worth about $2,000-more than enough to repay the principal 
amount of the funded debt. 
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for those who think the problem is only with the accountant's failure 
to use fair market values of assets-Bankruptcy Act insolvency does not 
imply bottom line insolvency.200 Fourth-a point for those who think 
that fair valuation of assets and liabilities would surely provide ac- 
curate predictions-a balance-sheet test of insolvency based on a state- 
ment which listed assets at fair market values and liabilities, not at 
their face values, but at their discounted negative present values (as 
is done for life insurance and pension fund liabilities), would not im- 
ply bottom line insolvency.201 Fifth-a point for those untroubled by 
regulatory overkill, so long as failures are prevented-solvency in nei- 
ther the accounting nor the Bankruptcy Act sense implies that the 
firm will not soon fall into bottom line insolvency. A fortiori, more 
remote tests of soundness which build on balance sheet solvency-such 
as net worth, surplus, and capital adequacy requirements-do not im- 
ply freedom from future bottom line insolvency. 
The fifth result bears special comment because it may not be as 
obvious as the others. Consider, for example, a company solvent in 
the Bankruptcy Act sense that failed, because of a liquidity squeeze, 
to pay its debts as they became due. If the creditors became intran- 
sigent and resorted immediately to their legal remedies, such as execu- 
tion, to enforce their debts, one might think the creditors would be 
satisfied in full, albeit involuntarily. This need not occur, however, 
because execution sales, for a variety of institutional reasons such as 
thin markets and inherent uncertainty about the legal rights acquired 
by execution purchasers, often bring the creditor far less than the 
fair market value of the property sold.202 Thus, creditors faced with a 
200. Suppose that the corporation analyzed in the preceding footnote had a somewhat 
different balance sheet: 
Assets Liabilities 
Cash $100 Current Liabilities $100 
Receivables 100 Funded Debt 800 
Fixed Asset (at FMV) 600 Net Worth (100) 
As before, assume that the fixed asset generates net annual earnings of $60. If the com- 
pany were fortunate enough to be paying only 5% per annum on its 20-year funded debt 
of $800, the company could meet its interest payments and have an annual profit of $20. 
In essence, its position would be similar to that of the corporation under the first set of 
assumptions. Even if the company were paying 7% interest per year on the funded debt 
(thereby reducing its annual profit to $4) it might, by prudent management of its earn- 
ings and a bit of luck, put itself into a position to obtain comparable refinancing at the 
end of 20 years. 
201. A firm insolvent on a balance sheet using fair valuation, but able to meet its 
legally required cash outflows in the near future, may not suffer bottom line insolvency. 
One reason is that before obligations become due the fair values of assets and obligations 
may change favorably in response to a variety of external or internal events, ranging 
from unexpected changes in the rate of inflation to technological advances. 
202. See D. EPSTEIN, DEBTOR-CREDITOR RELATIONS 50-51 (1973); R. NEEDHAM & L. POL- 
LACK, COLLECTING CLAIMS AND ENFORCING JUDGMENTS 194 (1969). 
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corporation solvent in the Bankruptcy Act sense and yet not paying 
its due and payable debts may in fact never be satisfied; real and ul- 
timate contractual failure may result if normal creditors' remedies are 
invoked. The rehabilitation chapters of the Bankruptcy Act203 are de- 
signed to deal with situations of this kind, and to salvage some of the 
excess of fair market or going concern values over liquidation values, 
for the benefit of creditors (and perhaps, in certain cases, debtors).204 
Yet these provisions are not always available;205 nor do they always 
work as intended.206 
ii. Reasons for Lack of Necessary Relationships 
Isolated examples showing that the more remote concepts of insol- 
vency or absence of adequate net worth need not indicate or predict 
bottom line insolvency are likely to leave one unimpressed; the ex- 
amples may be mere anomalies. It is in order, therefore, to contem- 
plate the more obvious factors that can compromise the utility of fi- 
nancial statements for indicating or predicting failures. The factors 
may be grouped into three categories: assets, liabilities, and nonfinan- 
cial factors. As will be seen, the interrelationships of items on the 
balance sheet can be crucially important. 
Assets: The balance sheet may not show the fair market value of an 
asset. Even the fair market value may be relevant only if the asset 
will in fact be sold on a market to meet the company's obligations 
when they become payable. Otherwise, fair market value is relevant 
only as a proxy for projected earnings from the asset.207 Thus, when 
203. Bankruptcy Act ? 77, 11 U.S.C. ? 205 (1970) (railroad reorganizations); id. ch. X, 
11 U.S.C. ?? 501-676 (1970) (corporate reorganizations); id. ch. XI, 11 U.S.C. ?? 701-799 
(1970) (arrangements). 
204. In Chapter XI arrangements of corporations, the stockholders often salvage signif- 
icant value for themselves. In Chapter X reorganizations this result is less common be- 
cause of the so-called absolute priority rule. See Blum & Kaplan, The Absolute Priority 
Doctrine in Corporate Reorganizations, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 651 (1974). 
205. Insurance and banking corporations, for example, are excluded from the benefits 
of the Bankruptcy Act. 11 U.S.C. ? 22(a), (b) (1970). 
206. See, e.g., B. GRAHAM, THE INTELLIGENT INVESTOR 195-96 (1949), quoted in W. BLUM 
& S. KAPLAN, CORPORATE READJUSTMENTS AND REORGANIZATIONS 485-86 (1976) (discussing 
stalling tactics by stockholders in Cotton Belt Railroad reorganization). 
207. For example, consider a life insurance company with a fixed obligation to pay 
the beneficiaries of its policies $1 million annually for the next 10 years. To cover these 
obligations the company has purchased marketable bonds whose maturities will provide 
the intermediary with $1.1 million each year shortly before payments are due to be made 
to the beneficiaries. The chief risks in assessing whether the company will become ir~sol- 
vent in the bottom line sense are the risk that the obligors will default (default risk) 
and the risk that the management or the employees will steal the company's bond income 
(infidelity risk), rather than the risk that the bonds will drop in value because of a sharp 
rise in the general level of interest rates (market risk). If interest rates shifted, the market 
value of the bonds might decline below the estimated present value of the company's 
obligations. Unless the decline was also attributable to a belief that the bonds would not 
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assets are not expected to be sold before the end of their lives, the 
relevant data from the standpoint of assessing prospects for con- 
tractual failure include their rates of return, their lifespans, and the 
benefits, such as salvage values or principal payments, received at the 
end of their useful lives. Whether assets will not be expected to be 
sold before the end of their lives will in turn depend on predictions 
about the maturity dates of the company's obligations and on a variety 
of aspects of the company's strategy for maximizing profits.208 
Furthermore, when it is expected that an asset will be sold or other- 
wise disposed of to meet a company's obligations, the relevant fair 
market value for purposes of predicting bottom line insolvency is that 
which obtains at the time of the future sale, which will be some rea- 
sonable time before the maturity of the obligations in question. These 
relevant fair market values may be hard to predict. In addition, fi- 
nancial intermediaries may not be able to fix in advance the dates 
on which obligations must be met. The dates may therefore have to 
be predicted by actuarial techniques or, sometimes, by guesswork. 
Other factors that impair the predictive utility of assets shown 
on balance sheets include the possibility that those assets may be sold 
and converted into other assets before obligations become payable. 
The new assets may have a different pattern of earnings and of future 
changes in salable values. Finally, a variety of uses may be made of 
any positive cash flow generated by a business, though balance sheets 
will hardly indicate the various alternatives and their probabilities of 
occurrence. A company might distribute the funds to shareholders, 
reinvest them in similar business ventures, invest them in money mar- 
ket instruments, and so forth. 
Liabilities: A balance sheet per se may exclude some liabilities, for 
example, contingent ones, that a rational businessman or regulator 
should consider. A group of acknowledged obligations may be con- 
tingent, either as to liability (e.g., a pending antitrust action against 
the company) or as to due date (e.g., the obligations to pay up on life 
insurance contracts or to meet requests for withdrawal of demand 
deposits). A balance sheet may not provide a good prediction of the 
seriousness of the contingency or, put otherwise, a best estimate of the 
contingency together with a measure of the probability of various 
specific deviations from that estimate. Furthermore, the balance sheet 
may not indicate the interest payable on the obligations. The interest 
be paid, the lower market value would be irrelevant to an assessment of the company's 
soundness. As long as the inflow of funds from the bonds equalled or exceeded the 
obligatory outflow of funds, the company would be solvent. 
208. See pp. 55-57 & n.207 supra. 
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itself may be contingent and varying;209 if so, the balance sheet's lack 
of a useful prediction as to probable interest obligations may be serious. 
Finally, just as management may replace its stock or portfolio of 
assets and have better luck with the new block, it may change the 
nature and extent of its liabilities before an apparent future day of 
reckoning arrives. Rather than relying upon its earnings or sales of 
assets, a bank might decide to meet future obligations by resorting to 
borrowing-for example, in the federal funds market, from a Federal 
Reserve Bank, or by issuing negotiable certificates of deposit or com- 
mercial paper from its bank holding company. Needless to say, this 
delicately tinted and complex horizon of borrowing strategies is no- 
where painted on the bank's balance sheet. Yet one cannot assess the 
bank's soundness without considering its ability to take advantage of 
these alternative strategies. The extent and validity of the bank's re- 
liance on "liability management" is left to the unsystematized experi- 
ence and judgment of management and regulators-or perhaps only to 
their hunches and biases. 
Nonfinancial Factors: Even specially and carefully prepared balance 
sheets, such as those toward which the SEC has moved,210 may not 
reflect all information that is relevant in evaluating the soundness of 
a company. Management's health, integrity, competence, and image 
may all be crucially relevant to the fortunes of an enterprise, as may 
be such factors as future developments in technology, the competi- 
tive setting of the business, and economic trends. In a sophisticated 
projection of future earnings, complete with estimates of the riskiness 
of the earnings, all of these factors should be considered, though ma- 
terial facts often will be overlooked or misinterpreted. 
It should be apparent, then, that the value of regulation aimed -It 
ensuring financial soundness or detecting unsoundness will depend on 
the accuracy and tractability of the data obtained by the regulators, 
the nature of the tests and constraints, and the extent to which these 
tests and constraints reflect the more important of numerous and com- 
plex relevant variables. The proper portrayal of assets and liabilities, 
or proper projection of cash inflows and outflows, for purposes of pre- 
dicting bottom line insolvency, can be extremely difficult. The diffi- 
209. Some bank holding companies have issued floating-rate notes. See, e.g., N.Y. 
Times, July 25, 1974, at 43, col. 1. A related point is that many short-term liabilities in- 
dicated on the balance sheet, e.g., borrowings in the federal funds market and negotiable 
certificates of deposit, may soon be rolled over in the normal course, but at a different 
interest rate. 
210. See 17 C.F.R. pt. 210 (1976); Wall St. J., Sept. 23, 1976, at 1, col. 6 (discussing 
reactions to SEC accounting rule requiring balance sheets to show effect of inflation on 
replacement costs). 
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culties place a great handicap on simplified balance-sheet-type tests of 
solvency, traditional techniques of financial analysis, and mechanical 
rules concerning financial ratios derived from financial statements. 
iii. From Balance Sheet to Model of Flows 
The manifold, and practically elusive, factors that have been intro- 
duced to impart a sense of the complexity and extent of the problem of 
soundness should be related to a simpler and more fundamental de- 
scription of the problem. In view of the diversity of factors, it is easy 
to lose sight of the elements of the problem and to confuse what is 
directly relevant to preventing bottom line insolvency with what is 
indirectly relevant. 
At its most elementary level, the problem of soundness involves 
money and cash flows, not assets and unmatured obligations. Ignoring 
flows of funds for expenditures not peculiar to financial intermediaries 
(e.g., rental and salary payments), the principal flows of money with 
which the intermediary is concerned are, quite simply, the inflows, 
both from investment assets and capital suppliers, and the outflows, 
both for investment assets and to holders of the intermediary's obliga- 
tions and common stock. From an insolvency prevention standpoint, 
the crucial characteristics of each of the cash flows are (1) the ex- 
pected amounts and (2) the expected times pf future flows, together 
with (3) the pattern of estimated probabilities of dispersion of actual 
flows around the expected flows. Within this framework many com- 
mon distinctions and simple classifications of balance-sheet data ap- 
pear relevant only insofar as they illuminate and suggest what the 
values of the three primary characteristics are.211 
In terms of flows, the objective of the intermediary is to maximize 
one type of flow, payments to equity owners, in relation to another, 
payments by equity owners. This objective is always subject to the 
constraint that the amount of cash in the intermediary may never be 
insufficient to meet legal demands made on it. That is, cash on hand 
must equal the amount of obligations legally due and payable at that 
211. Included among such distinctions are the difference between obligations or as- 
sets that are fixed in amount (e.g., bank deposits or bonds) and those not so fixed (e.g., 
casualty insurance policies or common stock); between relatively continuous flows from 
interest or dividend payments on assets or obligations (e.g., interest revenues from port- 
folio bonds and dividend payments to policyholders) and lumpy flows from principal 
payments and capital gain receipts (e.g., payment of requests for withdrawals of de- 
posits and receipts of gains on the sale of portfolio stock); and between fixed maturities 
of assets and obligations (e.g., the maturities of short-term notes and capital debentures) 
and unfixed maturities of assets and obligations (e.g., the maturities of callable bonds 
and life insurance contracts). 
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same instant. The regulator's job is-or ought to be-to ensure that 
the probability that the constraint will not be satisfied is kept below 
some specified level, without unnecessarily impairing management's 
abilities to maximize the flow to equity owners. 
This model of the problem is, of course, both simple and abstract. 
To employ the approach would require greater specification of ele- 
ments, sophisticated mathematical techniques, computer time, and a 
great deal of information, much of which would have to be estimated. 
A complicated legal rule based on balance sheet ratios might still be 
practically more feasible than a comprehensive analysis of fund flows. 
Reports of detailed financial information could be required, and a capi- 
tal adequacy ratio could be defined in a way that varies in a complex 
manner with the characteristics of particular subclasses of assets and 
obligations-such as is done by the Federal Reserve Board's capital ade- 
quacy formula.212 It should be theoretically possible to take into ac- 
count many factors typically ignored by balance sheets but required by 
a comprehensive flow model. Nevertheless, the flow model should serve 
as a heuristic guide to regulators seeking to study better modes of pre- 
dicting contractual failure from information that intermediaries are 
reporting or could be required to report. Approaches similar to the 
model are already used by sophisticated intermediaries attempting to 
sharpen their policies for meeting liquidity needs and to improve their 
profit-maximizing strategies.213 
Moreover, the model is a simple reference source for generating crit- 
icisms of particular ratio tests and incomplete "theories" of liquidity 
or solvency. Using a simple ratio of loans to deposits as a measure of 
a commercial bank's degree of illiquidity, for example, might be fault- 
ed for ignoring the maturities and repayment schedules of loans, the 
expected pattern of future loan demand, the expected likelihood and 
extent of deposit fluctuations, and the degrees of liquidity of assets 
other than loans.214 Similarly, the distinction among four common 
212. See Problem Banks: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and 
Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 142-44, 146-47 (1976) (Federal Reserve Board memoran- 
dum discussing capital adequacy and Board's form for analyzing bank capital). 
213. See E. REED, R. COTTER, E. GILL & R. SMITH, COMMERCIAL BANKING 111-17 (1976). 
214. Id. at 119-20. Whereas the loans/deposit ratio is intended as a measure of illi- 
quidity, the Comptroller of the Currency's Bank Liquidity Analysis form uses a pur- 
ported measure of liquidity (net liquid assets to net liabilities) that is subject to the 
same criticisms. The Comptroller freely admits that such mechanical analyses are inade- 
quate and that maintenance of adequate liquidity depends on many factors which differ 
among individual banks. He concludes that the best regulation is both flexible and 
informed (i.e., that assessment of liquidity should be left to the regulators' discretion and 
not confined or disciplined by statute or rulemaking). See I FINE STUDY PAPERS, supra 
note 3, at 314-15 (statement of Comptroller of Currency). Whether the unsystematized 
and nonscientific practical judgment of bank examiners is consistently better than that of 
bank management is, of course, open to question. 
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"theories" of a bank's liquidity management-the commercial loan 
theory, the shiftability theory, the anticipated-income theory, and the 
liability-management theory215-readily can be perceived as a differ- 
ence in emphasis upon relevant factors. Liquidity needs obviously can 
be satisfied by any dollars, whether they come from loan repayments, 
receipts from the sale of short-term securities, new deposits, or newly 
borrowed funds. The true task is to find the combination of sources 
that is cheapest. 
It is hoped that this lengthy discussion will have indicated the 
sterility of pure reason in generating or evaluating useful balance- 
sheet shaping rules. It is not enough to test such a rule against a stan- 
dard of plausibility or seemingly inevitable relevance. Systematic em- 
pirical study must be employed to test such rules. Since the empirical 
studies create serious doubts about the effectiveness of much existing 
portfolio regulation, newly devised but unproven rules and guidelines 
should be treated with appropriate skepticism. 
3. Summary 
Balance-sheet shaping rules, which comprise one major class of tech- 
niques of portfolio regulation, are of doubtful efficacy in their current 
form. To make them effective in the future will probably require sub- 
stantial advances in theory and empirical research. Restraints on kinds 
of assets, which comprise another class, can be effective in reducing 
institutional riskiness; but to the extent that they are effective they 
are likely to be based on archaic conceptions of risk and unduly re- 
strictive. Future developments in portfolio theory which take account 
of differences in the obligational context faced by the different types 
215. Under the commercial loan theory, which prevailed throughout the olden days 
of American banking, banks are supposed to keep their loan maturities short, so that 
principal repayments can be used to meet deposit withdrawals and new loan demands. 
The theory was criticized for ignoring the de facto partial stability of deposits. See E. 
REED, et al., supra note 213, at 125-27. 
Under the shiftability theory, a bank's liquidity is to be maintained by its keeping 
liquid assets-short-term securities not subject to much market risk-that can be shifted 
or sold for cash as the need arises. The idea has validity, though it did not help banks 
in the 1920s and 1930s, when they relied for liquidity on call loans collateralized by 
stock: when stock prices fell, the liquid assets evaporated. Today, government securities 
are used, and regulators are probably less cautious about banks that employ this theory 
than they are about those leaning heavily upon liability management techniques. See id. 
at 127. 
The idea of the anticipated-income theory is to relate scheduled loan repayments to 
the borrower's income. The liability-management theory is simple enough in concept: a 
bank should rely on borrowing-via certificates of deposit, federal funds, Eurodollars, 
and the like-to meet liquidity needs. The strategy was much in vogue in the 1960s and 
early 1970s, but suffered something of a setback in the recession of 1974-1975. See id. at 
127-28. 
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of financial intermediaries (or better, by particular financial inter- 
mediaries) may mitigate these unfortunate aspects of the strategy, but 
the success or timing of these developments cannot be firmly predicted. 
Portfolio regulation has tended to generate very high direct enforce- 
ment costs, though perhaps this characteristic does not necessarily in- 
here in the strategy. On the other hand, portfolio regulation does not 
appear to generate indirect costs or secondary formulation costs to 
the same extent as anticompetitive regulation. On balance, when the 
two strategies so far considered are viewed as functional substitutes 
for one another, portfolio regulation appears to be less harmful. It 
may even be, or with future research and improvement in legal ma- 
chinery become, justifiable. 
C. Insider Misconduct Regulation 
Studies of the failures of certain financial intermediaries indicate 
that insider misconduct has played an enormous role in causing the 
financial downfall of these institutions. Even after discounting the 
reliability of the data or indications, one is still left with a picture that 
contrasts with the various studies of bankruptcies of ordinary, nonfi- 
nancial corporations.217 The causes of this apparent contrast have never 
been adequately explored. 
It is perhaps not an overgeneralization to say that the substantive 
rules pertaining to self-dealing and conflicts of interests are stricter 
in the case of many financial intermediaries than in the case of ordi- 
nary nonfinancial corporations. For example, the Investment Com- 
pany Act of 1940 is essentially a stringent set of federal rules designed 
to prevent investment company managers, advisors, underwriters, 
broker-dealers who sell investment company shares, and other affiliated 
persons from taking advantage of investment company shareholders.218 
Yet the generalization about the strictness of insider misconduct regu- 
216. See pp. 12-14 supra. 
217. See note 48 supra. Questions can readily be raised. Were the data collected in a 
fatally unsystematic, nonuniform way? Can causal roles be meaningfully assigned to 
factors present before insolvencies? Are regulators more motivated than trustees in bank- 
ruptcy to find dishonesty, since failure for other reasons seems to suggest the ineffective- 
ness of their regulatory efforts? Does the higher rate of failures due to misconduct among 
financial intermediaries as opposed to ordinary business corporations simply reflect the 
fact that, because of anticompetitive and portfolio regulation, few intermediaries can fail 
for other reasons? Are the studies of failures poor indicators of the incidence of insiders' 
misconduct in ongoing intermediaries? I hope to show in a forthcoming study, see note 
242 infra, that a generally negative answer is justified for most of these questions. 
218. There arc some provisions in the Act, however, which do reflect the strategies of 
anticompetitivc regulation and portfolio regulation, see, e.g., 15 U.S.C. ?? 80a-13, -18 (1970 
& Supp. IV 1974), but they are less extensive and less intrusive than the techniques ap- 
plied to depository-type and insurance-type financial intermediaries. 
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lation cannot be made absolute. In particular, many conflicts of in- 
terest in the savings and loan industry, though pervasive, were long 
tolerated for peculiar historical reasons.219 Even here, though, recent 
insider transaction regulations of the Federal Home Loan Bank 
Board220 herald a stricter regime. 
Although regulation of insider misconduct in the case of financial 
intermediaries generally may be stricter than that for ordinary cor- 
porations, it is nevertheless true that the actual regulations appli- 
cable to the different types of financial intermediaries differ greatly 
in their stringency. One may take as an example a perennially impor- 
tant kind of insider misconduct, the abuse of power to the detriment 
of an intermediary in transactions in which one of its directors has a 
personal interest. Possible legal responses to such misconduct may be 
considered in order of roughly increasing severity. First is the Dela- 
ware rule for business corporations, which, initially seems to require 
disclosure of the conflict of interest in addition to approval by di- 
rectors or ratification by shareholders. Alternatively, however, the Dela- 
ware rule permits the interested transaction if it is "fair"-a determina- 
tion that may only be made through litigation.221 Second is a rule 
requiring that disinterested directors be informed of the conflict of 
interest, make an explicit finding that the proposed transaction is 
fair, and keep records of the finding available for inspection by regu- 
lators. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation's recent regulations 
concerning insider transactions in insured nonmember banks are of 
this sort.222 A third kind of rule prohibits interested transactions, but 
provides a procedure for obtaining regulatory approval of particular 
transactions. Section 17 of the Investment Company Act of 1940 pro- 
vides a simple example.223 A more elaborate complex of rules is given 
by ERISA, which imposes a general duty of loyalty on pension fund 
fiduciaries, prohibits many kinds of transactions with interested parties, 
lists specific exceptions to the prohibitions, and provides a procedure 
219. For a superb study, see Herman, Conflicts of Interest in the Savings and Loan 
Industry, in II STUDY OF THE SAVINGS AND LOAN INDUSTRY 763 (I. Friend ed. 1969). 
220. 41 Fed. Reg. 35811 (1976). 
221. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, ? 144 (Michie 1975). 
222. 41 Fed. Reg. 18405 (1976) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. ? 337.3). 
223. 15 U.S.C. ? 80a-17(a), (b) (1970). The administrative burdens of the approval pro- 
cedure have been suggested as a reason for change to a three-tier system: de minimis 
exceptions from approval requirements; no application procedure for transactions that 
the disinterested directors are willing to find fair and reasonable; and traditional appli- 
cation procedure before the SEC for transactions falling within a zone of reasonableness, 
but as to which the disinterested directors are unwilling to make a finding. Rosenblatt & 
Lybecker, Some Thoughts on the Federal Securities Laws Regulating External Investment 
Management Arrangements and the ALI Federal Securities Code Project, 124 U. PA. L. 
REV. 587, 640-43 (1976). 
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for regulatory permission in special cases.224 A fourth kind of rule 
proscribes dealings between the institution and its directors or entities 
in which they are interested, while allowing some exceptions which 
are usually trivial from an economic standpoint-for example, per- 
mission for the institution to make an ordinary home mortgage loan 
to a director. Some life insurance company statutes exhibit this kind 
of rule.225 A fifth kind of rule simply prohibits all transactions in 
which directors have an interest, without any exceptions or procedures 
for approval. Some statutes also have rules which attack the problem 
of insider self-dealing from a structural rather than a transactional 
perspective. An example is the rule that the board of directors of an 
investment company must include a certain percentage of outside 
directors.228 
Because of the variety of regulatory patterns and the rather funda- 
mental differences among them, evaluation of insider misconduct regu- 
lation as a strategy for encouraging the soundness of financial inter- 
mediaries is more difficult and uncertain than evaluation of the 
anticompetitive and portfolio-manipulating strategies. As the ensuing 
discussion indicates, assessment of insider misconduct regulation is 
uncertain for other reasons as well. 
1. Costs 
Primary formulation costs are apt to be low because, as with anti- 
competitive regulation, little thought has been devoted to devising 
insider misconduct rules. The secondary formulation costs of insider 
misconduct regulation-such as those associated with development of 
the Financial Institutions Supervisory Act of 1966227 and the recent 
bill228 expanding the powers granted by that Act-seem to be moderate, 
and perhaps lower than those generated by the anticompetitive strat- 
egy. Insider misconduct rules are certainly subject to clever circum- 
vention.229 In response, regulators may propose either general rules to 
224. ERISA ?? 403, 406-08, 29 U.S.C. ?? 1103, 1106-08 (Supp. IV 1974). 
225. E.g., N.Y. INS. LAW ? 78(6)-(8) (McKinney 1966 & Supp. 1975-76) (prohibition 
against loans to directors or officers; general exception for policy loans). 
226. 15 U.S.C. ? 80a-10(a) (1970) (no more than 60% of directors may be "interested 
persons"). 
227. Pub. L. No. 89-695, 80 Stat. 1028 (1966) (codified at 12 U.S.C. ?? 1464(d), 1724, 
1728, 1730, 1813, 1817-21 (1970)). 
228. S. 2304, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). 
229. If, for example, a bank is prohibited from making loans to its principal officers, 
or loans on preferential terms, the officer of Bank A may approach Bank B and request 
a loan either for himself or his nonbanking business. The loan may be granted on pref- 
erential terms because of some incentive granted to Bank B, such as a promise by the 
officer to cause Bank A to place corresponding balances with Bank B. The example is 
not made of whole cloth. It was recently held that an indictment for the use of an 
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cover all possible misconduct or specific new rules to combat each act 
of misconduct. Nevertheless, it seems that the spirit or underlying pur- 
pose of insider misconduct rules is easier for judges to ascertain and 
accept wholeheartedly than is that of anticompetitive rules, and, there- 
fore. somewhat easier to extend to novel shenanigans. 
As for direct enforcement costs, some speculations may be ventured. 
As an a priori judgment about human nature, the temptation for a 
manager to extract a secret personal gain seems harder to squelch by 
legal admonition than the tendency to operate at an excessive risk level 
for the benefit of the shareholders as a group. If so, compliance with 
even the literal terms of a substantive rule governing insider conduct 
will fall short of the level of compliance with clear-cut legal rules of 
the anticompetitive and portfolio-manipulating strategies. Accordingly, 
the enforcement aspect of insider misconduct regulation will become 
comparatively hypertrophied and costly. In addition to the costs of 
examinations and reports that are allocable to insider misconduct regu- 
lation, there will be the costs of letters of reprimand, hearings, cease 
and desist orders, extended criminal prosecutions, and, in some areas, 
private litigation. Thus, direct enforcement costs of insider misconduct 
regulation may currently be rather low in comparison with those gen- 
erated by portfolio regulation, but high in relation to the number of 
cases handled. An enforcement effort adequate to cause a sizable re- 
duction in the incidence of misconduct might also significantly increase 
the aggregate direct enforcement costs. It seems impossible to prove 
these conjectures empirically, but some rough data about. the size of 
enforcement efforts seems consistent with the supposition that existing 
enforcement levels (and costs) are low.230 
interbank deposit as a compensating balance for a loan at preferential rates to an official 
of the depositing bank alleges a (criminal) violation of 18 U.S.C. ? 656 (1970) (misapplica- 
tion of bank funds). United States v. Mann, 517 F.2d 259 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 
U.S. 1087 (1976); United States v. Brookshire, 514 F.2d 786 (10th Cir. 1975). In affirming 
conviction in the latter case the court said, "If, as the defendant says, this practice is the 
usual way in which bankers do business, those who engage in it must suffer the penalty 
which the law constitutionally provides." Id. at 790. 
230. The FDIC's experience perhaps typifies the patterns of enforcement costs incurred 
by the government. Since a meaningful breakdown of dollar figures is unavailable, I focus 
on numbers of actions taken within the FDIC's Division of Supervision. In 1974 the FDIC 
conducted over 7,400 examinations of main offices and approximately the same number 
of examinations of departments and branches of nonmember insured banks. It made 304 
investigations in connection with applications for insurance; 1,013 in connection with 
applications for consent to new branches; and 212 in connection with applications for 
consent to consolidate, merge, purchase assets, or assume liabilities. [1974] FDIC ANN. 
REP. 10. Although most of the expense of these efforts must be allocated to portfolio 
regulation and anticompetitive regulation, some should be allocated to insider misconduct 
regulation. 
By contrast, there were few FDIC actions in proceedings more likely to involve insider 
misconduct. It initiated five new cease and desist proceedings and terminated nine of 
80 
This content downloaded from 130.132.173.207 on Wed, 5 Jun 2013 13:25:13 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
The Soundness of Financial Intermediaries 
Use of insider misconduct regulation to further ulterior ends has not 
surfaced as a significant problem. Although the other types of indirect 
costs caused by such regulation generally appear not to be high, there 
are exceptions. Some exceptions are presented by rules with such a 
wide sweep and flatly prohibitive approach that ordinary and reason- 
able combinations of business functions become impossible. If this 
effect were serious, it would tend toward both misallocation of re- 
sources and discrimination against those affected by the rules who 
would deal honestly and fairly with affiliated intermediaries even in 
the absence of regulation. ERISA has been accused of creating this 
kind of problem, though solutions to its dilemmas have been and will 
be provided.23' 
Possibly more important is the argument that there should not be 
prohibitions against loans by a commercial bank to its directors. This 
argument suggests that an exception be made in the many places where 
there is only one bank and all the businessmen who could conceivably 
be borrowers are directors of the bank. To prohibit loans to directors 
or to their affiliated businesses in such a case deprives the bank of its 
major source of profitable and generally honest business. This prob- 
lem appears to be restricted to cases where the market for financial 
services is so small and isolated that self-dealing is practically un- 
avoidable-situations that do not exist for most financial intermedi- 
aries. Insurance companies, for example, tend by the nature of their 
business to seek growth, to do business in a diversity of areas, and to 
diversify investments in a regional or national market. Similarly, in 
the case of most mutual funds, it would be ludicrous to suggest that 
they "need" to invest in securities issued by businesses affiliated 
with insiders. To be sure, some large, nationally oriented banks cus- 
tomarily have on their boards of directors officers and directors of 
major borrowing companies. But that custom does not seem to serve 
any vital function that could not be served in some other way. 
In the pension fund area, the parallel question is whether investing 
heavily in securities or obligations issued by the plan's sponsor pro- 
vides significant advantages, not obtainable by a fully diversified fund. 
the outstanding cease and desist orders; it began three new proceedings to terminate 
deposit insurance; it issued a removal order against one bank director; it issued orders 
suspending three persons from their offices in banks; and it caused 10 other persons to 
resign or suspend themselves from their positions with insured banks. Id. at 14-18. Good 
information about the number of Justice Department actions taken in response to FDIC 
referrals of apparent criminal violations does not seem to be available. 
231. See, e.g., Proceedings of ABA National Institute on Fiduciary Responsibilities 
under the Pension Reform Act: Special Problems of the Securities Industry, 31 Bus. LAW. 
269 (1975). 
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Attempts have been made to justify heavy investment in employer se- 
curities in terms of employee capitalism.232 Under certain conditions 
the practice is permitted by ERISA.233 Yet experience suggests that 
the abuses facilitated by the practice have outweighed the benefits, 
except under rigidly controlled conditions.234 
It thus appears that only small, isolated banks and thrift institutions 
can credibly claim that strict insider misconduct regulation imposes 
unacceptable indirect costs. Furthermore, the probable demise of an- 
ticompetitive regulation and the growth and development of elec- 
tronic funds transfer systems will weaken these claims by eliminating 
the competitive isolation in which many of these institutions now 
operate. 
It may be possible to generalize the above analysis of the ERISA 
rules and the problem of bank loans to directors. Given a large, inte- 
grated economy in which both the intermediary and the insiders face 
numerous parties with whom they might bargain, even a flat prohi- 
bition against conflict of interest transactions usually would leave the 
insiders free to achieve their legitimate goals elsewhere. Costs would 
only arise to the extent that dealings between the intermediary and 
its insiders have unique efficiency advantages, such as savings in the 
cost of formulating and communicating information between potential 
bargaining entities; but rules that regulate rather than prohibit such 
dealings may preserve these advantages. 
Of course, some conflicts are inevitable and cannot be proscribed. 
To take the most pervasive example, the persons in de facto control 
of an intermediary and, within broad limits, its salary payments, will 
often be salaried officers. Yet, at least historically, regulation of man- 
agement compensation has tended to rely on flexible general standards, 
such as the doctrine of waste, rather than on mechanical limits which 
arguably distort the demand for executive talent and discriminate 
against the honest but superior executive who deserves above-normal 
compensation. 
Despite the above attempts at generalization about costs, it should 
be confessed that generalizations across financial intermediaries are 
hazardous because of the fundamental differences in regulatory pat- 
terns. Banking regulators make periodic, on-site, intensive investiga- 
2329. See, e.g., Note, Employee Stock Ownership Plans: A Step Toward Democratic 
Capitalism, 55 B.U. L. REV. 195 (1975). 
233. ERISA ?? 407, 408(e), 29 U.S.C. ?? 1107, 1108(e) (Supp. IV 1974) (investment in 
employer's securities limited to 10%/,, of plan's assets; exceptions). 
234. See J. BROOKS, supra note 46, at 15-19; Wall St. J., Aug. 2, 1976, at 2, col. 3 (pro- 
posed rules to prevent abuses in employee stock ownership plans). 
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tions of the condition of all banks under their jurisdiction.5 They 
discourage disclosure of their findings to the general public and even 
to the public suppliers of capital.236 The banking regulators also 
preempt enforcement actions, for insider misconduct in the banking 
field has generated comparatively little private litigation.237 The 
SEC's regulation of investment companies is different in all three 
respects. It makes no comparable periodic investigations, but merely 
receives reports and conducts special investigations from time to 
time.238 It strenuously urges detailed and extensive disclosure of in- 
formation to public suppliers of capital.239 And it encourages private 
235. For examples of statutes concerning examination of depository-type financial in- 
termediaries, see 21 U.S.C. ? 481 (1970) (Comptroller examines each national bank twice 
a year, but may waive one examination or cause more frequent examinations); 12 U.S.C. 
? 483 (1970) (each Federal Reserve Bank may provide for special examinations of member 
banks in district); id. ? 1820(b) (FDIC may examine insured bank); CAL. FIN. CODE ? 1900 
(West Supp. 1976) (superintendent examines banks at least yearly); id. ? 1911 (West 1969) 
(examination of national banks); N.Y. BANKING LAW ? 36 (McKinney 1971) (superintendent 
examines commercial and mutual savings banks annually; discretionary extra examina- 
tions); CAL. FIN. CODE ? 8800 (West Supp. 1976) (biennial examinations of MSBs by 
commissioner); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 167, ? 2 (Michie/Law. Co-op 1970 & Supp. 1976) 
(commissioner examines MSBs at least yearly). For descriptions df the bank examining and 
supervisory processes of the Comptroller of the Currency and the Board of Governors 
of the Federal Reserve System, in response to a detailed congressional questionnaire, see 
I FINE STUDY PAPERS, supra note 3, at 349-400, 514-70. 
The insurance-type financial intermediaries are also subject, in general, to examina- 
tions. E.g., N.Y. INS. LAW ? 28-2(a), (b) (McKinney Supp. 1975-76) (examination of casualty 
insurers at least once every three years; life insurers, five years). But see note 238 infra 
(pension plans). 
236. For an extraordinary display of regulatory concern for "confidentiality," see 
[Current] FED. BANKING L. REP. (CCH) If 96,834 (1976) (memorandum of agreement de- 
fining scope of GAO study of Federal Reserve System and Chairman Burns's accompany- 
ing letter). The GAO study will deal with functions relating to examinations, detection of 
unsound and unsafe conditions, violations of law and regulations, and remedial processes 
-all of which could be "material" information to investors in particular banks. See also 
note 239 infra. 
237. This statement is difficult to support; reported cases are hardly dispositive, Since 
much litigation against corporate insiders is probably settled. My impression is based pri- 
marily on observations made while attending practitioner-oriented conferences on banking 
law and others on investment company law. Fear of private litigation against directors 
and officers was more evident at the latter. Compare J. WHITE, BANKING LAW (1976) (only 
scattered references to private litigation based on insider conflicts of interest or excessive 
fees and salaries) with R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, SECURITIES REGULATION 1438-1571 (3d ed. 
1972) (discusses insider misconduct largely through opinions in private civil lawsuits). See 
also Knepper, Officers and Directors: Indeinnification and Liability Insurance-An Update, 
30 Bus. LAW. 951, 963, 964 (1975) (mutual funds unable to get insurance for directors and 
officers, biut 1/3 of banks have it). 
238. 15 U.S.C. ?? 80a-29, -41 (1970); cf. ERISA ? 504, 29 U.S.C. ? 1134 (Supp. TV 1974) 
(Secretary of Labor's special investigatory powers; regular examinations not contemplated). 
239. 15 U.S.C. ?? 80a-8, -29 (1970). National banks with 500 or more shareholders are 
subject to Comptroller-promulgated Securities Exchange Act Disclosure Rules, which with 
certain exceptions are substantially similar to the SEC's regulations. Moreover, the banks 
must complete reports designed to increase public knowledge of the banks' financial 
conditions and income. I FINE STUDY PAPERS, supra note 3, at 348. (A similar point can 
be made about member banks and insured nonmember banks. See pp. 4-5 su pra.) It 
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litigation, of which there has been a great deal, at least in relation to 
the rather small size of the investment company industry.240 The most 
recent regulatory statute, ERISA, governs private pension funds. It 
provides the most complete and most potent set of public and private 
remedies against breach of its many fiduciary duties.241 Reasonably 
might be thought, then, that banks are subject to as much required disclosure as are 
ordinary corporations. There is, however, some arguably material information about a 
bank that is not disclosed: the regulators' examination reports. See 5 U.S.C. ? 552(b)(8) 
(1970) (material prepared by the regulators of financial institutions exempt from dis- 
closure requirements of Freedom of Information Act); cf. 18 U.S.C. ? 1906 (1970) (criminal 
penalties for examiners who disclose information about specific borrowers). 
The secrecy of examination reports is usually defended by arguing that the ability to 
conduct 25,000 effective examinations annually is made possible only by the cooperation 
of the banks and examiners; disclosure could seriously interfere with the "examination 
process." I FINE STUDY PAPERS, supra note 3, at 352. For a full discussion of disclosure 
policies, see Financial Disclosure by Banks and Bank Holding Companies: Hearings Be- 
fore the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1975). 
240. See note 237 supra. 
241. Individuals who willfully violate the extensive reporting and disclosure provisions 
of the Act may be punished by fines up to $5,000 and imprisoned up to one year. ERISA 
? 501, 29 U.S.C. ? 1131 (Supp. IV 1974). The IRS may impose excise taxes on disqualified 
persons who engage in prohibited transactions. Id. ? 3003, 29 U.S.C. ? 1203 (Supp. IV 
1974). A 5%/,O tax is immediately levied when the transaction is discovered. If, after notice 
from the IRS, the transaction is not corrected, a 100% tax is imposed. The disqualified 
person has a duty to correct the transaction. The IRS polices only tax-qualified plans, 
but civil penalties that are identical to the excise tax provisions are available to deal 
with persons who engage in prohibited transactions with non-tax-qualified plans. Id. 
? 502(i), 29 U.S.C. ? 1132(i) (Supp. IV 1974). 
The civil liability provisions are perhaps of greater concern to fiduciaries (a term de- 
fined quite broadly). A participant or beneficiary may sue to recover benefits due or to 
clarify rights to future benefits. The participant, the beneficiary, or the Secretary of 
Labor may sue to enjoin any action or practice that violates the provisions of the Act. 
The Secretary of Labor and the Secretary of the Treasury may also intervene in suits 
brought by participants and beneficiaries, but their right of intervention does not extend 
to actions for benefits due and clarification.. The Secretary of the Treasury may not 
intervene to enforce fiduciary standards. Id. ?? 502(h), 3002(d), 29 U.S.C. ?? 1132(h), 1202(d) 
(Supp. IV 1974). The fiduciary is personally liable for any losses to the plan resulting 
from his breach of fiduciary standards and for any profits made through the use of plan 
assets. He is also subject to such other equitable relief as the court may deem appro- 
priate, including removal. Id. ? 409(a), 29 U.S.C. ? 1109(a) (Supp. IV 1974). Attorney's fees 
are recoverable. Id. ? 502(g), 29 U.S.C. ? 1132(g) (Supp. IV 1974). All exculpatory provi- 
sions that would protect the fiduciary are void. Id. ? 410(a), 29 U.S.C. ? 1110(a) (Supp. IV 
1974). The plan may purchase insurance to cover losses incurred by the fiduciary, but the 
insurance policy must allow an action by the insurance company against the fiduciary. Id. 
? 410(b)(1), 29 U.S.C. ? 1110(b)(1) (Supp. IV 1974). The fiduciary may purchase his own 
insurance. Id. ? 410(b)(2), 29 U.S.C. ? 1110(b)(2) (Supp. IV 1974). Requirements for service 
and joinder are eased, and places where actions may be brought are expanded. Id. 
? 502(d)(1), (e)(l), 29 U.S.C. ? 1132(d)(1), (e)(1) (Supp. IV 1974). 
The Secretary of Labor may make investigations at least once a year and more often 
if he has reasonable cause. Id. ? 504, 29 U.S.C. ? 1134 (Supp. IV 1974). Participants and 
beneficiaries may not be removed, fined, disciplined, or discriminated against for exercis- 
ing their rights under the Act. Id. ? 510, 29 U.S.C. ? 1140 (Supp. IV 1974). Use of vio- 
lence or coercion in this connection is a crime. Id. ? 511, 29 U.S.C. ? 1141 (Supp. IV 
1974). ERISA preempts state law except for applicable state insurance, banking, securities, 
or criminal law. Id. ? 514, 29 U.S.C. ? 1144 (Supp. IV 1974). 
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adequate justifications for these differences in the regulation of in- 
termediaries were never presented to any of the legislatures which 
enacted the various statutes.242 
2. Benefits 
Regulation of insider misconduct attempts to protect against a major 
risk-moral or fiducial failure-that is not significantly reduced by 
anticompetitive regulation or portfolio regulation. Evaluating the 
success of the strategy is more difficult than defining the type of 
protection afforded. Unfortunately there has been no extensive em- 
pirical research measuring how much insider misconduct is actually 
deterred. Nor is there any evidence indicating the certainty of achiev- 
ing protection. Evidence on the role of insider misconduct in the 
failures of banks, insurance companies, and savings and loans,243 may 
suggest that insider misconduct in financial intermediaries is fairly 
widespread. But the evidence reveals neither how much more miscon- 
duct would exist if there were no insider misconduct regulation nor 
how much less there would be if regulation were greatly intensified. 
To measure the effectiveness of any species of insider misconduct 
regulation, one ideally would want to measure the difference in the 
amount of misconduct occurring with and without the regulation. 
That type of measurement has not been attempted. 
Moreover, there is no established theory, comparable in quality to 
macroeconomic theory in the case of anticompetitive regulation or to 
portfolio theory and the theory of cash flow models in the case of 
portfolio regulation, upon which one can build a meaningful a priori 
argument about the effectiveness of insider misconduct regulation. 
Theories of deterrence in criminology have no clear-cut applications 
to insider misconduct in the operation of financial intermediaries. 
Consider, for instance, the view that an insider will be deterred from 
extracting from his intermediary a secret profit or unfair advantage of 
the value X, if X is exceeded by S., the negative value of the sanction 
applied to him if caught and convicted or made civilly liable, mul- 
tiplied by P., the probability of being caught and convicted or made 
civilly liable.244 It is extraordinarily difficult to find any meaningful 
242. The author is engaged in a project, sponsored by the Law Enforcement Assistance 
Administration, to study the bases for the choice among regulatory patterns for coping 
with insider misconduct in the operation of financial intermediaries. In connection with 
this project, he has reviewed the legislative histories of all the major regulatory patterns. 
Details of the research will be presented in a forthcoming monograph. 
243. See pp. 12-13, 77-78 & nn.46, 48, 219 supra. 
244. See Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POLITICAL 
ECON. 169 (1968). 
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value of P without having some idea of the prevalence of insider mis- 
conduct of the type in question. 
3. Summary 
Insider misconduct regulation produces a special benefit-deterrence 
of fiducial failure-which the anticompetitive and portfolio strategies 
do not. The magnitude of the benefit, however, is uncertain. Unlike 
anticompetitive regulation and, to a lesser extent, portfolio regulation, 
regulation of insider misconduct appears not to generate significant 
indirect costs. Its secondary formulation costs also seem to be low. Its 
direct enforcement costs appear to be higher than those of anticom- 
petitive regulation, though not nearly as high as those of portfolio 
regulation. On the whole, it is a strategy which should be implemented 
in some mode because it is not rendered otiose by the implementation 
of the other two preventive strategies,245 because its side effects are 
not overly offensive, and because it satisfies a moral sense, not quite 
reducible to economic considerations, that the law ought to stand 
against the acts that insider misconduct regulation seeks to control. 
D. Reactive Regulation 
The major way in which government protects public suppliers of 
capital to financial intermediaries from realized risks of failure is by 
sponsoring back-up funds (BUFs). Depositors in almost all of the 
nation's 15,000 commercial banks and 500 mutual savings banks are 
insured up to $40,000 by the FDIC, or in similar amounts by a state 
fund.246 Deposits in most savings and loan associations are insured by 
the FSLIC.247 Both of these regulatory schemes for coping with the 
risk of institutional failure began in the 1930s. 
245. Whether it is rendered useless by the fourth strategy, reactive regulation, is a 
somewhat more difficult question. It appears neither politically feasible nor morally ac- 
ceptable for the legal system to do nothing about insider misconduct. Nevertheless, one 
can certainly raise questions about the proper degree of involvement of regulators in the 
enforcement process-for example, whether there should be public examiners who regu- 
larly inspect all institutions in order to deter or uncover misconduct. When possible, those 
questions can be answered in light of the strengths and weaknesses of reactive regulation. 
246. 12 U.S.C. ?? 1813(m), 1817(i), 1821(a)(1) (Supp. IV 1974). National banks and 
other member banks of the Federal Reserve System are necessarily insured. Id. ? 1814(b) 
(1970). State nonmember banks may opt for insurance, and most do. As of December 31, 
1974, the total number of insured banks was 14,550; noninsured banks numbered 411. 
Total assets of the former were over $912 billion, whereas the latter had assets of almost 
$15 billion. [1974] FDIC ANN. REP. 186, 211. 
247. 12 U.S.C. ?? 1724(b), 1787(c)(1) (Supp. IV 1974) (insurance coverage raised to 
$40,000 for FSLIC-insured institutions and for insured credit unions). A large proportion 
of state-chartered savings and loan associations are insured by the FSLIC. ABA HANDBOOK 
OF SAVINGS AND LOAN LAW 6 (1973). All federally chartered savings and loan associations 
are FSLIC-insured. 12 U.S.C. ? 1726(a) (1970 & Supp. IV 1974). 
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More recently, in the wake of failures of automobile liability in- 
surance companies and the ensuing threat of federal intrusion into 
the regulation of insurance, 47 states have enacted legislation estab- 
lishing guaranty funds to protect policyholders against loss in the 
event of the insolvency of their property and liability insurers.248 Some 
states even have guaranty funds for life insurance companies.249 Un- 
like the federal deposit insurance schemes, many of the guaranty 
companies established by state law are not fully funded but are of the 
assessment type. They collect premiums from member companies each 
year as losses occur, rather than collect periodic level premiums which 
are invested in assets for liquidation as needed to deal with failures.250 
Moreover, membership in the state schemes tends to be legally com- 
pelled, whereas state nonmember banks are not required to participate 
in the federal deposit insurance scheme.251 Another recent, and ex- 
tremely important, development was ERISA's establishment in 1974 
of the Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation to provide plan- 
termination insurance for the participants and beneficiaries of most 
pension plans covered by the Act; membership is generally com- 
pulsory.252 
In short, governmental insurance protection of public suppliers of 
capital against the financial failures of their intermediaries has become 
nearly universal, extending well beyond the depository-type inter- 
mediaries to most of the insurance-type intermediaries that pose any 
significant risks of failure. Although the presence of insurance schemes 
both for depository and for insurance-type intermediaries can be use- 
fully evaluated as isolated phenomena,253 the similarities are more 
important than the differences for an understanding of the legal 
system's response to financial intermediation. Only the investment- 
type financial intermediaries (the investment companies and the 
REITs) are untouched by the insurance or guaranty fund concept. To 
some extent, this may reflect the more elite nature of the suppliers of 
248. See Epton & Bixby, supra note 46. 
249. E.g., N.Y. INs. LAW ? 224 (McKinney 1966 & Supp. 1975-76) (creates Life Insurance 
Guaranty Corp.). Life insurance companies fail at a much lower rate than do property 
and liability insurance companies. Epton & Bixby, supra note 46, at 248. 
250. Telephone Interview with Leonard H. Minches, Assistant Special Deputy Super- 
intendent of Insurance, New York Insurance Department (Apr. 9, 1976) (notes on file 
with Yale Law Journal). 
251. Id. 
252. ERISA ?? 4001-4082, 29 U.S.C. ?? 1301-1381 (Supp. IV 1974). 
253. See Epton & Bixby, supra note 46 (discussion of insurance guaranty funds); Scott 
& Mayer, supra note 76 (discussion of FDIC and FSLIC). However, awareness of insurance 
funds for most types of intermediaries should preclude some arguments-such as those 
based on the supposed "special" treatment of bank and S&L deposits-that might other- 
wise surface in such inquiries. 
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capital to these intermediaries.254 More importantly, it stems from 
their intended role as outlets for small investors who are self-consciously 
willing to take some investment risks. By contrast, those who supply 
capital to other intermediaries do so, in most cases, to acquire financial 
services, such as checking accounts or insurance protection; providing 
funds for an investment is subjectively conceived as incidental to that 
primary purpose.255 
The strategy of reactive regulation also includes responses to li- 
quidity crises as well as to insolvencies. Since only the depository-type 
financial intermediaries have significant and recurrent liquidity prob- 
lems,256 this second technique applies only to them. Government- 
sponsored institutions such as the Federal Reserve Banks, the Federal 
Home Loan Banks, and other second-order financial institutions257 
are designed to act as lenders of last resort to their member institu- 
254. This hypothesis is offered as an explanation of the different treatment of invest- 
ment company shareholders because it makes sense. It is supported somewhat by negative 
inferences from the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. ?? 78o, 78aaa- 
78111 (1970). The legislative history contains the remark that the "need [for protection of 
customers of broker-dealer firms] is similar, in many respects, to that which prompted 
the establishment of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and the Federal Savings 
and Loan Insurance Corporation." H.R. REP. No. 91-1613, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1970), 
reprinted in [1970] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5254, 5255. Even so, no one even thought 
to consider whether the customers should be insured against fluctuations in the value 
of the securities they purchased through the failed broker-dealer firms. Basically, the 
Act insures against loss or theft of securities purchased by customers but kept with their 
broker-dealers. In liquidation proceedings under the Act, customers are entitled to have 
their "specifically identifiable" property returned to them in kind. 15 U.S.C. ? 78fff(c) 
(2)(C) (1970). Other property held for customers by the failed broker-dealer constitutes a 
".single ahd separate fund" in which customers of the failed firm share ratably. Id. 
? 78fff(c)(2)(B). The customer's claim against the fund is computed by reference to the 
market values of his securities as of the date of initiating the proceedings. Id. For a 
number of reasons the single and separate fund might be insufficient to pay all claims: 
customers' property might have been misused by the firm or stolen by employees in the 
preinsolvency confusion, or the aggregate value of the customers' securities might have 
dropped during the period in which they could not get them back (because of the pro- 
ceedings). When the fund is insufficient, the Securities Investor Protection Corporation 
will advance funds to the liquidation trustee to discharge the customer claims, but only 
to the extent of $50,000 per customer. Id. ? 78fff(f). The Act does suggest, however, that 
similar protections ought to be available to mutual fund shareholders, who are, if any- 
thing, less elite than people who invest directly in securities through broker-dealer firms. 
255. Again, the chief support for this explanation is only its intellectual coherence. 
256. Other financial intermediaries have liquidity needs, of course, but they generally 
find them less troublesome to manage. See STAFF OF THE SUBCOMM. ON DOMESTIC FINANCE 
OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, 93d CONG., 1ST SESS., FINANCIAL INSTITU- 
TIONS: REFORM AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 81-91 (Comm. Print 1973) (discussion of asset 
and liability maturity ranges of different types of financial intermediaries). Moreover, 
the assertion in the text is rough and impressionistic; fire and casualty company officials, 
for example, might object to it on the basis of their troubles in recent years. See Bus. 
WEEK, Sept. 6, 1976, at 46. 
257. Second-order intermediaries obtain funds from other financial institutions, and 
only indirectly from households and nonfinancial corporations. Clark, supra note 1, at 
1606. 
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tions. Their role may be instrumental, not only in preventing the 
failure of individual financial institutions, but also in averting industry- 
wide crises. Two dramatic examples are the aid given by the Federal 
Home Loan Banks to thrift institutions during periods of financial 
disintermediation258 and the promise of the Federal Reserve Board 
to keep the discount windows open during the crisis in the com- 
mercial paper market caused by the Penn Central's insolvency.259 
A third major technique of reactive regulation is the provision of 
special insolvency proceedings for financial intermediaries apart from 
the ordinary types of federal bankruptcy proceedings. Statutes provid- 
ing for such proceedings have long governed every kind of commercial 
bank,260 thrift institution,261 and insurance company.262 More recently, 
special proceedings have been created for pension plans.263 Investment- 
type financial intermediaries, again because of their role as vehicles 
for the self-conscious taking of investment risks, are left to ordinary 
bankruptcy and reorganization techniques.264 
258. The aid may not always be adequate, however. For a variety of views on the 
Federal Home Loan Bank System's response to the disintermediation in 1966, see Cootner, 
supra note 139, at 315-31; Grebler & Doyel, Effect of Industry Structure and Government 
Policies on Housing Demand and Cyclical Stability: Study of 1966 Experience, in III 
STUDY OF THE SAVINGS AND LOAN INDUSTRY 1241, 1329-51 (I. Friend ed. 1969); Duesenberry, 
Appraisal of Selected Policy Instrutments Affecting Savings and Loan Associations, in IV 
id. at 1591, 1605-13; Friend, Summnary and Recommendations, in I id. at 23. 
259. See M. MAYER, THE BANKERS 406-08 (1974). 
260. National Banks: 12 U.S.C. ? 191 (1970) (Comptroller may appoint receiver to close 
up banking association); id. ? 197 (after creditors paid off, stockholders vote whether to 
continue with the receivership or to elect agent to wind up); id. ? 1821(c) (Comptroller 
must appoint FDIC as receiver). 
State Banks: 12 U.S.C. ? 1821(e) (1970) (FDIC must accept appointment as receiver if 
offered; state law determines proceeding); id. ? 1821(h) (if found advisable, FDIC or- 
ganizes new national bank in same community to assume insured deposits of closed in- 
sured bank). CAL. FIN. CODE ?? 3101-3132 (West 1968) (superintendent takes possession 
and liquidates); N.Y. BANKING LAW ?? 606, 618 (McKinney 1971) (same as Cal.). 
261. Mutual Savings Banks: MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 168, ? 32 (Michie/Law. Co-op 1970) 
(when assets of savings bank depreciate and fail to exceed deposits plus creditors' claims, 
bank may, with Commissioner's approval, petition Supreme Judicial Court to have lia- 
bility to each depositor reduced); N.Y. BANKING LAW ? 259 (McKinney 1970) (same as 
Mass.). 
Savings and Loan Associations: 12 U.S.C. ? 1729(b) (1970) (FSLIC appoints receiver of 
federal S&L; receiver may choose to operate S&L, put S&L in sound financial condition, 
merge S&L with another insured S&L, organize new federal S&L to take over assets, or 
liquidate); CAL. FIN. CODE ,? 9001, 9011 (West 1968 & Supp. 1976) (commissioner takes 
possession and may liquidate); id. ? 9100-9104 (West 1968) (FSLIC as liquidator for in- 
sured S&L). 
262. For examples of comprehensive statutes relating to life insurance companies as 
well as fire and casualty insurance companies, see CAL. INS. CODE ?? 1010-1062 (West 
1972); N.Y. INS. LAW ?? 510-546 (McKinney 1966). 
263. ERISA ? 4042(f), 29 U.S.C. ? 1342(f) (Supp. IV 1974) (Pcnsion Benefit Guaranty 
Corporation appoints trustee and operates as if in Chaptcr X bankruptcy; stay of all other 
proceedings). 
264. The Investment Company Act makes no provision for special insolvency proceed- 
ings; the Bankruptcy Act does not exclude investment companies. But cf. 15 U.S.C. ? 80a- 
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The costs and benefits of the techniques for responding to liquidity 
crises and of special insolvency proceedings will be discussed only 
briefly, after a fuller discussion of BUFs. It should be realized, how- 
ever, that when a BUF scheme involves special insolvency proceedings, 
the proceedings should be viewed as an essential part of the BUF's 
insuring activities. Separate treatment of the latter two techniques is 
simply a matter of expositional convenience. 
1. Costs of BUFs 
The direct enforcement costs of a BUF arise from administering the 
fund and enforcing compliance with its rules. Those costs seem fairly 
low in relation to the direct enforcement costs of portfolio and insider 
misconduct regulation265 and, perhaps, in relation to the expenses of 
ordinary insurance companies.266 
25(c) (1970) (special SEC power to ask district court to enjoin reorganization if plan not 
fair and equitable); Clark, Fair and Equitable Reorganizations of Investment Companies, 
53 B.U. L. REV. 1 (1973). 
265. The most seasoned of the guaranty funds, the FDIC, may be used for a very 
rough index. At the end of 1974 there were 233 employees in the Division of Liquidation 
and 2,054 in the Division of Bank Supervision. [1974] FDIC ANN. REP. 23. The Division 
of Liquidation is essential to the FDIC's role as a BUF, while most of the work of the 
Division of Supervision must be allocated to portfolio regulation and insider misconduct 
regulation. It is not clear how many of the FDIC's 521 other employees (in the Legal 
Division, Office of the Controller, etc.) should be allocated to each of the four regulatory 
strategies. As for the absolute magnitude of the FDIC's BUF-related expenses, for the 
entire period between January 1, 1934 and December 31, 1974, net expenses in deposit 
assumption and payoff cases totalled only $9.8 million. Id. at 7. Compare this to aggre- 
gate administrative and operating expenses of $592.9 million. Id. at 28. 
Comparisons of the costs of the different strategies to the regulators do not imply 
similar relationships of the costs to others such as the regulated firms. In the absence 
of specific reasons to think otherwise, however, it seems plausible that any such dif- 
ferences would not be so great as to change the orders of magnitude of costs that are 
indicated by considering the regulators' expenditures. 
266. In a discussion of compensation for personal injury, Professor Conard pointed 
out that the operating costs of the fault system were about 120% of the net benefits re- 
ceived by victims; of private loss insurance systems (principally life and health insurance), 
about 22%; of some Blue Cross systems, less than 5%; of Social Security programs, about 
2%. Conard, The Economic Treatmient of Automobile Injuries, 63 MICH. L. REV. 279, 290 
(1964). 
It is difficult to make a comparison with a BUF such as the FDIC without some rca- 
sonable definition of "net benefits" received by its beneficiaries. If a bank fails, the 
amount of deposits paid by the FDIC (in a deposit payoff case) or the amount of loans 
and assets purchased (in a deposit assumption case) undoubtedly overstates the loss that 
would have occurred to depositors absent the FDIC's back-up activities, because the value 
of the failed bank's assets is typically close to the total deposit claims against the bank. 
In other words, banks are usually closed before they become grossly insolvent. Accordingly, 
a reasonable index of net benefits to depositors may be the FDIC's net insurance losses. 
By the latter I mean the principal disbursements in deposit assumption and payoff cases 
($1.2 billion betNwcen 1934 and 1974) less recoveries through subrogation, liquidation of 
purchased assets, and the like ($990 million over the same period), which leaves ap- 
proximately $210 million for the 1934-74 period. [1974] FDIC ANN. REP. 7. Dividing 
the $9.8 million of expenses mentioned in note 265 supra by $210 million gives an expense- 
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As is true of most of the other regulatory techniques, the primary 
formulation costs of BUFs are sunk costs. Secondary formulation costs 
of BUF systems are currently trivial, though they could reach a 
moderately significant level if, as is sometimes suggested,267 the BUFs 
were to charge premiums that vary as closely as possible with differ- 
ences in the riskiness of each insured institution. With variable 
premiums, the funds would have to engage in or pay for data collection 
and rate-establishing activities similar to those of private insurers and 
rating boards. They would presumably use only those classifications 
that could be shown by empirical evidence to have a bearing on the 
insured institutions' probabilities of failure. As the earlier discussion of 
balance-sheet shaping rules suggested,268 only a rather crude system 
of classifications would now be justified; nevertheless, with more 
research the funds could identify better criteria. 
As for the first subtype of indirect costs, BUFs need not, and com- 
monly do not, serve unsound ulterior ends. A minor exception may 
be a situation in which a funded plan is required to invest in the 
securities of the governmental unit that established the plan. This 
may provide a small captive market for these securities. Such a market 
could decrease slightly the interest paid by the governmental unit and 
constitute a tax on the institutions insured under the plan.269 
All this is preface. The heart of the matter is whether BUFs impose 
substantial indirect costs by interfering with a reasonably vell-func- 
tioning market system of allocating resources or by unfairly dis- 
criminating among types of capital suppliers. More than the preventive 
strategies, a BUF operates rather immediately, directly, and effica- 
ciously to constrain the choices that public suppliers of capital might 
make. Interference with free choice in the market may cause a misal- 
location of resources. One is therefore inevitably brought back to a 
consideration of the reasons for any risk regulation of financial in- 
termediaries. 
Suppose the public suppliers have information adequate to assess 
the financial soundness of the intermediaries with which they might 
deal, as well as information about *other relevant aspects of the 
services provided-for example, the meaning and coverage of insur- 
to-net insurance losses ratio of about 4.7%. The figure will be somewhat different if cer- 
tain unallocated insurance expenses and miscellaneous disbursements are included. Never- 
theless, the ratio seems to be within the Blue Cross expense range as determined by 
Conard, which is a low range. All of this depends, of course, on viewing the FDIC's 
supervisory activities as independent of its insurance function. 
267. Scott & Mayer, supra note 76, at 886-95. 
268. See pp. 67-76 supra. 
269. Scott & Mayer, supra note 76, at 897. 
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ance policies, their comparative prices, and the like. They are able to 
balance institutional safety against other financial product attributes. 
They know their own preferences, which the legal system will not 
second-guess. The institutions are not already so regulated that a BUF 
would countervail the misallocations caused by any existing regulation. 
Under these circumstances, an institutional failure would con- 
stitute a healthy market discipline on both public suppliers of capital 
and their intermediaries-i.e., on the owners of the residual earn- 
ings of the intermediaries. Everyone who "took" the risk should bear 
the costs of the realized risks. A legislatively imposed BUF would shift 
the cost of risk taking away from the public suppliers of capital who 
would voluntarily take greater risks, thus giving them more safety 
than they want and would bargain for. And it would be difficult for 
them to escape the excess safety completely, because many services of 
financial intermediaries-for example, payment services or home fire 
insurance protection-are not principally investments and have no close 
subsititutes. Over time, the allocatively correct amount of risk taking 
would not occur. To be sure, shareholders of the insured institutions 
will still bear the risks they took, because they are not covered by 
BUFs and because the BUFs are subrogated to the rights of public 
suppliers of capital in insolvency proceedings.270 Indeed, this fact, 
and the fact that variations in income short of those causing default 
are not insured against by BUFs, supply the basic reasons why it makes 
no sense to argue that if the government is going to insure insurance 
companies, it might as well simply dispense with private insurers. 
Similarly, whoever is entitled to the residual earnings of a mutual 
institution will be unprotected by the BUF from the consequences of 
institutional failure. But these qualifications do not negate the fact 
that the insured institutions can no longer offer the public supplier 
270. 12 U.S.C. ? 1821(g) (1970) (subrogation rights of FDIC); id. ?? 1728(b), 1729(b) 
(FSLIC pays insurance when account "surrendered and transferred" to it; such surrender 
and transfer causes subrogation); Lanigan v. Apollo Sav., 52 Ill. 2d 342, 288 N.E.2d 445 
(1972) (FSLIC's subrogation rights in liquidation of state-chartered, FSLIC-insured sav- 
ings association); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 168 app., ? 17(d) (Michie/Law. Co-op 1970) (sub- 
rogation rights of Deposit Insurance Fund for member savings banks established in Massa- 
chusetts); N.Y. INS. LAW ? 224(5) (McKinney 1966) (power of Life Insurance Guaranty 
Corporation to "receive, own and administer" assets acquired in connection with assump- 
tion, reinsurance, and guaranty operations); id. ?? 333(7), 334(1) (McKinney 1966 & Supp. 
1974-75) (subrogation rights of property and liability insurance security fund). Compare 
ERISA's more elaborate technique of making plan-sponsoring employers liable to reim- 
burse the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation for insurance benefits paid to plan par- 
ticipants upon termination of the plan. The liability is for 100% of the employer's un- 
derfunding of the plan, though it cannot exceed 3(0% of the employer's net worth and 
may become secured by a lien. ERISA ?? 4062, 4068, 29 U.S.C. ?? 135l2, 1368 (Supp. IV 
1974). Some employers are exempted from such liability. 
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of capital financial intermediary services with a variety of risk-return 
characteristics. 
a. BUFs v. The Free Market 
In assessing the relevance of this sort of criticism, one may first 
contrast a regulatory regime using only a BUF technique with a 
free market system (neither system is a live option, of course), and 
then, more realistically, consider the BUF in relation to the other 
strategies. One major problem with premising an argument on the 
hypothetical market for financial services is that, in fact, public sup- 
pliers of capital appear to face severe information costs in assessing 
the riskiness of financial services. Regulatory machinery to supply the 
relevant information to public suppliers of capital would be costly; 
machinery to provide the information quickly enough to be useful 
would be even more expensive and institutionally difficult.271 One 
suspects that most ordinary people, even if supplied regularly and 
quickly with financial statements, would be unable to assess properly 
the risk of financial failure of the intermediaries without a great deal 
of effort. Nor, of course, could they predict the risk of managerial 
self-dealing very well. In short, individual public suppliers of capital 
do not appear to be particularly good evaluators of the risk of failure. 
If this assessment is correct, then two related propositions can be 
made. First, a BUF need cause only an insignificant loss in terms of 
the policing of institutional risk-taking by public suppliers of capital. 
Most of them did no policing to start with, since risk of institutional 
failure did not figure in the evaluation of financial services and their 
prices. Policing that might have occurred could even be preserved 
in a rough way. If, for example, it is thought that large depositors of 
commercial banks, or large business purchasers of insurance, are gen- 
erally sophisticated enough to evaluate a company's soundness and can 
do so reasonably cheaply, then the BUF can be designed so as to ex- 
clude them from coverage (as well as from the inadvertent, unpaid-for 
salvation that is sometimes available in special insolvency proceed- 
ings). 272 
The second proposition is that a BUF may be more clearly desirable 
271. Cf. Benston, The Effectiveness and Effects of the SEC's Accounting Disclosure Re- 
quirements, in ECONOMIC POLICY AND THE REGULATION OF CORPORATE SECURITIES 26 (H. 
Manne ed. 1969) (arguing that SEC-required information is irrelevant and untimely). 
272. Some regulators believe that the FDIC's use of merger and sale techniques has 
kept most large, technically uninsured depositors from suffering loss in bank failures. 
Interview with C.F. Muckenfuss III, Special Assistant to the Director, FDIC, in New 
Haven, Conn. (Apr. 19, 1976) (notes on file with Yale Law Journal). 
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if designed so that those who are better risk-evaluators than the public 
suppliers of capital evaluate the riskiness of financial intermediaries 
and either restrict or pool the risk. Among the entities that might 
more cheaply evaluate the riskiness of a financial intermediary are 
regulatory agencies, other members of the industry, and private in- 
surance firms. Each has its own problems, of course, though imposing 
the task on any of them appears better than leaving it on the public 
suppliers of capital. Regulators, with prodding from conservative mem- 
bers of the industry, can discern risky practices and can either directly 
restrict them as unsound practices or, if legally permitted, cause higher 
insurance premiums to be charged the riskier institutions. They can 
do this without the high cost of communicating to and educating the 
public suppliers of capital. Their institutional mandate and political 
pressures may, however, lead regulators to act as if there can never be 
too much safety.273 Alternative sources for risk evaluation are other 
members of the industry. But it can be dangerous to allow institutions 
of a given type to judge each other's riskiness. The process may be cor- 
rupted by the dominant, better-established institutions, who might 
consider innovations in risk taking to be unsound practices. 
A system that required each institution to obtain insurance against 
its owvn financial failure through any of a number of approved private 
insurers would have several advantages. The system would be eco- 
nomically feasible, despite the doubts of some that the private in- 
surance markets could not cope with the burden.274 Competition 
273. Even if the regulator believed that one cheap strategy of risk-reducing regulation 
gave virtually absolute protection to public suppliers of capital, he would suffer little 
except cognitive dissonance by continuing to enforce redundant strategies. Moreover, it 
is not implausible that the regulator would actually benefit from redundancy. His agency 
is not always competing against other suppliers of regulatory services, and even when 
it is, the regulated firms may choose one agency over another on the basis of which 
imposes lower costs on them (i.e., their elite capital suppliers), without regard to the 
relative benefits produced by each agency for public suppliers of capital. Redundant 
regulation may also produce more jobs for regulatory personnel-perhaps a major, if 
unexpi-essed, goal of bureaucratic political organizations. Finally, the redundancy may 
create an impression among the unsuspecting public that the regulators are really doing 
a good job for them, a situation that will produce more respect and status for the 
regulators. 
274. See Scott & Mayer, supra note 76, at 866-80 (insurance of banks and S&Ls im- 
poses almost open-ended potential obligation on insurer; only institution with open-ended 
money-creating power, such as federal government, able to assume burden). Nevertheless, 
Scott and Mayer contend that the deposit insurance funds of the FDIC and the FSLIC- 
in 1969 about $4.1 billion and $2.8 billion respectively-are unnecessarily large. Id. at 878- 
86. It certainly seems within the capacity of private insurance funds to amass reserves of 
this size. Private non-life insurance companies in the United States already have, as a 
group, more than $68 billion in financial assets. Clark, supra note 1, at 1606 n.7. Sixteen of 
the 50 largest diversified financial companies (a fair number of which have non-life in- 
surers within their corporate families) have assets in excess of $2.8 billion. The largest, 
Aetna Life and Casualty, has over $15 billion in assets, and its casualty subsidiary is a 
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among the private insurers could restrain them from exacting pre- 
miums for super safety and would encourage them to find the best 
feasible subcategorization of risk classes. As opposed to social insurance 
systems, this private system, if well-functioning, would give the insurer 
of the financial intermediaries an economic incentive to find the 
optimal mix between risk prevention and risk pooling, and to sell 
that mix to the insured institutions.275 Despite these advantages, how- 
ever, a system of private back-up insurers would lack the symbolic and 
psychological advantages of a governmental fund. An ultimate back-up 
commitment by a governmental unit might be thought necessary be- 
cause of the possibility of a double failure of the insured financial 
intermediary and its insuring company. Moreover, if regulators were 
to approve the private insurers, the regulators' biases about proper 
risk levels might not be avoided. 
One principal fear about the BUF applies equally to a governmental 
or private system and could be resolved equally well by either of them. 
If the prospects of failures among a type of financial intermediary are 
so uncertain as not to be susceptible to actuarial treatment, insurers 
pushed or drawn into the business of insuring such risks may over- 
charge substantially, as they apparently do in wildly uncertain areas 
like directors' and officers' liability insurance. To mitigate this pos- 
sibility, the law establishing the BUF could call for an assessment plan 
rather than a funded plan. The governmental or private insurer, 
though having funds or an emergency line of credit adequate to meet 
liquidity needs, would collect premiums each period reflecting the 
actual losses and costs incurred in the previous period plus, in the 
case of the private insurers, a preannounced markup. The normal 
disadvantage of the assessment plan of insurance, that volatile rather 
than level premiums bear too harshly on many insureds, would hardly 
be a problem where the insureds are financial intermediaries rather 
than individuals, and are paying premiums that are quite small in 
relation to their total volume of business. 
The argument thus far has been that introduction of a BUF into an 
major part of it. The 50 largest together have total assets exceeding $143 billion. FORTUNE, 
July 1976, at 208. Even quite small insurers might participate in private back-np in- 
surance by means of reinsurance agreements. Furthermore, the possibility of "open-ended" 
liability is really not so awesome: a slight probability of a truly enormous wave of failures 
does not mean that a back-up insurer, whether private or public, ought to have an in- 
finite fund or charge infinite premiums. And if macroeconomic disaster and a consequent 
(decimation of financial intermediaries should occur, nothing prevents the government 
from trying to help. 
275. Besides affecting the risks that insurers take by presenting risk-related premium 
classifications to them, insurers in many lines are greatly concerned with loss prevention 
and minimiiization. See, e.g., S. HUEBNER, K. BLACK & R. CLINE, siipra note 21, at 506-19. 
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unregulated market for consumer financial services will probably not 
lead to a greater misallocation of resources, since there are substantial 
market imperfections already. A properly designed system might even 
improve allocation by putting the choice of risk-taking levels upon 
entities that can better evaluate the risks of institutional failure. Pos- 
sible distributional effects are subsumed in the discussion of benefits, 
where it is assumed that spreading the losses that would otherwise fall 
on the public suppliers of capital of a particular failed intermediary is 
a desirable program. 
One other argument, phrased in terms of equity rather than alloca- 
tion, concerns the public supplier of capital who (1) is a good evaluator 
of risk and (2) desires to take higher than normal risks for a modest 
increase in benefits or returns, or a decrease in the price of a financial 
service. By giving him an absolutely safe deposit, savings account, fire 
insurance policy, retirement plan, or the like, even though he would 
knowingly and intelligently choose a less safe product, the system is 
treating him unfairly. 
A conservative response to this argument-i.e., a response shying 
awvay from paternalistic assertions-is not that the rights of the rational 
riskophile may be trampled for no reason, but that such persons are 
thought to be rare among the public suppliers of capital dealing with 
financial intermediaries. Most public capital suppliers are probably 
not good evaluators of risks;276 even if given the simple option of 
checking a box to indicate whether they wanted account insurance, 
they would not have or understand the information necessary to make 
the choice properly. Most of the individuals dealing for their personal 
account with insurance-type financial intermediaries are looking 
mainly for protection from risks; one suspects that very few would 
welcome the chance to save a few pennies that meant that a govern- 
mental BUF would no longer cover them. Nor is there any reason to 
believe that checking account depositors and holders of savings de- 
posits are searching for a chance to take greater risks but are foiled 
by the overprotective legal system. Rather, those capital suppliers who 
have some discretionary assets and desire to risk them for a chance of 
higher returns have many options open to them, from investing in 
mutual funds to betting on the horses. 
b. BUFs v. The Other Strategies 
If BUFs are the second best choice because a free market would be 
imperfect, are they second best in relation to the other strategies? One 
276. See pp. 15-21 supra. 
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argument sometimes made in the banking context is that the FDIC 
protects small-to-moderate depositors fully, and large depositors are 
either virtually protected277 or can take care of themselves. Therefore, 
it is argued, the other safety-oriented strategies must be directed at 
something other than the protection of depositors.278 The task is thus 
thought to be discovery of that hidden agenda. More generally, since 
the BUFs protect virtually all public suppliers of capital, except those 
involved with investment-type financial intermediaries, the other three 
strategies of risk regulation must not be directed at protection of public 
suppliers of capital. As expressed, this argument is an anachronism. 
Anticompetitive regulation, portfolio regulation, and insider miscon- 
duct regulation of an especially strict sort were all in full sway before 
the BUFs were established.279 It is much more likely that BUFs were 
enacted as the cheapest strategy for taking protection of public sup- 
pliers of capital closer to the ultimate level. 
The likely historical scenario may be sketched. At a given time there 
are only preventive strategies which achieve a certain level of protec- 
tion. It is desired to raise the level of protection so that the total 
represents almost absolute safety. It is correctly perceived that the last 
layer of protection would be enormously expensive to achieve by 
strengthening the preventive strategies. For example, draconian port- 
277. See note 272 supra. 
278. Some have argued that the purpose of capital adequacy rules is to restrict the 
growth of banks. See, e.g., Golembe, supra note 180. 
279. The point is true of the property and liability insurance area, since most of the 
insolvency guaranty funds were established within the last few years. It is also true in 
the life insurance area, where fewer states have adopted guaranty funds, though port- 
folio regulation and insider misconduct regulation are intense. As for commercial banks, 
it might be observed that the FDIC was created by ? 8 of the Banking Act of 1933, ch. 
89, 48 Stat. 162 (codified at 12 U.S.C. ? 1811 (1970)), long after the framework of federal 
bank regulation had been created by the National Bank Act, ch. 106, 13 Stat. 99 (1864), 
anul the Federal Reserve Act, ch. 6, 38 Stat. 251 (1913). 
The chronology of the federal statutes concerning savings and loan associations is 
mildly indicative. The Federal Home Loan Bank System, with its handle on the li- 
quidity policies and other financial aspects of member associations, was created by the 
Federal Home Loan Bank Act, ch. 522, 47 Stat. 725 (1932) (codified at 12 U.S.C. ? 1437 
(1970)). Afterwards came federal chartering and the potential for federal regulation of 
insider misconduct. Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933, ch. 64, 48 Stat. 128. Finally, the 
FSLIC was created by Title IV of the National Housing Act, ch. 847, 48 Stat. 1246 (1934) 
(codified at 12 U.S.C. ? 1725 (1970)). Much more significant is that all of the federal 
laws came into a context of well-established state-chartered savings and loan associations, 
which had long been heavily regulated (but not insured) by state agencies in the detailed 
manner in which banks Were regulated. 
Pension plans comprise a more complicated case. ERISA created a plan termination 
insurance system at the same time that it mandated adequate funding (portfolio regu- 
lation) and draconian insider misconduct rules. The investment options and standards 
of conduct of pension plan trustees, however, had long been regulated by state trust law; 
and pension plans managed by insurance companies were the beneficiaries (or victims, 
perhaps) of state law's intense regulation of life and annuity insurers. 
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folio restraints might be necessary to eliminate the last bits of portfolio 
risk, and a colossal enforcement effort would have to be mounted to 
eliminate all failure-causing insider misconduct. By contrast, a BUF 
could clearly add the final layer of protection at a fairly low cost. 
Of course, private firms and insurance companies make this sort of 
judgment-the decision to resort to pooling rather than preventing 
risks-all the time. A manufacturing company subject to strict products 
liability for harm caused by defects in its products, for example, may 
spend money on improvements in design and assembly procedures that 
make the product safer. But at some point the company will judge it 
cheaper to deal with the residual risk by obtaining insurance or self- 
insuring. 
Once the BUF system has been put into operation, however, it will 
eventually occur to regulators and commentators that the preventive 
strategies might be dispensed with, in whole or in significant part, 
without sacrificing the ability to obtain the higher level of protection 
and without a substantial increase in the cost of the BUF. To be sure, 
relying entirely on the BUF would lead to more failures and a need 
for higher premiums. The latter would make the misallocative po- 
tentialities of a simple premium system appear much greater and, in 
an effort to mitigate this kind of cost, the BUF might be converted to 
a variable premium system, which would entail its own special costs. 
But if the judgment can be made that these additional costs are less 
than the old total cost of implementing the preventive strategies, then 
it follows that the decision to abandon the preventive strategies is a 
wise one. 
If the general considerations and hypotheses put forward here about 
the four strategies are accepted, the legal system could probably achieve 
the optimal mix of strategies for the depository and insurance-type 
financial intermediaries by substantially cutting back on the use of 
the three preventive strategies, especially those employing anticompeti- 
tive regulation and portfolio regulation. 
2. Benefits of BUFs 
One striking characteristic of reactive regulation in general, and the 
BUF in particular, is that it easily deals with risk in a comprehensive 
way. A BUF does something for the public suppliers of capital regard- 
less of the cause of failure. In this sense it is more complete in the 
type of protection it gives than any of the other strategies. Moreover, 
given the limits of human imagination, preventive strategies are likely 
to omit regulation of some unforeseen routes to failure. If one may 
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use the long-tested FDIC and FSLIC as reliable indicators, a BUF 
will provide a rather high level of protection to public suppliers of 
capital and ivill provide it in a predictable and nonvolatile way.280 
Bank' capital adequacy ratios have often failed to prevent bank fail- 
ures. The FDIC has never failed to meet the valid claims of insured 
depositors.28' Thus, in terms of the scope, level, and certainty of 
benefits they provide, BUFs are clearly superior to the other three 
strategies of risk regulation. 
3. Special Insolvency Proceedings and Quasi- 
Governmental Liquidity Schemes 
The theory behind special insolvency proceedings for financial in- 
termediaries appears not to have received careful and sustained at- 
tention.282 A BUF's interest in minimizing its losses might be thought 
to justify putting its agents in charge of the proceeding, as is often 
done.283 It is simply too inefficient always to meet the insurance 
obligation by direct payments to public suppliers of capital. Other 
techniques, such as arranging an acquisition of the failed institution 
by a strong one, may reduce losses but require the BUF to be in con- 
trol of the situation. Moreover, there is a felt need for ensuring that 
280. In the past five years, payment of insured deposits has usually begun within 
five to seven days following the closure of the bank, regardless of its size. 
. . .While I have indicated my belief that FDIC has adequate financial resources 
to handle even within a single year bank failures several times the combined mag- 
nitude of United States National Bank, Franklin National Bank and American Bank 
& Trust, a massive breakdown of our entire banking system, which I do not believe 
is even remotely possible, could be a different story. 
Address by FDIC Chairman Wille to the 18th Bank Presidents' and Senior Officers' Policy 
Seminar of the Western Independent Bankers in San Francisco, Cal. (Mar. 11, 1975). 
281. By contrast, the FDIC disbursed only $1.337 billion between January 1, 1934 
and year-end 1974 to pay depositors up to the insured limit, .... Furthermore, the 
3,300,000 depositors in those banks who were helped by FDIC protection have suf- 
fered a loss, on average, of less than 1/2 of 1 percent of that deposit total-borne en- 
tirely by depositors with more than the FDIC-insured amount on deposit on the day 
of failure, most of whom are corporations, institutions or public bodies. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
282. There are occasional discussions in published sources. An early memorandum sub- 
mitted to a Senate subcommittee by the then Chairman of the FDIC gave a number of 
reasons for having the FDIC act as receiver of failed banks. The FDIC's tremendous 
investment in closed insured banks was thought to require that it have the right to 
supervise liquidation of the assets; an analogy to the principle of creditor control in 
bankruptcy (via election of the trustee) was (Irawn. It was also argued that selection of 
the FDIC would reduce liquidation expenses, both because of its incentive to minimize 
its losses and because a large portion of the work preliminary to actual liquidation 
would be done by the FDIC whether or not it acted as receiver. Banking Act of 1935: 
Hearings on S. 1715 Before a Subcoirnm. of the Senate Commn. on Banking and Currency, 
74th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 186-87 (1935). 
283. For example, the FDIC is always the receiver for failed national banks. See note 
260 supra. 
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conservators, receivers, and liquidators with a special expertise in 
esoteric financial matters will be appointed. And certainly it will 
facilitate either reorganization or liquidation if regulators, who are 
familiar with the institution's assets, liabilities, and problems during 
the final days, are put in charge of the post mortem and the disposi- 
tion of the estate. The procedures may also reflect an appreciation of 
the need for speed in reorganization or liquidation of a financial in- 
termediary, so that situations like a failure of confidence on the part 
of public suppliers or a failure to continue premium payments will 
not force numerous liquidation sales at distress prices. Another pos- 
sibility is that official regulators of financial intermediaries, or persons 
appointed by them as conservators or receivers, will be better able to 
discover the insider misconduct that contributed to the failure. Re- 
gardless of whether special insolvency proceedings always produce 
positive benefits that ordinary federal bankruptcy proceedings do not, 
it is definitely probable that they are less costly and less cumbersome. 
Quasi-governmental sources of liquidity pose considerations that are 
similar to those suggested by the BUFs. Depository-type financial 
intermediaries can be told by regulators how to manage their liquidity 
needs so as to avoid a liquidity crisis, with varying degrees of speci- 
ficity and at varying costs. But at some point it becomes more efficient 
to cope with residual risks by pooling rather than by increasing the 
cost of preventing a liquidity crisis at each individual institution. From 
one perspective the Federal Reserve Banks and the Federal Home Loan 
Banks are a pooled source of liquidity for institutions. Even more than 
the insurance funds, however, these banks, in their role as lenders of 
last resort, serve functions other than protection of public suppliers of 
capital. Liquidity crises can be quite widespread. The Federal Reserve 
Banks stand ready to prevent perturbations in the money supply, 
which could multiply in their impact and have serious and widespread 
macroeconomic consequences. The Federal Home Loan Banks can 
also be seen as serving a similar function, if a -more expansive view of 
monetary aggregates is taken.284 The latter also help to maintain a 
flow of funds to the housing sector during tight money periods. Neither 
of these goals should be regarded as an undesirable ulterior end. 
4. Summary 
Reactive regulation, as exemplified in the BUFs, surpasses the other 
strategies in the scope, level, and certainty of the protection of public 
suppliers of capital that it provides. Furthermore, it generates only 
284. See note 77 supra. 
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low or moderate enforcement and secondary formulation costs. Upon 
analysis, its possible misallocative effects and unfair treatment of some 
persons appear not to be serious. Probably an ideal mix of strategies 
would be approached by substantially curtailing anticompetitive and 
portfolio regulation, and dealing with the resulting increases in failures 
through reactive regulation. 
Conclusion 
Perhaps only my conclusion about portfolio regulation is really 
surprising. Abolition of anticompetitive regulation, though a displeas- 
ing prospect to certain interests affected by regulation, is certainly not 
a recommendation foreign to study commissions and academic com- 
mentators.285 In view of the role of insider abuses in some of the more 
spectacular failures of financial intermediaries, continued pursuit of 
insider misconduct regulation seems desirable. Increased emphasis on 
reactive regulation is also consistent with elements of received learn- 
ing, which generally treats deposit insurance as one of the happier 
regulatory ventures launched during the Depression. Surggestin, a 
substantial reduction in the energy channeled into portfolio regulation 
may, however, sound a discordant note in view of occasional reports 
in the media about sophisticated early warning and surveillance sys- 
tems.286 Much of this article has been aimed at justifying a rather 
negative assessment of that strategy. 
Exactly how lawmakers and regulators should withdraw from the 
addictive charms of portfolio regulation is a difficult question. The 
most obvious focus of change is the examination process. Of course, 
this study has not explored whether periodic examinations of financial 
intermediaries might be justified on a cost-benefit basis when all of the 
goals of these examinations, including those not pertaining to sound- 
ness, are taken into account. But assuming that we can satisfy ourselves 
as to a negative outcome in that reckoning-as I suspect we could-then 
radical changes are called for. The number of bank and insurance 
company examiners could be greatly reduced. Regular examinations 
of all regulated intermediaries could be replaced by a system of special 
investigations of some intermediaries upon the happening of specific 
triggering events or suspicions. Such investigations as do occur would 
285. See, e.g., REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON FINANCIAL STRUCTURE AND 
REGULATION (1971). 
286. The Comptroller of the Currency's national bank surveillance system (which is 
now in operation) has recently received favorable mention as the "most advanced" of 
the systems for spotting bank problems. Ailing banks are hard to spot, Bus. WEEK, Nov. 
8, 1976, at 108. Note, however, the theme of the article as reflected in its title. 
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focus on detection of suspected problems and on the adequacy of the 
institution's system of internal control and monitoring, rather than on 
a routine review of asset quality and compliance with financial ratios. 
A second line of attack would be to broaden the powers of all financial 
intermediaries with respect to permissible investments, liabilities, and 
balance-sheet characteristics. Even the experiment of permitting banks, 
thrift institutions, and insurance companies to invest in any kinds of 
financial assets in any proportions should be seriously considered.287 
At the same time, substantially greater resources should be devoted to 
empirical research on the application of portfolio theory to financial 
intermediaries and to the discovery of financial attributes that predict 
failures and can be manipulated effectively without the generation of 
substantial indirect costs and enforcement costs. 
This inquiry has been principally an attempt to produce extremely 
rough generalizations about the costs and benefits of the four strategies 
of risk regulation. It has only occasionally dealt with the question of 
the distribution of costs, which would warrant a major effort in its own 
right. Soundness is a good. It is not free. To the extent that regulation 
produces it, someone pays. As a rough first guess, anticompetitive 
regulation seems to impose costs principally on customers of inter- 
mediaries and their public suppliers of capital. Portfolio regulation 
seems to impose its costs, at least initially, on elite suppliers of capital 
-the stockholders of financial intermediaries. Insider misconduct 
regulation burdens both bad and good insiders-directors, officers, and 
controlling shareholders-who often comprise a subset of elite suppliers 
of capital. Reactive regulation imposes costs on intermediaries as en- 
tities. Who the ultimate cost bearers are may be a question as elusive 
and arguable as the much-debated problem of the incidence of the 
corporate income tax, but one suspects that the costs are substantially 
passed on to public suppliers of capital. 
Nevertheless, it is not unrealistic to believe that, within limits, im- 
plementations of any of the four strategies could be designed so as to 
have costs fall where it is thought that they ought to fall. In any event, 
if the cost of soundness ought to be spread among the protected class, 
the public suppliers of capital-as I think they should-then it should 
not be difficult to modify reactive regulation so as to achieve more 
certainly that result. That done, giving- the palm to the fourth strategy 
will honor equity as it serves efficiency. 
287. To the extent that freeing up asset restraints impairs the attainment of goals 
other than soundness, such as subsidizing home purchases, corrective adjustments in other 
laws may have to be made. For example, bigger tax breaks for home buyers might be 
enacted. 
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